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for competition policy 
Competition policy is relevant not only for those 
in business and their advisers, but also for the cit-
izens of Europe, who need to have an overall 
view of how competition policy is implemented 
and its relevance to improving their daily lives. 
One of the essential roles of competition is to pro-
mote innovation and ensure that goods and ser-
vices are produced as efficiently as possible and 
that these efficiencies are benefiting consumers 
in the form of lower prices or improvements in 
quality, choice or services. For example, during 
the period 1997-99, residential tariffs for inter-
national calls fell, on average, by 40 % in most 
Member States. The introduction of competition 
to this sector resulted not only in a reduction in 
prices but also gave rise to a considerable 
increase in the supply of new and efficient ser-
vices and products. 
Another role is to ensure that markets are suffi-
ciently competitive in order to keep up with glob-
alisation, and to support employment. For exam-
ple, State aid control helps to foster structural 
change and thereby contributes to the develop-
ment of competitive and innovative industry 
structures, which safeguard the creation of new 
jobs. Without competition the driving forces 
behind growth and employment would be lost. It 
is therefore of the utmost importance that the 
competition rules be clear, transparent, and effi-
ciently enforced. But competition rules must also 
keep up with the pace of economic and techno-
logical development in the 21st century. 
This year, I would therefore like to put the spot-
light on the need to modernise Community com-
petition law, both in the area of antitrust, where the 
actions of companies may distort competition, 
and in the area of State aid, where the actions of 
Member States may produce similar effects. 
Reform in the field of vertical restraints 
In 1999, new competition rules in the field of ver-
tical restraints were established. This follows a 
thorough policy review and an extensive consul-
tation exercise, which commenced in 1997 with 
the publication of the Commission's Green Paper 
on vertical restraints. The reform of the Commis-
sion's policy in the area of vertical restraints rep-
resents an important pillar in the overall reform 
process. This review exercise resulted in the 
reaching of a consensus in favour of an approach 
which focuses on economic analysis, with verti-
cal restraints being assessed in terms of their 
impact on the market and not of their form. Such 
a consensus has major implications for review of 
policy in other areas. 
This is a policy area where the need for reform 
was widely acknowledged. In fact, the block 
exemption regulations concerning certain types 
of distribution agreement had been criticised in 
recent years for being too narrow in scope and 
over-formalistic in their approach and for impos-
ing a straitjacket on industry which was incom-
patible with the evolution of production and dis-
tribution methods. The Commission's reform is 
aimed at simplifying the rules and reducing the 
regulatory burden for companies, especially 
companies lacking market power like SMEs, 
while ensuring a more effective control of verti-
cal restraints implemented by companies holding 
significant market power. 
The Council agreed with the Commission's plans 
for reform in June 1999 when it adopted Regula-
tion (EC) No 1215/1999 broadening the legisla-
tive powers of the Commission in the field of ver-
tical restraints. On the basis of these new powers, 
the Commission adopted, in December, a new 
Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 exempting cer-
tain categories of vertical agreements and con-
certed practices from the prohibition of restric-
tive agreements in Article 81. This new block 
exemption regulation has a wide scope as it cov-
ers all vertical restraints concerning final or inter-
mediate products as well as services, with the 
exception of a limited number of 'hardcore' 
restrictions and conditions. Its principal objective is to allow undertakings which have no signifi-
cant market power to benefit from a safe haven 
within which they are no longer obliged to assess 
the validity of their agreements under the Com-
munity competition rules. In order to link the 
granting of exemption to the market power of the 
undertakings in question, the block exemption 
uses a market share threshold set at 30 %. Above 
this threshold, the block exemption does not 
apply. Agreements that are not covered by the 
block exemption are not presumed to be illegal 
but require an individual examination under Arti-
cle 81. In order to assist undertakings in carrying 
out such an examination, and thus to increase the 
effectiveness of the competition rules, the Com-
mission published in September the draft of a set 
of guidelines which is currently subject to public 
consultation and which we hope will be adopted 
in the first half of 2000. 
Another important element of this reform was 
introduced by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1216/1999 whereby all vertical agreements 
have been dispensed from the requirement of 
prior notification provided for by Article 4(2) of 
Regulation No 17. This change makes it possible 
to backdate an exemption for individual vertical 
agreements to the date on which they were con-
cluded and not, as in the past, to the date of their 
notification. Such a possibility for retroactive 
exemption is necessary to cover agreements 
which, while falling outside the new block 
exemption, may fulfil the conditions for individ-
ual exemption under Article 81(3). 
By ensuring a wider coverage of such agreements 
in a single block exemption, the new rules will re-
store the freedom to contract for most companies, 
while allowing the Commission to concentrate 
more on important cases which raise serious com-
petition issues and affect the interests of consumers. 
Modernisation of antitrust rules (Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty) 
1999 saw the intensification of the debate on the 
reform of the procedural rules in the area of 
antitrust with the publication by the Commission 
of a White Paper on modernisation of the proce-
dural rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty. This document proposes a funda-
mental reform of Regulation No 17, the proce-
dural regulation which has been in place since 
1962. It is designed to stimulate discussion 
between the Commission and interested parties. 
Many contributions, mostly of a very high qual-
ity, have been received by the Commission. 
The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 
this matter on 18 January 2000, following the 
report made by Mr Karl von Wogau. The resolu-
tion emphasises the urgent need for reform in 
view of the shortcomings of the existing system 
and the important changes that have taken place 
in the real economic world. It welcomes the 
Commission's proposal and supports in principle 
the main points in the White Paper, namely the 
abolition of the notification and authorisation 
system under Article 81 of the Treaty and decen-
tralised implementation of competition rules by 
enhancing the role of the authorities and courts of 
the Member States, as this could do much to bol-
ster the European 'culture of competition'. 
The Economic and Social Committee adopted an 
opinion on 8 December 1999. This opinion also 
supports the Commission's proposal, saying that it 
will benefit industry and in particular SMEs. How-
ever, it sets out a number of measures that it consid-
ers should be taken prior to the implementation of 
the reform. These measures include direct consulta-
tion of courts, training and otherforms of assistance 
to national courts and measures to address the issue 
of forum shopping. The Committee also stresses 
that harmonisation of the national procedural rules 
would be desirable in order to promote consistent 
application of substantive rules. 
The White Paper proposes a reform based on 
abolition of the current system of notification and 
authorisation which will in turn lead to an 
increase in the involvement of national competi-
tion authorities and courts in the application of 
the Community competition rules. The reforms 
proposed in the White Paper are based on two 
principal objectives: first, releasing the Commis-
sion from tasks which are not contributing suffi-
ciently to the efficient enforcement of the com-
petition rules, and second, bringing the deci-
sion-making process closer to citizens. 
Releasing the Commission from tasks 
which are not contributing sufficiently to 
the efficient enforcement of the 
competition rules 
The current system, put in place in the early 
1960s to deal with the difficulties of that period, 
is a system based on authorisation by a cen-FOREWORD BY PROFESSOR MARIO MONTI 
tralised body: agreements restrictive of competi-
tion are automatically void unless notified to the 
Commission, which has sole power to exempt 
them from the competition rules. This system 
facilitated the development of a body of clear, 
structured rules and their coherent application 
throughout the Community. It favoured the set-
ting-up of national competition authorities and 
the adoption of national competition rules mir-
roring those of the Community. However, some 
40 years after the adoption of Regulation No 17, 
the environment in which competition policy 
finds itself has been largely transformed: the 
Community has become a market which is 
strongly integrated, it has also increased in size 
and with future enlargements will soon consist of 
more than 20 Member States. 
In this changed environment it has to be recog-
nised that the system put in place by Regulation 
No 17 has reached its limits. The authorisation 
regime which compels undertakings to notify 
their agreements to the Commission has become 
a bureaucratic constraint which no longer facili-
tates the efficient protection of competition. 
Dealing with notifications prevents the Commis-
sion from focusing on the most serious restric-
tions. It is very rare for such notifications to give 
rise to a prohibition decision; in the last five years 
only 0.5 % of notifications have resulted in the 
adoption of a prohibition decision. This shows 
the lack of relevance of a notification system for 
the efficient enforcement of the competition 
rules. Management of the centralised exemption 
system diverts the Commission from its primary 
mission which is the detection and suppression of 
the most serious infringements, which are never 
notified. In addition, the notification system 
obstructs the full application of the Community 
competition rules by national competition 
authorities and courts. 
It is for these reasons that the White Paper pro-
poses a fundamental reform; namely, the replace-
ment of the current system based on prior autho-
risation by one based on subsequent suppression 
of possible infringements. This will allow the 
Commission to refocus on those infringements 
which are never notified and which are the most 
harmful for European consumers and the Euro-
pean economy. Such a reform would increase the 
efficiency of control in at least two respects. 
First, by increasing the probability that those 
responsible for infringements will be identified 
and fined, the reform would reinforce the dissua-
sive effects of the competition rules. Secondly, a 
growing involvement of national competition 
authorities and courts in the application and 
enforcement of Community competition rules 
should greatly improve the detection of the most 
harmful infringements and the overall effective-
ness of competition policy. In fact, national com-
petition authorities, being closer to local markets, 
are generally in a better position to both detect 
and suppress the more serious infringements of 
the Community competition rules. Moreover, 
national courts can, where appropriate, award 
damages, grant interim measures or even order 
the performance of contracts. 
Bringing the decision-making process 
closer to citizens 
In a Community of 15 Member States with 
strongly integrated economies, the application of 
the full range of competition rules should no 
longer be confined to one body, not only for the 
reasons associated with efficiency outlined 
above, but also to ensure that the citizens of 
Europe view competition policy in a positive 
manner and recognise it as playing an important 
role in their daily lives. The protection of the 
interests of consumers, and therefore of Euro-
pean citizens, is at the heart of Community com-
petition policy. However, this is not always the 
public perception. By permitting consumers to 
address national competition authorities and 
courts who have the power to apply the full range 
of EC competition rules we will go a long way 
towards improving the perception which Euro-
pean citizens have of competition policy and of 
its benefits for them. 
Follow-up to the White Paper 
While the White Paper contains a reasoned 
choice in favour of a particular option, its pri-
mary purpose is to serve as a basis for discussion. 
Since it was published a number of round tables 
have been organised with associations of under-
takings and lawyers, and a working group involv-
ing the representatives of the Member States has 
been set up. The Commission has received over 
100 written observations from Member States, 
associations of undertakings, lawyers and acade-
mics. The European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee have formulated 
opinions on the White Paper. It is only following 
a full and open dialogue with all interested par-ties and on the basis of observations received that 
the follow-up to this White Paper will be pro-
posed by the Commission. 
Mergers 
The merger regulation, itself in force for less than 
10 years, has already been the subject of one 
major review, which led to modifications adopted 
by the Council in June 1997, and implemented in 
March 1998. Therefore 1999 was the first full 
year in which jurisdictional and other modifica-
tions have been applied. The Commission will be 
reporting to the Council on the thresholds in 
2000. Meanwhile, the main task of the Commis-
sion this year has been to ensure the proper appli-
cation of the regulation to the ever-increasing 
number, size and complexity of mergers notified 
toit. 
Single market and State aid 
State aid may cause distortions of trade and com-
petition that are not acceptable in a common mar-
ket. State aid control policy therefore contributes 
to the efficient operation of the single market. In 
order to allow the single market to generate sus-
tainable growth and higher employment, State 
aid control policy will require continual review. I 
am personally convinced that there is still room 
to reduce current levels of State aid in all sectors 
of the economy. The Commission has made clear 
in several decisions that it is increasingly review-
ing Member States' financial relations with 
industry in whatever form and in areas which so 
far have not been tackled extensively enough. In 
this context I want to mention the sectors of pub-
lic banking and broadcasting. Furthermore, we 
will be putting the focus on fiscal measures. I 
have instructed my staff to step up their actions in 
this field, particularly in the light of the Commu-
nity's 'code of conduct'. At this stage, my staff 
are investigating whether certain tax measures 
constitute State aid. 
The sharpening-up of State aid control, rightly 
called for by the European Parliament, is behind 
the Commission's modernisation drive and its 
wish to increase the efficiency of State aid proce-
dures. As in the area of antitrust, it is important 
that the efficiency of State aid procedures be 
improved. Several initiatives during the year 
under review have contributed to this aim. The 
procedural regulation that was adopted by the 
Council in March 1999 paves the way for this 
purpose. Not only does it codify the procedures 
based on Commission practice and the Court of 
Justice's case law, but it will also enable the 
Commission to intensify its monitoring of aid. 
The Commission may now require the immediate 
provisional recovery of non-notified aid, pending 
its decision on the compatibility of such aid with 
the Treaty. It also may undertake on-site moni-
toring to check on compliance with its decisions. 
The regulation will speed up procedures by set-
ting time limits within which the Commission 
has to close formal investigation proceedings. We 
are discussing with Member States, in the newly 
created advisory committee on State aid, the 
forthcoming block exemption regulations. 
Another important element to be included in the 
current review of State aid control policy is trans-
parency. Transparency and the concomitant 
availability of further, improved information on 
the implementation of State aid policies are 
essential for the Commission to base its deci-
sion-making process and future policies upon 
solid economic foundations. Increased trans-
parency is also necessary to raise awareness in 
Member States of the necessity for strict State aid 
control. Increased information to the public will, 
moreover, encourage peer pressure on Member 
States to reduce State aid volumes. 
My staff are therefore examining how trans-
parency can be increased and made more effec-
tive. The feasibility of a State aid register and 
scoreboard is, for example, being considered. 
The register would contain factual information 
on all State aid decisions, whilst the scoreboard 
would provide guidance to the Member States on 
how to evaluate more accurately the cost/benefit 
consequences of their State aid policies. The 
annual survey on State aid in the EU will also 
continue to be improved and will provide a more 
detailed assessment of State aid expenditure. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Com-
mission is willing to adapt and improve the legal 
framework of European competition policy. 
While an important step has been taken with the 
adoption of a new policy in the area of vertical 
restraints, we must continue to modernise our 
competition and State aid rules so as to ensure 
their effectiveness in both the current and fore-FOREWORD BY PROFESSOR MARIO MONTI 
seeable economic and legal environment, partic-
ularly in the light of pending enlargement. In 
doing so we will better serve the objectives of the 
Treaty, which, in particular, requires the mainte-
nance of a system ensuring that competition in 
the internal market is not distorted. 
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ƒ. On 1 January, 11 Member States adopted the 
euro as their common currency. The changeover 
took place smoothly and the new currency 
rapidly became established on the financial mar-
kets. Competition policy contributed to this 
process by continuing the drive to modernise 
Community competition law and by pursuing the 
two principal objectives that underlie its 
approach. 
2. The first objective of competition policy is 
the maintenance of competitive markets. Compe-
tition policy serves as an instrument to encourage 
industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of 
resources, technical progress and the flexibility 
to adjust to a changing environment. In order for 
the Community to be competitive on worldwide 
markets, it needs a competitive home market. 
Thus, the Community's competition policy has 
always taken a very strong line against price-fix-
ing, market-sharing cartels, abuses of dominant 
positions, and anticompetitive mergers. It has 
also prohibited unjustified State-granted monop-
oly rights and State aid measures which do not 
ensure the long-term viability of firms but distort 
competition by keeping them artificially in busi-
ness. 
3. The second is the single market objective. An 
internal market is an essential condition for the 
development of an efficient and competitive 
industry. As the Community has progressively 
broken down government-erected trade barriers 
between Member States, companies operating in 
what they had regarded as 'their' national mar-
kets were, and are for the first time, exposed to 
competitors able to compete on a level playing 
field. There are two possible reactions to this: 
either to seek to compete on merit, looking to 
expand into other territories and benefit from the 
opportunities offered by a single market, or to 
erect private barriers to trade — to retrench and 
act defensively — in the hope of preventing mar-
ket penetration. The Commission has used its 
competition policy as an active tool to prevent 
this, prohibiting, and fining heavily the parties to 
two main types of agreement: distribution and 
licensing agreements that prevent parallel trade 
between Member States, and agreements 
between competitors to keep out of one another's 
'territories'. Moreover, the objectives of compe-
tition policy have been integrated into the Com-
mission's new strategy for the European single 
market adopted on 24 November. The aim is to 
prevent anticompetitive practices from under-
mining the single market's achievements. 
4. The implementation of these two principal 
objectives and the drive to modernise Commu-
nity competition rules are described in some 
detail in this report. 
5. In the context of enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union it should be noted that the Helsinki 
European Council decided that considerable 
progress had been made in the accession negoti-
ations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In 1999, 
progress has also been made by candidate coun-
tries in the preparation or adoption of new com-
petition laws, or the amendment of existing laws, 
in order to further align these with Community 
law. This progress is described in the interna-
tional section of this report, together with devel-
opments in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
6. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam came into 
force on 1 May 1999. This Treaty reaffirmed the 
Commission's role as the authority responsible 
for enforcing the competition rules, and the com-
patibility of the principles of free competition 
and services of general economic interest ('). It 
also provided, inter alia, for the renumbering of 
the Treaty provisions concerning competition. 
For the facility of readers, corresponding old and 
new numbers of the relevant Treaty provisions 
are listed in a table at the beginning of this report. 
7.. Competition policy is well known among the 
business community, the Member States and 
public authorities. The maintenance of open and 
competitive markets is generally considered one 
of the most important policy objectives of the 
EU. None the less, and in spite of its successes, 
competition policy is not so well known among 
EU citizens and most of them are unaware of the 
positive impact competition policy has on them 
as consumers of goods and users of public and 
private services. The Commission therefore 
wants to explain more clearly action taken in the 
field of competition policy to EU citizens. As a 
result of these efforts, it is hoped that the Com-
mission will gain their support. The Commission 
has already adopted a series of measures in pur-
suit of this objective such as the development of 
an information policy aimed at the general public 
(see Boxes 1 and 3 below). 
(') 1997 Competition Report, points 2 to 7.  13 Statistics on Commission activity in 
applying Community competition laws in 
1999 
As in previous years there was intense activity in 
all areas within the Commission's sphere of com-
petence. In 1999, the total number of new cases 
was 1 201, comprising 388 antitrust cases (under 
Articles 81, 82, and 86), 301 merger cases (') and 
512 State aid cases. Comparable figures for 1998 
were a total of 1 198 new cases, comprising 509 
antitrust cases, 245 merger cases (
2) and 444 State 
aid cases. While the total number of new cases re-
mains stable compared with 1998 (1 201 as 
against 1 198), increases in the number of merger 
cases (301 against 245) and State aid cases (512 
against 444) were offset by a reduction in the num-
ber of antitrust cases (388 against 509). The total 
number of cases closed was 1 273, comprising 582 
antitrust cases, 279 merger cases, and 412 State 
aid cases. Comparable figures for 1998 were 1289 
cases closed, comprising 581 antitrust cases, 248 
merger cases and 460 State aid cases. A more 
telling indicator is the increase in the number of 
formal decisions which are particularly resource-
intensive (20 Phase II merger proceedings, as op-
posed to 12in 1998 and 11 in 1997; 68 antitrust de-
cisions, as opposed to 42 in 1998 and 27 in 1997; 
and 66 State aid decisions following the initiation 
of a formal investigation procedure, as opposed to 
61 in 1998and32in 1997). This demonstrates that 
the work output in 1999 was at an even higher lev-
el than that of the previous year. 
In the antitrust sphere there were two notable fea-
tures. The first was an increase in the number of 
cases closed by way of formal decision (68 
against 42 in 1998). Secondly, there was a drop in 
the number of new cases (388 against 509 in 
1998). New cases comprise notifications (162 in 
1999 against 216 in 1998), complaints (149 in 
1999 against 192 in 1998) and ex officio pro-
ceedings (77 in 1999 against 101 in 1998). 
The reduction in the number of notifications can 
probably be partly attributed to the 1997 notice on 
agreements of minor importance. This trend was 
first noted in last year's annual report. It can also 
probably be attributed to companies anticipating 
the Commission's reforms in the area of vertical 
restraints, with the publication in 1998 of a com-
munication setting out the Commission's propos-
als for reform in this field. The reduction in the 
number of complaints can probably be explained 
by sectoral factors. For example, in 1999 the Com-
mission exempted the standard pub leases of the 
three largest brewers in the UK, Whitbread, Bass 
and S&N. This sector had heretofore given rise to 
numerous complaints on the part of tenants tied to 
brewers (
3). This is also evidenced by the fact that 
over the years there have been wide fluctuations in 
the number of complaints (177 in 1997, 159 in 
1996,114 in 1995,170 in 1994, and 110 in 1993). 
It is therefore too soon to draw any conclusions re-
garding the reduction in the number of complaints 
for 1999. Moreover, some cases which in the past 
may have been dealt with by the Commission are 
now being handled by national authorities. More 
information on this issue is to be found below in 
Box 2 on cooperation with national authorities. 
The reduction in the number of ex officio proceed-
ings can be explained by the fact that 1997 and 
1998 were record years because the Commission 
initiated a number of ex officio proceedings in the 
run-up to liberalisation in the télécoms sector on 1 
January 1998. 
In 1999, 292 (
4) cases were notified under the 
merger regulation compared with 235 in 1998. 
The Commission took a decision in 270 cases 
compared with 238 in 1998. Moreover, in 1999 
the Commission found it necessary to initiate the 
second stage of examination ('Phase II proceed-
ings') in respect of 20 planned operations, as 
opposed to 12 in 1998. A total of eight cases 
where Phase II proceedings were initiated were 
authorised subject to conditions, one was for-
mally prohibited, five were withdrawn and nine 
were carried over to 2000. The main factors 
underlying the current merger wave are the glob-
alisation of markets, the introduction of the euro, 
the completion of the single market and the forth-
coming enlargement. These factors will continue 
to generate high levels of merger activity in 
Europe for the foreseeable future. 
While there was a slight drop in the number of 
Commission decisions in the area of State aid, 
14  (') Including nine ECSC mergers. 
(
2) Including 10 ECSC mergers. 
(
3) While there were no 'beer* complaints in 1999, 19 cases were 
opened for beer complaints in 1998, and 22 in 1997. 
(
4) Changes to the merger regulation, which came into force in 1998, 
brought within its scope a number of joint venture cases which 
would formerly have been examined under Regulation No 17. 
Such joint venture cases falling within the scope of the new Arti-
cle 2(4) of the merger regulation have also to be assessed in accor-
dance with the criteria of Article 81 and. therefore, are mostly dealt 
with by the antitrust directorates rather than the merger task force. 
In 1999 there were 15 decisions pursuant to Article 2(4) of the 
merger regulation (joint venture cases). INTRODUCTION 
there was an increase in the number of decisions in 1999 compared with 61 in 1998 and 32 in 
made following the initiation of a formal inves- 1997). Such decisions are extremely 
tigation procedure (there were 66 such decisions resource-intensive. 
Box 1: EU citizens and competition policy 
EU competition policy is widely known and appreciated in the business community and among public au-
thorities, at both national and international level. In these circles competition policy is often perceived as one 
of the most important of the policies pursued by the European Commission. But it is not seen in the same way 
by the public at large: most people are unaware of what competition policy can do for them and the benefits it 
can bring. Very often the Commission's competition policy is mentioned in connection with the decision to 
stop a merger or to refuse State aid to a company. This sort of information can generate misunderstanding and 
apprehension among the public, orat best a measure of indifference. Until now, the citizens of the Union have 
not been clearly informed of what the Commission is called upon to do and what it has done in competition 
policy, or of the importance of competition policy for the working of the economy as a whole. 
Many citizens do not realise that competition policy is a powerful and effective tool for protecting their 
interests as consumers, users of services, workers and taxpayers. If they were conscious of these things, it 
is likely that they would provide the Commission with strong political support in this area. The Commis-
sion departments could take advantage of the day-to-day contact that consumers have with markets. The 
experience of consumers and consumers' associations could be of great assistance in identifying and eval-
uating possible anticompetitive practices. 
The Commission must therefore set about explaining its competition policy more clearly to the man or 
woman in the street. There are different ways of achieving this, different channels that can be used and dif-
ferent groups to aim at. One way is to involve economic, social and trade organisations and associations. 
The Commission has already adopted a series of measures in pursuit of this objective. It has developed an 
information policy aimed at the general public, distributing a wide variety of documentation and indeed 
making it available on the Internet; this includes such things as the Competition Policy Newsletter, the 
annual Competition Reports, and the list of prices in the motor trade. On the basis of complaints lodged by 
consumers the Commission has taken the step of initiating antitrust proceedings, as it did in Volkswagen 
for example, a case to which it gave wide publicity. 
Nevertheless, communication with the citizens of the Union can be improved further. The Commission 
intends to take the following approach. 
— First, for every single decision taken as part of competition policy the question should be asked what spe-
cific advantage there may be for the citizen, and especially the consumer. The Commission will seek to 
reflect this concern in every press release, in every decision, and in the annual Competition Report. 
— Secondly, the Commission intends to treat consumers not merely as people who benefit as a result of com-
petition policy but also as promoters of competition policy. As has already been pointed out, consumers 
and consumers' organisations can be of great help in identifying anticompetitive practices. If the Com-
mission is able to show clearly that it can resolve competition questions that concern consumers more di-
rectly, it will be better understood. The Volkswagen case is still too isolated. The Commission intends to 
step up relations with consumers' organisations and more generally with the citizens of the Union. 
— Lastly, the Commission is considering the advisability of organising meetings of various kinds with 
the citizens of the Union. One possibility would be an annual meeting with consumers' organisations. 
Here the Commission would have the opportunity of presenting and explaining its own policy. Another 
possibility would be 'competition conferences' to be held in the Member States. These meetings could 
be held once or twice a year in the country chairing the Council at the time. Through occasions of this 
kind it should be easier to reach national associations of consumers, trade associations, companies, 
national competition authorities and so on. 
• 
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A — Modernisation of the legislative 
and interpretative rules 
1. New Commission competition rules in 
the field of vertical restraints 
8. On 22 December, the Commission adopted 
Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the applica-
tion of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices (')· 
This regulation replaces three existing regula-
tions, one on exclusive distribution, one on 
exclusive purchasing and one on franchise agree-
ments (
2), whose period of validity expired on 31 
December. 
9. The new regulation is the result of an 
in-depth policy review which the Commission 
launched in 1997 with the publication of a Green 
Paper on the application of Article 81 of the 
Treaty to vertical agreements (
3). The Green 
Paper generated wide public debate. Comments 
made by Member States, the European Parlia-
ment, the Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and interested parties 
were generally in favour of a reform of Commu-
nity competition policy in the field of vertical 
restraints. The Commission subsequently set out 
the framework for the proposed policy reform in 
its communication on the application of EC com-
petition rules to vertical restraints (
4) of 30 Sep-
tember 1998 and, at the same time, it submitted 
two proposals for regulations to the Council for 
the amendment of: 
— Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 
March 1965 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices (
5), in 
order to extend the Commission's delegated 
legislative powers, and 
— Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 
1962, first regulation implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty (
6), in order to extend 
to all vertical agreements the dispensation 
C) OJL336, 29.12.1999. 
(
2) Respectively Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 (OJ L 173.30.6.1983) 
and Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 (OJ L 173, 30.6.1983), pro-
longed by Regulation (EC) No 1582/97 (OJ L 214,6.8.1997), and 
Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 (OJ L359, 28.12.1988). 
(') COM(96)72I final. 
(
4) COM( 1998) 544 final. 
(') OJ 36, 6.3.1965. 
(') OJ 13.21.2.1962. 
from prior notification provided for by Arti-
cle 4(2) ofthat regulation. 
10. On 10 June, the Council adopted the 
Commission's proposals as Regulation 
(EC) No 1215/1999 (
7) amending Regulation 
19/65/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 1216/1999 (
7) 
amending Regulation No 17. 
11. The new block exemption regulation, Regu-
lation (EC) No 2790/1999, will effect a shift from 
the traditional policy, which relied largely on for-
malistic assessment criteria, towards an approach 
which focuses more on the economic effects of 
vertical agreements. The basic aim of this new 
approach is to simplify the rules applicable to 
vertical restraints and to reduce the regulatory 
burden for companies, while ensuring a more 
effective control of agreements entered into by 
companies holding significant market power. 
12. In sum, the new policy is based on a single 
Commission regulation, with a wide scope, 
which block-exempts, up to a market-share 
threshold of 30 % and subject to a limited num-
ber of 'hardcore' restrictions and conditions, all 
agreements or concerted practices between two 
or more undertakings, each of which operates at 
a different level of the production or distribution 
chain, where such agreements or practices relate 
to the conditions under which the parties may 
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services. 
This includes agreements concluded by retailers' 
associations, on condition that none of the mem-
bers has a turnover of more than EUR 50 million, 
and certain non-reciprocal vertical agreements 
concluded between competing undertakings. 
13. A single market share threshold of 30 % lim-
its the scope of the block exemption. The regula-
tion contains specific provisions intended to 
ensure flexible application of the market-share 
threshold in cases where it is temporarily 
exceeded. This increases legal certainty for the 
undertakings concerned. Above the 30 % thresh-
old, agreements are not presumed to be illegal but 
require individual examination. In order to assist 
undertakings in carrying out such an examina-
tion, the Commission plans to adopt a set of 
guidelines during the first half of 2000. A draft of 
these guidelines was published on 24 September 
and is currently subject to public consultation (
K). 
(
7) OJL 148, 15.6.1999. 
(") OJC 270, 24.9.1999.  17 18 
14. The regulation relies on a 'blacklist' of 
clauses, that is, on a list of restrictions which can-
not benefit from the block exemption. This list of 
'hardcore' restrictions includes resale price main-
tenance, whether in the form of fixed or mini-
mum prices, and certain types of territorial or 
customer restriction. To a large extent, it codifies 
current case law. 
15. The application of the block exemption is 
also subject to a limited number of conditions, 
the most important of which concerns non-com-
pete obligations, i.e. arrangements preventing the 
buyer from manufacturing, purchasing, selling or 
reselling competing goods or services. Bearing in 
mind the potential risks of market foreclosure 
associated with this type of restraint, non-com-
pete obligations are covered by the new regula-
tion in so far as their duration does not exceed 
five years. However, this rule is subject to certain 
exceptions. For example, in the regulation it is 
indicated that this time limit does not apply when 
the products are sold from premises owned or 
leased by the supplier. Moreover, in the guide-
lines, it will be explained which other situations 
may justify a longer duration (e.g. transfer of 
know-how and long-term investments, especially 
when sunk or brand specific). 
16. Under the regulation, it is also possible for the 
benefits of the block exemption to be withdrawn. 
This is a mechanism which is intended to be used 
in situations where, below the market share 
threshold of 30 %, a vertical agreement does not 
have any objective advantages which compensate 
for its negative effects on competition and where, 
for this reason, it does not fulfil all the conditions 
set out in Article 81(3). The withdrawal mecha-
nism is intended, in particular, to protect competi-
tion from the negative consequences resulting 
from the cumulative effect of parallel networks of 
similar agreements put in place by competing sup-
pliers, as well as in cases of buying power. 
17. Moreover, in order to ensure more effective 
supervision and to encourage the decentralised 
application of Community competition rules, the 
new Council enabling regulation allows national 
competition authorities to withdraw the benefit 
of the block exemption where a particular agree-
ment has a negative effect within their national 
territory and where this territory constitutes a dis-
tinct geographic market. 
18. The block exemption regulation also pro-
vides that the Commission may, by regulation 
and without retroactive effect, exclude specific 
vertical restraints from the scope of the block 
exemption in cases involving parallel networks 
of similar vertical agreements covering more 
than 50 % of the relevant market. 
19. Finally, the regulation provides for a transi-
tional period whereby the agreements currently 
covered by the existing block exemption regula-
tions may continue to benefit from the applica-
tion of those regulations until 31 December 2001. 
2. White Paper on modernisation of the 
rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty 
20. On 28 April, the Commission adopted a 
White Paper on modernisation of the rules imple-
menting Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (')· This 
document is the starting point for a wide-ranging 
debate on the reform of Regulation No 17, the 
cornerstone of the system for implementing Arti-
cles 81 and 82, drawn up at the beginning of the 
1960s. 
21. The Treaty of Rome laid down a general ban 
on anticompetitive agreements, tempered with 
the exception in Article 81(3), but left open the 
question of how this exception was to be applied. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, European compe-
tition policy was yet to be developed: only two 
out of six Member States had any competition 
legislation, there was only one real competition 
authority and European law was in an embryonic 
state. The very general wording of Article 81(3) 
and the newness of the prohibition principle 
made it difficult for firms to evaluate the legality 
of their agreements. The Commission, as a young 
institution, needed to be informed about the types 
of agreement which existed and to develop real 
knowledge of the various sectors of the economy. 
22. In those circumstances, a centralised autho-
risation system rapidly became the obvious 
choice. Regulation No 17 set up a system under 
which anticompetitive agreements and practices 
affecting trade between Member States, in order 
to qualify for exemption, have to be notified to 
the Commission, which has exclusive power to 
apply Article 81(3). Subject to the exceptions 
listed exhaustively in Article 4(2) of Regulation 
No 17, the exemption can be applied retroac-
(') COM(1999) 101 final (OJ C 132, 12.5.1999). I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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tively only to the date of notification. Restrictive 
agreements which have not been declared 
exempt are automatically null and void. This sys-
tem enabled the development of a consistent 
body of law and the spread of a 'competition cul-
ture' throughout the Community. Competition 
policy is today rightly perceived as a pillar of 
European integration, a true guardian of the sin-
gle market. 
A necessary reform 
23. Despite successive enlargements of the 
Community and the establishment of credible 
competition authorities in all the Member States, 
the system set in place at the beginning of the 
1960s has not undergone any substantial changes 
to date. The Regulation No 17 system today has 
two main shortcomings: it no longer ensures 
effective surveillance and it constitutes an exces-
sive bureaucratic constraint for firms. 
24. In a Community of 15 Member States, cen-
tralised surveillance cannot ensure that competi-
tion is effectively safeguarded. The growing inte-
gration of Europe's economies has considerably 
widened the scope of Community law and with it 
the Commission's powers. The latter's monopoly 
on the application of Article 81(3) blocks decen-
tralised application by both courts and competi-
tion authorities and leaves the Commission as the 
sole real guarantor of compliance with the com-
petition rules. This situation is all the more wor-
rying as around half of all cases handled by the 
Commission start as notifications. However, 
notifications no longer bring to the Commis-
sion's attention the important competition cases. 
The figures are telling: in 35 years, the Commis-
sion has been informed by notification of agree-
ments justifying a prohibition decision in only 
nine cases. While the Commission is giving its 
attention to analysing these notified agreements, 
it is unable to investigate properly the complaints 
it receives and to conduct the necessary own-ini-
tiative proceedings against the most serious 
infringements, which are never notified. 
25. The second shortcoming of the current sys-
tem is the bureaucracy that it generates and the 
insufficient legal certainty with which it provides 
firms. Unlike the merger regulation, Regulation 
No 17 does not lay down any real obligation to 
notify although it contains a strong incentive to 
firms to do so. Notifications generate major 
costs, whether they are made by the firms them-
selves or via specialised lawyers. The procedure 
set out in Regulation No 17 rapidly proved too 
cumbersome to be followed systematically. 
Under the regulation, each time a restrictive prac-
tice is notified to it, the Commission should 
examine the case, publish a notice in the Official 
Journal in the 11 languages to allow third parties 
to submit their comments, present a draft deci-
sion to the advisory committee and lastly, adopt 
the decision and publish it in all the languages. 
Given the large number of cases, the Commission 
quickly came to reserve this complex procedure 
for the most important ones, adopting on average 
less than 10 or so formal decisions each year. 
More than 90 % of cases are closed informally, in 
particular by sending 'comfort letters'. These let-
ters merely constitute a factor which the courts 
may take into account and are preceded only 
rarely by the publication in the Official Journal of 
a notice giving third parties the opportunity to 
submit their comments (in 1997, seven publica-
tions under Article 19(3) for 210 comfort letters, 
i.e. 3 % of cases): the system's transparency is 
thus limited. 
26. While Regulation No 17 has allowed the 
development of a complete corpus of coherent 
rules, it is no longer appropriate in Europe at the 
start of the 21st century. The procedures it laid 
down have proved to be impracticable. Reform is 
needed, all the more so since competition policy 
will face two major challenges in the immediate 
future: enlargement to include new member 
countries and the increasing globalisation of 
Europe's economies. 
27. Today there is broad consensus on the need 
to reform Regulation No 17 and on the objectives 
that the reform must pursue, namely the effec-
tiveness of competition policy and the simplifi-
cation of administrative supervision. Since the 
1980s, numerous proposals for reform have been 
made by the Member States as well as by acade-
mics and practitioners. Some of the proposals 
have been confined to minor adjustments to the 
Regulation No 17 system, while others have 
entailed a thorough overhaul and a sharing of the 
power to grant exemptions between the Commis-
sion and the national competition authorities. 
28. After conducting a thorough analysis of 
these various options, the Commission con-
cluded that minor adjustments to the current sys-
tem were not sufficient to ensure effective appli-
cation of the competition rules in an enlarged  19 20 
Community and that the option of decentralising 
notifications to the national authorities was more 
risky than it was advantageous. The White Paper 
therefore takes a clear stance in favour of another 
option: the adoption of a directly applicable 
exception system. 
29. This option consists in abolishing the autho-
risation arrangements and the notification system 
which is their corollary. Under a directly applic-
able exception system, Article 81(3), like Articles 
81(1) and 82, could be applied not only by the 
Commission but also by any national authority or 
court. Article 81 would become, like Article 82, 
a unitary prohibition. Anticompetitive practices 
which affected trade between Member States, i.e. 
those caught by Article 81(1), would be lawful ab 
initio if they met the conditions laid down in Arti-
cle 81(3). No procedure for authorisation by an 
administrative authority, and hence no notifica-
tion, would then be necessary. The Commission 
takes the view that adopting a directly applicable 
exception system would enable it to safeguard 
competition more effectively and to simplify 
administrative supervision, thus meeting the 
requirements of Article 83 of the Treaty. 
More effective application of the 
Community competition rules 
30. Adopting a directly applicable exception 
system would improve the protection of compe-
tition in two ways: it would enable effective 
decentralisation of the application of the rules 
and it would make it easier for the Commission 
to refocus its work on restrictions that are really 
detrimental to competition. 
31. The reform proposed in the White Paper 
would improve the protection of competition by 
facilitating effective decentralised application 
not only by national authorities but also by 
national courts. In an enlarged Community, 
effective protection of competition requires the 
involvement of several decision-makers in the 
application of the rules. At present, national 
courts apply Articles 81 ( 1 ), 82, and 86( 1 ) and (2), 
the Court of Justice having recognised the direct 
effect of these provisions at the beginning of the 
1970s. However, the effectiveness of the courts' 
intervention is largely undermined by the fact 
that the firms against which an action is brought 
may notify their agreements to the Commission 
and de facto block any court proceedings. There 
are three reasons for allowing national courts to 
apply Article 81 in full: (i) they have powers 
which neither the national authorities nor the 
Commission have, such as the power to award 
damages to victims of illegal agreements, to 
order specific performance of a contract or to rule 
more quickly and more effectively than the com-
petition authorities on urgent measures; (ii) they 
can simultaneously apply competition law and 
general commercial law, which simplifies pro-
ceedings in cases where Community competition 
law applies to one aspect only of a dispute; (iii) 
lastly, giving national courts the power effec-
tively to apply Article 81 should result in a 
greater number of legal actions being brought in 
this field and thus contribute to the effective 
application of competition law. This is in line 
with the role in the effective application of Com-
munity law traditionally ascribed by the Court of 
Justice to the national courts. 
32. The adoption of a directly applicable ex-
ception system would also allow decentralised 
application by the national competition author-
ities. This clearly presupposes that the seven 
Member States that have not yet done so em-
power their authorities to apply Community 
law. There is a clear advantage in better ex-
ploiting the synergies which exist between the 
Commission and these specialised authorities, 
which often have extensive resources and a 
very good knowledge of their respective na-
tional markets. 
33. Adopting a directly applicable exception 
system would allow the abolition of the notifica-
tion arrangements, which have become ineffec-
tive in safeguarding competition. This would 
enable the Commission to focus on the most seri-
ous restrictions. In these circumstances, com-
plaints would take on greater importance and the 
White Paper thus proposes improving the way in 
which they are handled, in particular by intro-
ducing a deadline of four months within which 
the Commission must inform the complainant of 
the action it intends to take in response to the 
complaint. In addition, the reform should be 
accompanied by a strengthening of the Commis-
sion's powers to penalise infringements. The 
White Paper proposes a number of measures, 
including updating the amounts of fines and peri-
odic penalty payments, making it easier to have 
recourse to oral questions during an investigation 
and reforming the mechanisms for obtaining 
authorisation from a judge to conduct an investi-
gation. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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Simplifying administrative supervision 
34. Secondly, adopting a directly applicable 
exception system would simplify administration, 
the second requirement of Article 83(2)(b) of the 
Treaty. Firms would no longer be obliged to 
notify their restrictive agreements to the Com-
mission and, if the conditions of Article 81(3) 
were met, they could apply directly to the 
national courts in order to have its provisions 
enforced. 
35. The White Paper sets out the arguments in 
support of a particular option for reform but it 
none the less offers a basis for discussion. Since 
its publication, numerous debates have been 
organised with business associations and 
lawyers, a working group has been set up with the 
representatives of the Member States, and vari-
ous conferences have been held. Around 100 
written statements from Member States, firms 
and business associations, lawyers and acade-
mics have been received by the Commission. The 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on the 
subject on 18 January 2000 following the report 
by Mr Karl von Wogau. The resolution supports 
the general thrust of the Commission's proposal 
while stressing the importance of consistency in 
the application of Community law and of legal 
certainty for firms. The Economic and Social 
Committee also discussed the White Paper and 
adopted an opinion on 8 December. It too came 
out in favour of the Commission's proposal, con-
sidering it to be beneficial for firms in general 
and SMEs in particular. However, it listed a num-
ber of flanking measures which it considered 
necessary in order to ensure the uniform applica-
tion of Community law in a system of parallel 
jurisdictions. On the basis of all these responses 
to the White Paper, the Commission will draw up 
a proposal for a regulation which will be pre-
sented to the Council and to Parliament. 
36. Other instruments will then need to be 
amended or produced: for example, the notices 
on cooperation with national authorities and 
courts will need to be revised and a specific 
notice on complaints will need to be drafted. Spe-
cific measures to train national judges should be 
taken and the network made up of the Commis-
sion and the national authorities should establish 
rules on how it will operate. The White Paper 
merely marks the start of the final stage of the 
thorough reform of the rules implementing Arti-
cles 81 and 82, which is essential to the smooth 
operation of a Community with enlargement on 
its agenda. 
3. Review of the policy on horizontal 
cooperation agreements 
37. Companies need to respond to increasing 
competitive pressure and changes in the market 
place driven by globalisation, the speed of techno-
logical progress and the generally more dynamic 
nature of markets. Cooperation can be a means of 
sharing risk, saving costs, pooling know-how and 
launching innovation faster. In particular for small 
and medium-sized enterprises, cooperation is an 
important means of adapting to the changing mar-
ket place. Consumers will share these gains, pro-
vided that effective competition is maintained in 
the market. 
38. In 1998 the Commission's departments had 
intensified their thinking on the review of policy 
in this area, reaching certain initial conclusions 
such as on the need to focus on economic analy-
sis, in line with the way in which the vertical 
restraints exercise was tackled (')· Work on the 
review continued in 1999, with the Commis-
sion's departments preparing drafts of revised 
block exemption regulations on specialisation 
and on research and development, as well as draft 
guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to 
horizontal cooperation agreements. The objec-
tive is to clarify the Commission's policy in the 
area of horizontal cooperation and to make it 
more effective for the future economic and legal 
environment. The approach is likely to be similar 
to that recently adopted for vertical agreements. 
The Commission hopes to be in a position to start 
public consultation on the drafts in the first half 
of 2000. 
39. It should also be recognised that this review 
is an essential pillar of the Commission's 
attempts to modernise the EC competition rules. 
By clarifying the rules, the Commission should 
be freed from examining cases which are of no 
interest from a competition policy point of view 
and will thus be able to concentrate on more 
important cases, particularly on those which 
harm consumers by increasing prices or by 
reducing output, innovation or the variety or 
quality of goods and services. Moreover, any 
switch to a directly applicable exception system 
(') 1998 Competition Report, points 54 and 55.  21 under Artide 81 (see Section 2 above) requires 
both a reinforcement of the legislative frame­
work and the setting-up of mechanisms, such as 
guidelines, in order to ensure the uniform appli­
cation of Article 81 in a system where several 
bodies have enforcement powers. 
4. Review of procedural rules 
As regards procedures, two changes should be 
noted. 
40. In a number of previous reports ('), mention 
was made of consultation of the advisory com­
mittee in cases where the Commission envisaged 
sending a comfort letter to the companies con­
cerned following the publication of a notice 
under Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17. This 
practice has been abandoned since 1998 in cases 
where the notice does not give rise to any com­
ments which might change the positive stance 
taken in it: where the comfort letter is a logical 
follow-up to the notice, the Committee is merely 
informed after the event. It is only when key 
developments which might modify the initial 
stance follow the publication of the notice that 
the Commission enters the case on the agenda of 
a Committee meeting prior to sending the com­
fort letter. A case may also be discussed at the 
request of a Member State. When it publishes its 
intention to take a favourable view of a request or 
notification, the Commission gives interested 
institutions and individuals the opportunity to 
submit their comments. The competent authori­
ties in the Member States may therefore take 
advantage of the publication to send their com­
ments to the Commission and request that the 
case be discussed in the advisory committee. 
41. The second innovation is intended to align 
practice in the antitrust field and the mergers and 
acquisitions field. So that the same letter does not 
have to be sent twice, once to the firm and once to 
its lawyer, firms may nominate a lawyer to receive 
their correspondence from the Commission. Such 
correspondence would be formally addressed to 
the firm involved in the proceedings, but would be 
sent to its lawyer (using the 'care of' formula), 
who would be required to forward it to the firm. 
However, the Commission allows firms this pos­
sibility only if the lawyer possesses an authorisa­
tion containing the following three elements: (1) 
the representative is authorised to receive and pass 
on any correspondence relating to a case, and to 
reply to any correspondence; (2) he has power of 
attorney to act for the firm, in particular by reply­
ing on its behalf; and (3) the firm undertakes to in­
form the Commission should the authorisation be 
withdrawn or amended. 
42. This procedure applies to all correspondence 
sent in the course of proceedings, with the excep­
tion of requests for information under Article 11 of 
Regulations No 17 and (EEC) No 4064/89. Under 
paragraph 4 of this article in each case 'the owners 
of the undertakings or their representatives and, in 
the case of legal persons, companies or firms, or of 
associations having no legal personality, the per­
sons authorised to represent them by law or by 
their constitution, shall supply the information re­
quested'. This wording is designed to ensure that 
any reply to requests for information, or indeed 
failure to reply, commits the firm. Requests for in­
formation should therefore always be sent direct­
ly to the firm. This does not of course prevent the 
persons mentioned in Article 11(4) from designat­
ing a lawyer to reply; however, in such cases, the 
reply is fully binding on them. It should be noted 
that the White Paper on modernisation proposes 
amending Article 11(4) (
2). 
Β — Consolidating the single 
market (
3) 
43. Consolidating the single market is of prime 
importance in ensuring that economic and mone­
tary union is a success. Of the Community poli­
cies that help to further single market consolida­
tion, competition policy plays a key role, not just 
because it strengthens structures by tackling pri­
vate or public initiatives designed to prevent or 
delay the opening-up of markets, but also 
because it stimulates the operation of the single 
market by promoting positive cooperation 
between companies in areas such as R & D or 
environmental protection, and by punishing anti­
competitive conduct. The Commission believes 
that this action to consolidate the single market 
has an immediate impact on the progress of eco­
nomic and monetary union. 
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Box 2: Cooperation with national authorities and national courts 
In the antitrust field, the 1997 notice on cooperation between the Commission and the competition author-
ities in the Member States was applied in some 50 cases, namely: 
— 13 complaints rejected or suspended by the Commission on the ground that a national authority was 
handling them; 
— 4 discomfort letters sent to the national authority so that, if it wished, it could prohibit a restrictive 
agreement notified to the Commission that did not meet the conditions of Article 81 (3) but was not rel-
atively significant enough to justify initiating the formal procedure; 
— 30 cases of cooperation on cases handled simultaneously by the Commission and a national authority; 
— 10 cases of the Commission being consulted by a national authority on a case handled by that author-
ity alone; 
— 2 dilatory notifications. 
In addition, pursuant to point 49 of the notice, the Italian competition authority spontaneously informed 
the Commission of four cases in which it was applying Articles 81 and 82: StreamlTelepiù (pay television, 
encrypted film rights); EnellUnapace (electrical energy supply); KM Zundhokl CIF-Conaedi (production 
and sale of matches); and Aeroporti di Roma (groundhandling tariffs). 
As regards relations with national courts, five cases in which the relevant notice on cooperation was applied 
in 1999 should be noted. These were the reply to the question put by the Helsingborg District Court 
(tingsrätt) in Case IV/36.568 — Scandlines Sverige/Port of Helsingborg (port charges), and four questions 
put by the Barcelona and Madrid Courts of First Instance in cases relating to the distribution of petroleum 
products. 
In the merger field, five cases were referred to the competent authorities in the Member States under Arti-
cle 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. Three cases were referred in full: RabobanklBeecklHomann to the 
German Federal Cartel Office, HeinekenlCruzcampo to the Spanish authorities, and CSME/MDP-SCPA to 
the French authorities. Two further cases were referred in part: PetrofmalTotal and Totalfinal Elf Aquitaine 
to the French authorities. More detailed information can be found in Chapter II of this report. 
A case in which national law was applied and which is of interest for the Community was the prohibition 
by France of the acquisition of Orangina by Coca-Cola, despite undertakings given by the latter. Coca-Cola 
proposed granting an exclusive 10-year licence to an independent third party to market Orangina on the 
'non-home' market. However, the Minister for Economic Affairs, in agreement with the Competition 
Council, took the view that such a system would lead to coordination of behaviour, which, while it might 
be necessary in order for Orangina to remain competitive on this market, would also be detrimental to free 
competition. Faced with the impossibility of resolving this contradictory situation, the Minister prohibited 
the acquisition. This case is the first in which the concept of joint dominant position, already familiar in 
Community law, has been applied under French law. 
1. Cartels invariably concern prices and thus severely 
undermine competition. The Commission is 
44. Of all restrictions of competition, restrictive committed to an extremely tough stance against 
practices in the form of secret agreements are cartels, particularly following the adoption of the 
undoubtedly the most destructive. Very often, euro as a common currency. The changeover to 
these practices involve a substantial number of the euro in 11 Member States should increase 
economic operators in a given area of activity price transparency within the Union and, as a 
and, as such, they have a very marked impact on result, intensify competition to the benefit of con-
tile relevant markets. Furthermore, they almost sumers. This must not be countered by restrictive agreements designed to sidestep market con-
frontation by artificially fixing prices or other 
trading conditions, which in the longer term 
could push up inflation and undermine the foun-
dations of economic and monetary union. 
45. As in previous years the Commission 
demonstrated its firm commitment by its strong 
action against secret cartel agreements between 
companies. Final decisions were issued in two 
cases and additional sets of proceedings have 
been instituted. 
46. On 26 October, the Commission found that 
the Dutch association of electrotechnical equip-
ment wholesalers, the Nederlandse Federatieve 
Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotech-
nisch Gebied (FEG), together with its largest 
member Technische Unie (TU), restricted com-
petition by operating a system of collective 
exclusive dealing in combination with a system 
of price coordination on the Dutch wholesale 
market for electrotechnical equipment. 
47. The Commission found evidence that FEG 
prohibited the association of importers of such 
products in the Netherlands from selling to whole-
salers which were not members of FEG. The pro-
hibition deprived these wholesalers of their 
sources of supply and complicated and delayed 
entry to the Dutch market by foreign wholesalers. 
At the same time, the arrangement prevented sup-
pliers from· selling their products on the Dutch 
market via wholesalers other than FEG members. 
As the collective exclusive dealing arrangement 
deprived potential price-cutters, such as non-FEG 
wholesalers, of their sources of supply, the artifi-
cial price stability created by FEG and its mem-
bers could not be endangered by outsiders. The 
Commission imposed fines of EUR 4.4 million on 
FEG and EUR 2.15 million on TU ('). 
48. On 8 December, the Commission adopted a 
decision imposing fines totalling EUR 99 million 
on eight producers of seamless steel tubes: 
British Steel Limited (United Kingdom), 
Dalmine SpA (Italy), Mannesmannröhren- Werke 
AG (Germany), Vallourec SA (France), 
Kawasaki Steel Corporation, NKK Corporation, 
Nippon Steel Corporation and Sumitomo Metal 
Industries Limited (Japan). These firms, which 
are among the largest producers of seamless 
tubes in the world, had colluded until 1995 (
2) 
over keeping to their respective domestic mar-
kets for certain seamless tubes used in oil and gas 
prospecting and transportation (
3). 
49. The products covered by the cartel were 
'standard' steel borehole pipes (commonly 
known as 'oil country tubular goods', or OCTG) 
and 'project' transportation pipes (commonly 
known as 'line pipe'); both varieties are used in 
oil and gas exploration and transport. To coordi-
nate their behaviour on the standard OCTG and 
project line pipe markets, the European and 
Japanese producers set up a cartel, which they 
called the 'Europe Japan club'. The 
cartel restricted competition in the common mar-
ket by requiring that the domestic markets of the 
different producers (i.e. the German, French, Ital-
ian, UK and Japanese markets) be respected: the 
supply of seamless tubes to Member States of the 
Community where a national producer was 
established was limited by the other producers 
party to the agreement refraining from delivering 
tubes to those markets. 
50. In fixing the amounts of the fines, the Com-
mission took account of the fact that, by defini-
tion, an agreement requiring the participating 
firms to keep to their domestic markets constitutes 
a very serious infringement of Community law, 
since it undermines the proper functioning of the 
single market. Moreover, the four Member States 
concerned account for most of the consumption of 
seamless OCTG and line pipe in the EC and hence 
constitute an extensive geographic market. 
57. However, the Commission also took account 
of the fact that the standard OCTG and project line 
pipe sold in the Community by the firms to which 
the decision is addressed account for only about 
19 % of Community consumption of seamless 
OCTG and line pipe. As attenuating circum-
stances, the Commission noted that the sector was 
in a long-term crisis and that its position had dete-
riorated since 1991; coupled with the increasing 
flow of imports, these factors have resulted in ca-
pacity reductions and plant closures. 
52. Pursuant to the notice on the non-imposition 
or reduction of fines in cartel cases (
4), the fines 
24 
(') OJ L 39, 14.4.2000; Bull. 10-1999. point 1.3.32; Press Release 
IP/99/803,26.10.1999. 
(
2) Except in the case of British Steel, which ceased producing the 
pipes in 1994. 
(') Bull. 12-1999; Press Release IP/99/957. 8.12.1999; not yet pub-
lished in the Official Journal. 
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imposed on Vallourec and Dalmine were 
reduced, since they had cooperated with the 
Commission in establishing the facts. 
2. Opening-up of markets 
53. The Commission has always kept a close eye 
on distribution agreements. While most distribu-
tion agreements are pro-competitive and facili-
tate market entry, some lead to the setting-up of 
watertight national distribution networks which 
partition markets, in particular where distributors 
are prevented from supplying customers based 
outside the contract territory. In this way, national 
markets are artificially isolated from one another, 
limiting competition and price convergence. 
Such agreements impinge upon the right of Euro-
pean consumers to purchase goods in the Mem-
ber State of their choice and result in their being 
denied the benefits of the internal market, partic-
ularly where there are price differences between 
Member States. This is taken into account in the 
Commission's new block exemption regulation 
in the field of vertical restraints ('), which, inter 
alia, does not apply to certain types of territorial 
and customer protection leading to a partitioning 
of markets (
2). Moreover, companies are advised 
not to use these restrictions in their agreements as 
individual exemption of such clauses will be 
unlikely (
3). 
54. In 1999 the Commission continued to 
demonstrate its determination to promote the 
opening-up of markets, a prime example of this 
being the case involving the creation of the joint 
venture British Interactive Broadcasting Ltd 
(BiB, which has since changed its name to 
'Open') (
4). Open is to provide a new type of ser-
vice, digital interactive television services, to 
consumers in the United Kingdom. This involves 
putting in place the necessary infrastructure and 
services to allow companies, such as banks, 
supermarkets and travel agents, to interact 
directly with the consumer via the TV set. In this 
case, the main concern raised by the Commission 
pursuant to Article 81 was that the creation of 
Open eliminated BT and BSkyB, two of the par-
ents of BiB, as potential competitors in the digi-
tal interactive television services market. The 
Commission decided to clear the creation of BiB 
only after the parties had given substantial under-
takings aimed at ensuring that the digital interac-
tive television services market in the UK 
remained open to competition. In particular, as 
competition to BT and BSkyB comes from the 
cable networks, the decision should ensure that 
third parties will have sufficient access to BiB's 
subsidised set-top boxes, as well as to BSkyB's 
films and sports channels, and that set-top boxes 
other that BiB's can be developed in the market. 
55. Another case where the Commission was 
concerned to ensure that a market remained open 
was the Microsoft Internet Explorer licensing 
case (
5). In this case, the Commission approved 
Microsoft's revised licensing agreements with In-
ternet service providers (ISPs) by way of a com-
fort letter. An ISP is a company that maintains a 
permanent connection to the Internet and enables 
its subscribers to connect to the Internet via a tele-
phone link to itself. ISPs may also provide their 
subscribers with worldwide web (www) pages. In 
1998, Microsoft, the computer software manufac-
turer, formally notified to the Commission a set of 
revised agreements made with some European 
ISPs for the licensing and distribution of its Inter-
net Explorer products. Microsoft's formal notifi-
cation of its agreements followed an inquiry 
launched by the Commission's Directorate-Gen-
eral for Competition into a previous version of the 
agreements. During this inquiry, the Competition 
DG advised Microsoft to re-examine the agree-
ments to ensure that they did not contain restric-
tions that might have the effect of illegally fore-
closing access to the market for Internet browser 
software by Microsoft's competitors and of ille-
gally promoting the use of Microsoft's proprietary 
technology on the Internet. 
56. Microsoft subsequently amended its agree-
ments and notified the revised agreements to the 
Commission. There were two major changes: the 
ISPs' failure to attain minimum distribution vol-
umes or percentages for Internet Explorer 
browser technology will no longer result in ter-
mination of their agreements, and ISPs are now 
allowed to promote and advertise competing 
browser software (
6). In the light of these changes 
(') Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81 (3) 
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ 
L 336. 29.12.1999). See Chapter I. A above. 
(
2) Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999. 
(■') See Press Release IP/99/1045,22.12.1999. 
C) See Press Release IP/99/686, 16.9.1999. 
(') Sec Press Release IP/99/317, 10.5.1999. 
(
6) Further details of the notification of the Microsoft Internet 
Explorer licensing agreements were published in the Official Jour-
nal of lhe European Communities (OJ C 175, 9.6.1998).  25 the Commission cleared the agreements by way 
of a comfort letter. The comfort letter covers only 
the agreements between Microsoft and the ISPs 
and does not give any ruling on the overall behav-
iour of Microsoft as regards a possible abuse of a 
dominant position. 
3. Undertakings in a dominant position 
57. Article 82 prohibits undertakings in a domi-
nant position on a given market from abusing this 
situation to the detriment of third parties. Such 
abuse consists, inter alia, in limiting production, 
charging excessive prices, discriminatory or 
predatory pricing, tied sales or other commercial 
practices not based on the principle of economic 
efficiency. The Commission takes the view that 
such practices, which undermine competition, 
are particularly dangerous when they are carried 
out by undertakings with the power to shield 
themselves from competitive pressure and elimi-
nate their competitors without significant dam-
age to themselves or to block market access by 
new entrants to a significant degree. In the con-
text of further development of the single market, 
these practices are particularly damaging 
because they lead to market partitioning and 
delay the integration of the Member States' 
economies. In addition, in recently liberalised 
markets there is a danger that they will wipe out 
the expected benefits in terms of restructuring, 
innovation'or job creation. This is why the Com-
mission is particularly alert to the effects of dom-
inant positions on these processes. In 1999 the 
Commission adopted four prohibition decisions 
under Article 82. 
58. On 10 February, the Commission found that 
the Finnish airport operator Ilmailulaitos Luft-
vartsferket abused its dominant position by 
granting a 60 % discount on landing fees at 
Helsinki, Vaasa, Turku, Pori and Tampere air-
ports for domestic flights but not for intra-Com-
munity flights. It ordered Ilmailulaitos Luftvarts-
ferket to terminate its discriminatory fees system, 
which had been introduced for no objective rea-
son. These discriminatory fees favoured the 
access of domestic flights over those originating 
in other Member States (')· 
59. Also on 10 February, the Commission found 
that the operator of Portuguese airports, Aeropor-
tos e Navegação Aerea-Empresa Publica, abused 
its dominant position by maintaining a tariff 
structure with a 50 % reduction on landing fees 
for domestic flights but not for intra-Community 
flights and a volume discount ranging from 7 to 
32 % according to the number of monthly land-
ings at Lisbon, Oporto and Faro airports. As this 
discriminatory rate structure, for which there was 
no objective justification, had been introduced by 
a government measure, the decision was adopted 
under Articles 82 and 86 (former Articles 86 and 
90) of the EC Treaty. Again, these discriminatory 
fees favoured the access of domestic flights over 
those originating in other Member States (
2). 
60. The Commission set out its policy on com-
missions paid by airlines to travel agents in its 
decision in the Virgin/ΒΑ case (
3). Virgin's com-
plaint against Β A was the first of a series of com-
plaints received by the Commission alleging 
abuses of a dominant position by airlines operat-
ing loyalty rebate schemes which effectively tie 
travel agents to a dominant airline. The Commis-
sion found that the commissions offered by Β A to 
UK travel agents were equivalent to a 'loyalty 
discount' i.e. a discount based not on cost savings 
but on loyalty. Schemes of this type have been 
consistently condemned as an abuse of a domi-
nant position in other industries in the past. It is 
well-established Community law that a dominant 
supplier cannot give incentives to its customers 
and distributors to be loyal to it, thereby fore-
closing market access by the dominant firm's 
competitors. As a dominant firm, BA should pro-
vide supplementary commissions to travel agents 
only where these reflect extra services provided 
by the agent or efficiencies realised by BA. The 
Commission is taking all measures necessary to 
ensure that the principles in this decision are 
applied to other EC airlines in equivalent situa-
tions. The Commission imposed a fine of EUR 
6.8 million on British Airways for a serious abuse 
of a dominant position over a period of seven 
years. 
61. On 20 July, the Commission found that the 
local organising committee of the 1998 Football 
World Cup (Comité Français d'Organisation de 
la Coupe du Monde de Football 1998, or 'CFO') 
had abused its dominant position by implement-
ing discriminatory ticket sales arrangements in 
26  (') OJ L69. 16.3.1999; Bull. 1/2-1999, point 1.3.79. 
(
2) OJL69. 16.3.1999; Bull. 1/2-1999. point 1.3.80. 
(') Decision of 14 July 1999. Not yet published in the Official Jour-
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the run-up to the tournament that favoured con-
sumers resident in France. The decision followed 
an investigation by the Commission, which 
revealed that some 570 000 entry tickets had been 
sold by the CFO exclusively to consumers able to 
provide an address in France. The practical effect 
of such a requirement was to deny the over-
whelming majority of consumers outside France 
access to a significant proportion of entry tickets 
for finals matches. 
62. The Commission would normally impose a 
heavy fine where an undertaking abuses a domi-
nant position in this manner. Nevertheless, given 
that the abusive ticketing arrangements as imple-
mented by the CFO were similar to those adopted 
for previous World Cup finals tournaments, and 
that the CFO could not easily have relied upon 
previous decisions of the Commission or case 
law of the Court of Justice in order to ascertain its 
responsibilities under EC competition rules, the 
Commission decided to impose no more than a 
symbolic fine of EUR 1 000 on the CFO. How-
ever, the decision sends a clear signal that the 
Commission expects future tournament organis-
ers to ensure that their ticketing arrangements 
comply fully with EC competition rules before 
putting them into effect ('). 
63. On 7 October, the Court of First Instance 
upheld in all material respects the Commission's 
decision concerning infringements by Irish Sugar 
of Article 82 (
2). The Commission had imposed a 
EUR 8.8 million fine on Irish Sugar and its sub-
sidiary SDL for having abused their dominant 
position on the Irish markets for industrial and 
retail sugar. The abuses consisted in a series of 
commercial practices, primarily rebate policies, 
aimed at tying customers to Irish Sugar and 
thereby foreclosing market entry (
3). 
64. The Court confirmed the Commission's view 
that Irish Sugar and its subsidiary SDL held a 
(vertically) collective dominant position on the 
relevant markets, observing inter alia that their 
market power was not affected by any counter-
vailing buying power on the part of their main 
customers. The Court went on to uphold the 
Commission's finding that various commercial 
practices engaged in by Irish Sugar and/or SDL 
had been abusive. It did, however, reduce the fine 
to EUR 7.88 million, on the grounds that the 
Commission had not sufficiently proven one of 
the abuses during a two-year period. Irish Sugar 
has appealed against the judgment (
4). 
(') OJL 5. 8.1.2000. 
(
2) Decision of 14 May 1997 (OJ L 258, 22.9.1997) and Case T-
228/97 Irish Sugar ν Commission. 
(■') For more details see 1997 Competition Report, point 65. 
(
4) Case C-497/99 Ρ Irish Sugar ν Commission. 
Box 3: Relations with consumer organisations 
A — Relations which are necessary and reciprocal 
The goal of competition policy is to maintain a high degree of competition in the common mar-
ket. For final users, this policy is reflected in lower prices, a wider choice of goods, and tech-
nological innovation. Given the impact of competition policy on final consumers, it would 
appear legitimate for relations to develop between the authorities responsible for competition 
and the organisations which represent consumers. 
Consumer organisations have a right to expect the Commission to protect consumers as eco-
nomic agents. It should preserve their capacity to act on the market as agents of competition and 
to reap its rewards. Consumers make up a structural element of the market (demand) which 
reacts to the commercial practices of firms (supply). Ensuring that markets operate properly 
therefore also means ensuring that consumers are able to make choices which influence the 
behaviour of suppliers. 
The Commission, and its departments which deal with competition, can expect a good deal of 
feedback from consumers and consumer organisations. Their knowledge of the daily operation 
of markets, especially markets for consumer goods, means that consumer organisations are in a 
27 position to provide the Commission, by means of complaints or through informal contacts, with 
information which may allow its departments to start own-initiative proceedings. Likewise, 
when they are interested parties in the context of proceedings initiated against firms, they can 
contribute to the establishment of the facts. Lastly, consumer organisations can act as an excel-
lent information relay for the Commission, passing on information intended for the public. 
ß — Sfafe of relations between the Competition DG and consumer organisations 
The Commission departments responsible for competition are in fairly regular contact with con-
sumer associations, notably in the context of general consultation on draft legislation or of indi-
vidual cases in which such associations lodge a complaint with the Commission or express con-
cerns informally. 
As regards draft legislation or rules, or monitoring reports in specific areas, consumer associa-
tions within the EU, together with their European federation, BEUC, have contributed to the 
debates. For example, BEUC was represented at the hearing organised by the Commission on 
the Green Paper on vertical restraints in competition policy and at the hearing organised by the 
European Parliament on the White Paper on modernisation. Cooperation between the Commis-
sion and consumer associations has been judged satisfactory during several such consultation 
exercises. 
Where the Commission publicises notifications of agreements or plans for mergers or acquisi-
tions via a notice in the Official Journal, consumer associations sometimes contact the Com-
mission as interested parties in individual cases, where they consider that consumer interests 
may be harmed by the effect of a restrictive agreement or a merger. The Commission may also 
contact them by administrative letter to ask for information in the context of proceedings. Thus, 
the UK Consumers' Association played an active part in the AirtourslFirst Choice merger case, 
in particular during the hearing. It presented economic studies and a legal argument in support 
of its position. Likewise, in a number of transatlantic alliance cases, the Commission had the 
opportunity of hearing consumer associations (airline passengers). The same went for postal ser-
vices cases, especially REIMS II, in which the Commission received comments from BEUC. 
< 
Consumer associations may also lodge complaints directly with the Commission in respect of a 
firm or a particular sector of the economy. When it receives complaints of this kind, the Com-
mission enjoys a certain amount of discretion, on the basis of the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice (Automec //judgment), in deciding whether to launch own-initiative proceedings or to reject 
the complaint on the ground of lack of Community interest. The Commission has already opened 
own-initiative proceedings on the basis of information received from individual consumers or 
their representative associations. The most significant own-initiative proceedings of this kind 
were without doubt those which were initiated against Volkswagen-Audi and which terminated 
in a decision imposing a fine of ECU 102 million. Another example is the case involving the 
Greek/Italian ferry cartel, in which the Commission initiated proceedings following receipt of a 
complaint (in the form of a letter from a consumer). 
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C — Sector-based policies 
1. Telecommunications 
1.1. Directive under Article 86(3) on the 
legal separation of cable and 
telecommunications activities (
1) 
65. On 23 June, the Commission adopted a 
directive amending for the sixth time Directive 
90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in 
telecommunications services. Pursuant to this 
amendment, Member States must ensure that 
telecommunications operators which are in dom-
inant positions and which are controlled by a 
Member State or granted special rights pursue 
their cable television activities in a structurally 
separate company. This is in the light of the con-
flict of interests that exists between the operation 
of the two networks. An operator active on both 
networks is much less inclined to carry out rapid 
upgrading of the cable network and to use it to 
compete with its own telephone network, which 
also allows broadband transmission thanks to 
new technologies available today such as xDSL. 
66. The directive was adopted following wide 
consultation of interested parties during 1998 on 
the basis of a first draft adopted on first reading 
by the Commission on 16 December 1997 (
2). 
During the consultation process, a consensus was 
reached on the need to deal with the conflict of 
interests arising where the same operator owns 
the telephone and cable networks. Legal separa-
tion was thought to be the minimum needed to 
deal with this problem·. This general analysis was 
confirmed by the European Parliament in its res-
olution adopted on 9 February. 
67. For this reason, several operators announced 
that they were taking the necessary preparatory 
steps to comply with the legal separation obliga-
tion, or even to go one step further (divestment of 
the cable networks), even before the directive 
was adopted. Most considered that the approach 
taken met the demands of the market in a multi-
media environment and was in the interest of the 
firms themselves. Deutsche Telekom thus 
launched a call for tenders for its cable networks 
in August, while France Télécom transferred its 
cable networks to companies jointly owned with 
the operators of its networks. The Commission 
none the less reserves the right to go further in 
certain cases, as illustrated by its decision on the 
Telia/Telenor merger (
3). 
1.2. Fifth report on the implementation 
of the directives 
68. On 10 November, the Commission adopted 
its fifth report on the implementation of the 
telecommunications regulatory package 
(COM(l999) 537 final). This report takes stock 
of the results of telecommunications liberalisa-
tion in the Member States. 
69. The fifth report was prepared by the 'joint 
team' (body responsible for implementing Com-
munity telecommunications legislation) com-
prising officials drawn from the 
Directorates-General responsible for telecommu-
nications and for competition. This team heard 
comments from incumbent operators, new 
entrants and the national regulatory authorities 
from each Member State during bilateral meet-
ings held in Brussels and collected statistics from 
the authorities, which are summarised in the 
annex to the report. 
70. The report's main conclusion is that the intro-
duction of competition has boosted the European 
Union's telecommunications services sector, 
which registered an annual growth in 1999 of 
10.3 %, four times greater than the growth of GDP 
in the EU. In terms of value, the telecommunica-
tions services market was worth EUR 183 billion. 
The most dynamic segment of the market was mo-
bile telephony, which grew by 31.5 % in 1999 to a 
value of EUR 49 billion. Furthermore, thanks to 
competition, residential telephone tariffs for inter-
national calls fell by 40 % on average between 
1997 and 1999 in most Member States (
4); busi-
ness tariffs for similar calls were also down in 
most Member States (on average by 25 % over the 
same period). Tariffs for 10-minute regional and 
long-distance calls fell by 13 % and 30 % respec-
tively (
5). The overview of quality indicators an-
nexed to the report confirms that voice telephony 
services offered by incumbent operators have im-
proved. However, tariffs for local calls have not 
(') See IP/99/413, 23.6.1999. 
(
:) 1997 Competition Report, point 109. 
(■') See Chapter II below. 
(
4) For 10-minute calls. Source: Eurodata Foundation. 
(') Fifth report on the implementation on the telecommunications reg-
ulatory package (COMO 999) 537 final, p. 2).  29 fallen significantly. The statistical data annexed to 
the report also confirm the rapid growth in mobile 
and Internet penetration in the European Union, 
which is underpinned by the keen competition on 
these markets. 
71. However, the report identifies a number of 
remaining barriers to the establishment of a sin-
gle European market, arising in particular from 
the gaps in harmonisation of national rules and 
approaches. Filling these gaps is one of the objec-
tives of the review of the regulatory framework 
also launched by the Commission on 10 Novem-
ber with the adoption of its communication 
'Towards a new framework for electronic com-
munications infrastructure and associated ser-
vices: The 1999 Communications Review' 
(COM( 1999) 539). 
1.3. Monitoring the implementation 
of the directives 
72. The Commission continued to monitor the 
effective implementation of the liberalisation 
directives in those Member States which had not 
correctly applied them, together with the intro-
duction of the regulatory framework in Portugal, 
whose additional period of grace for introducing 
competition expired on 31 December. 
73. During 1999 the Commission continued the 
infringement proceedings initiated in 1997 and 
1998 against those Member States which had not 
correctly transposed the liberalisation directives. 
The Commission thus decided to send five rea-
soned opinions to Greece ('), which had neither 
lifted all restrictions on the operation of DCS 
1800 and DECT mobile telecommunications ser-
vices, despite the availability of frequencies, nor 
liberalised satellite services and alternative infra-
structures in accordance with the directive on the 
implementation of full competition (Commission 
Directive 96/19/EC) and with Commission Deci-
sion 97/607/EC. These first two objections were 
referred to the Court of Justice (Joined Cases 
C-396 and C-397/99). On 9 September, the Com-
mission also brought an action before the Court 
of Justice in the context of proceedings initiated 
against Belgium on 2 December 1997 for failure 
to implement a Community directive in respect 
of the cost accounting method to be implemented 
by the incumbent operator, Belgacom. Under 
Directive 90/388/EEC Belgium had to ensure 
that a method identified the cost elements incor-
porated in the interconnection charge from the 
first half of 1997. Since Belgium amended its 
legislation accordingly, the Court was able to 
close the case (Case C-337/99). On 28 July, the 
Commission decided to refer to the Court another 
infringement case against Belgium, this time in 
respect of the method of calculating the net cost 
of universal service provision and the contribu-
tions of operators to its financing on the telecom-
munications market (Case C-384/99). On 17 
October, the Commission brought an action 
before the Court of Justice against Portugal for 
preventing competition in 'call-back' services on 
its territory (Case C-429/99). Despite substantial 
progress made by the Member States and espe-
cially by Belgium in the last few months of the 
year, 1999 ended with 15 infringement proceed-
ings in progress against Member States which 
had not correctly transposed the competition 
directives. On the same date, a total of 70 
infringement proceedings were also under way in 
respect of the harmonisation directives adopted 
by Parliament and the Council in this sector. 
1.4. Launching of an inquiry into the 
telecommunications sector (
2) 
74. On 27 July the Commission decided to 
launch an inquiry into the telecommunications 
sector, pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation 
No 17, covering three areas: 
— leased lines, especially international leased 
lines: the Commission had received informal 
complaints against certain incumbent opera-
tors, in which it was alleged that discrimina-
tion was being practised as regards charges, 
treatment and delays in delivery or the quality 
of service. Furthermore, the main internation-
al association of telecommunications users 
(INTUG) had compared the charges for leased 
lines applied by incumbent operators across 
the common market and its findings showed 
that the cross-border/national charge ratio ex-
ceeded 120 % in all Member States and was as 
high as 500 % in some cases, discrepancies 
which did not appear to be justified; 
— mobile roaming services, including national 
roaming: no real competitive supply appeared 
30  (') See Press Release IP/99/152. 3.3.1999.  (-) See Press Release IP/99/786, 22.10.1999. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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to be emerging on the market for wholesale or 
retail roaming services. Moreover, the Com-
mission had received complaints from users 
who considered that roaming charges were 
extremely high; 
— the local loop (line rental and local calls): 
charges appeared to remain inflexible, 
although the level of monthly rental fees still 
differed significantly from one Member State 
to another. On the other hand, complaints 
received by the Commission seemed to indi-
cate that in some Member States the price for 
access to unbundled local capacity seemed to 
be being kept artificially high. It therefore 
seemed appropriate to research any evidence 
of anticompetitive pricing, and to determine 
the real state of local-loop pricing in all Mem-
ber States, on the basis of cost accounting 
data, where available. 
75. The aim of the Commission's inquiry is to 
establish whether current commercial practices 
and prices infringe the EU competition rules, in 
particular the prohibition of restrictive practices 
and abuses of dominant positions (Articles 81, 
82, and/or 86 of the EC Treaty). This is only the 
third sector inquiry ever launched by the Com-
mission. 
76. On 22 October, the Commission launched 
the first phase of this sector inquiry into leased 
line charges. Detailed questionnaires were sent to 
national competition authorities, telecommuni-
cations regulators, incumbent operators through-
out the EU, new entrants which provide and/or 
use leased lines and major business users. 
2. Postal services 
2.1. The stage reached in the liberalisation 
of postal services 
77. The time limit for the implementation by 
Member States of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with the 1998 postal services directive ( ') expired 
on 10 February. The postal directive is a first step 
towards the creation of an internal market in the 
(') European Parliament and Council Directive 97/67/EC on common 
rules for the development of the internal market in Community 
postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ L 15. 
21.1.1998). See also 1997 Competition Report, point 124. 
postal sector; it establishes common rules to 
ensure greater harmonisation of the conditions 
governing the postal sector in the Community. 
The directive has two main aims: to provide for 
the gradual and controlled liberalisation of the 
postal market, and at the same time to guarantee 
the provision of a universal postal service to all 
users throughout the Member States. In imple-
menting its first aim, the directive establishes 
maximum limits for postal services which may 
be reserved. In furthering its second aim, the 
directive sets forth certain minimum require-
ments which the universal service must fulfil. At 
this stage, the postal services directive allows, to 
the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of 
a universal service, the reservation of domestic 
general letter mail services up to a weight of 350 
grams and below five times the public tariff for 
the first class service. 
78. Within this legal framework, the transposi-
tion measures notified by certain Member States 
raise competition issues which are currently be-
ing examined under Articles 86 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty. The Commission has received a 
number of complaints that some Member 
States' implementing legislation effectively ex-
tends the scope of the existing national postal 
monopolies. For example, certain postal ser-
vices, which are separate and distinct from the 
general letter mail service and were previously 
provided by private operators in competition 
with the incumbent postal operator, would be 
fór the first time included within the scope of 
the reserved area. The Commission will investi-
gate these complaints and determine whether 
the exclusion of competition in these distinct 
service areas is necessary to ensure the univer-
sal postal service. 
79. Complainants have raised concerns as ma-
jor players continue to expand into foreign mar-
kets by buying up competitors and potential 
competitors active in markets outside the uni-
versal service obligation. The issue of whether 
the funding of some of these acquisitions by 
means of revenues derived from the reserved 
area infringes the competition rules is currently 
being examined by the Court of First Instance in 
Case T-175/99. 
80. The question of a possible cross-subsidisa-
tion of competitive activities through monopoly 
income is also of relevance under the State aid 
provisions of the Treaty. In that respect, the Com- 31 mission decided to open a formal investigation 
into State aid to Deutsche Post AG ('). 
2.2. Decision exempting the Reims II 
Agreement 
81. On 15 September, the Commission 
approved, under the competition rules of the EC 
Treaty, the Reims II Agreement between 16 
European postal operators on terminal dues (
2). 
'Terminal dues' is the term used for the remuner-
ation that a postal operator sending cross-border 
mail has to pay to the receiving postal operator 
for delivering the mail to the addressees. The par-
ties to the Reims II Agreement comprise all 
Member States of the EU except for the Nether-
lands. The public postal operators of Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland are also parties to the 
agreement (
3). 
82. The main aims of the Reims II Agreement 
are to provide the parties with cost-based com-
pensation for the delivery of cross-border mail 
which reflects more closely the real costs of 
delivery of each party, and to improve the quality 
of the cross-border mail service. In this respect, 
the Reims II Agreement links terminal dues to 
domestic mail tariffs in the country of destination 
and to the quality of service provided by the 
postal operator that delivers the mail. The agree-
ment also introduces a system of quality-of-ser-
vice standards in order to improve the quality of 
service' and a penalty system which is to be 
applied when the agreed standards are not met. 
Special transitional rules are set out for the pub-
(') Case C-61/99 (OJ C 306. 23.10.1999). 
(
2) Commission decision of 15 September 1999 in Case No IV/36.748 
— Reims // (OJ L 275, 26.10.1999). 
(■') The content of the amended agreement for the remuneration of 
mandatory deliveries of cross-border mails was published in the 
Official Journal (OJ C 371. 1.12.1998). 
lie postal operators in Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. 
83. The Commission expects the notified agree-
ment to lead to an improvement in the distribu-
tion of goods and to promote technical or eco-
nomic progress. Given that terminal dues previ-
ously often resulted in a remuneration for the 
delivery of cross-border mail which did not cover 
costs, a move towards a more cost-based system 
will allow the postal operators to maintain and 
improve this service. By linking increases in ter-
minal dues to improvements in the quality of ser-
vice, the Reims II Agreement provides a strong 
incentive for the parties to improve their perfor-
mance. A better quality of service for cross-bor-
der mail would also be beneficial to consumers. 
84. In order to ensure that the agreement is com-
patible with the competition rules of the EC 
Treaty, the Commission requires in its decision 
that the transitional period provided for in the 
agreement be postponed so as to ensure that ter-
minal dues for the rest of 1999 are not increased 
beyond 55 % of domestic tariffs, and that the 
maximum increase in terminal dues is to 65 % of 
domestic tariffs in 2000 and to 70 % of domestic 
tariffs in 2001. In addition, the parties will have 
to grant each other effective access to the 'gener-
ally available domestic rates' (such as bulk rates 
for direct mail, printed matter or periodicals) in 
the country of delivery (so-called 'Level 3 
access'). Furthermore, the parties will have to 
introduce, by the end of 1999, a transparent cost 
accounting system ensuring that all significant 
cost elements can be identified, quantified, com-
pared and vetted. The exemption was therefore 
granted for the period 1 April 1999 to 31 Decem-
ber 2001. The Commission will closely monitor 
the development of tariffs for domestic and 
cross-border mail under the agreement and has 
already contacted the parties in this connection. 
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3. Media 
Box 4: Convergence between telecommunications, media and the Internet 
The development of digital technology, beginning in the field of computing, then telecommunications and 
now in television, has led to convergence between the areas through this common underlying technology. 
Accelerating the whole process dramatically has been the explosive growth of the Internet. 
Convergence can be viewed in different ways: technologically, from the consumer's perspective and from 
the point of view of the market players. Technological convergence means that different services (e.g. tele-
vision, telephony, Internet access) can now be provided over more or less any infrastructure (satellite, TV, 
cable, fixed telephone networks). From a consumer point of view, the same device, whether it be a TV, a 
fixed or mobile telephone or a PC, is today capable of delivering a range of different services, including 
moving images, telephony and Internet access. Access therefore becomes a key issue both in terms of 
access to infrastructure for operators, in particular new market entrants, and in terms of consumer access 
to the full range of services and content. Finally, the market players from all three areas, telecommunica-
tions, IT and the media, are positioning themselves to enter each other's market as well as protect their 
existing market positions. They are achieving this through alliances and joint ventures, several of them 
already notified to the Commission. 
Basically, these developments are procompetitive in that the number of communication channels is increas-
ing dramatically. However, the Commission has had to address these developments in a number of cases 
in the past few years and to assess whether the response of the market players gives rise to competition 
concerns. 
Since the prohibition of the MSG operation in 1994, where the joint venture between Kirch, Bertelsmann 
and Deutsche Telekom was found to create a dominant position on the market for technical services for 
pay-TV, a wide variety of other cases have been notified to or investigated by the Commission. The under-
lying theme of mese cases is that companies in different industries have formed joint ventures or acquired 
other companies in order to diversify their activities and to offer services in new and related markets. 
In the area of telecommunications, media and information technology, the issue of convergence is proba-
bly best looked at in relation to three levels. These levels are infrastructure, access and content. 
An important competition concern from the point of view of infrastructure is the promotion of competi-
tion in the last link between the local exchange and the consumer (the local loop). The Commission is doing 
this by ensuring that incumbent telecommunications companies separate their cable-TV activities into a 
separate company and on a case-by-case basis by requiring divestment of the cable company concerned. 
In addition, the Commission has encouraged the unbundling of the local loop to enable other infrastruc-
ture providers to offer services over their own infrastructure leased from the incumbent telecommunica-
tions operator. Both cable divestment and local-loop unbundling were undertakings given to the Commis-
sion by Telia and Telenor to secure clearance of their merger, which was subsequently abandoned. . 
Existing operators in the telecommunications field have sought to expand their operations into access activ-
ities, and in doing so have met companies seeking to do the same from the area of content. An example of 
this was the formation of British Interactive Broadcasting, now known as Open, to provide interactive ser-
vices using an incoming signal via satellite and a return signal via a telecommunications line. This joint 
venture was set up by BT (the telecommunications provider), BSkyB (the content owner and broadcaster), 
Midland Bank and Matsushita. A key function of the joint venture was to subsidise the cost of the set-top 
box needed in order to have access to digital satellite TV, to the Internet (limited access) and to interactive 
services, and to provide a platform for those services. 
Other operations in the telecommunications sector have raised a different issue, where companies have 
withdrawn from ownership of activities in a vertically related market, replacing this with an outsourcing 
contract for the activities which had been sold off. In 1999 the Commission assessed and approved under 
33 the merger regulation an operation by which AT&T and IBM acquired assets from each other in the area 
of data networks and business services to large companies. In each case, the two companies replaced their 
activities with outsourcing contracts for the activities they had sold to the other. MCI WorldCom and EDS 
concluded a similar arrangement, which was not, however, notified to the Commission. 
Overall, in its assessment of these types of operation in vertically related markets, the Commission treats 
each case on its own merits. However, certain themes run through its approach. First, companies which are 
dominant on one market should not be permitted to extend that dominance into related markets. An exam-
ple would be dominance with regard to ownership of films and sports rights being used to achieve domi-
nance in pay-TV and digital interactive television services. Second, the Commission cannot accept the con-
centration of excessive market power in the hands of one or a limited number of players which can put it 
or them in a gatekeeper role for existing or emerging markets. Finally, companies which have control of 
an important access device such as a set-top box, an EPG (electronic programming guide), a telecommu-
nications local loop or an Internet browser (such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer) are 
likely to be required to meet demanding conditions for the approval of any operation notified to the Com-
mission, inter alia to ensure that access to that device is not restricted. 
Incompatibility with the common market, 
pursuant to Articles 90(3) and 52 (now 
Articles 86(3) and 43) of the EC Treaty, of a 
monopoly established by law 
85. In its judgment of 8 July in Case T-266/97, 
the Court of First Instance (CFI) dismissed the 
application by Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij 
NV (VTM) for annulment of the decision 
adopted on 26 June 1997 by the Commission 
under Articles 90 and 52 (now Articles 86 and 43) 
of the Treaty (') concerning the exclusive right to 
broadcast television advertising in Flanders. 
86. The CFI first rejected two pleas claiming that 
the Commission had breached the right to be 
heard and the principle of legal certainty. With 
regard to the first plea, the CFI stressed that while 
an undertaking, that was the direct beneficiary of 
the State measure being challenged, had the right 
to be heard concerning the objections set out by 
the Commission in the letter of formal notice it 
addressed to the Member State in question, this 
did not mean that the Commission was required 
to communicate to that undertaking a copy of any 
complaint which had prompted initiation of the 
procedure or the comments submitted by the 
Member State in reply to the Commission's 
objections. The Court went on to point out that 
statements made in public by a Member of the 
Commission could not be regarded as commit-
ting the Commission, which operated according 
to the principle of collective responsibility, 
meaning in particular that it took its decisions as 
a body. 
87. With regard to the second plea, the Court 
ruled that the Commission did not have to exam-
ine on a single occasion the compatibility of a 
national regulatory measure with all of the Treaty 
rules. It then confirmed the Commission's assess-
ment of the exclusive right, pointing out that, for 
Article 90 (now Article 86) to apply in conjunc-
tion with Article 52 (now Article 43), it was suf-
ficient for the State measure concerned to be 
found to constitute a barrier to the right of estab-
lishment, there being no need to examine whether 
it constituted a disguised form of discrimination 
whose effects were protectionist (
2). 
4. Transport 
4.1. Air transport 
Airports 
88. On 10 February, the Commission took two 
decisions (
3) on systems for discounting and dif-
ferentiating landing charges at Portuguese and 
Finnish airports, thereby fleshing out its policy 
on competition at airports (
4). After the Frankfurt 
34 
(') Case No IV/35.760 
L 244. 6.9.1997). 
VT4/Vlaamse Gemeenschap+WM (OJ 
(
2) 1997 Competition Report, Part Two, Chapter II.A.2. 
(') OJL69. 16.3.1999. 
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airport decision, which concerned access to the 
groundhandling market, and the Paris airports 
decision, which related to the airports' commer-
cial policy, the focus has now switched to the 
issue of charges for access to airport infrastruc-
tures, and in particular the principle of non-dis-
crimination in the setting of those charges. The 
Commission first tackled this issue with a deci-
sion concerning Zaventem airport ('); it has now 
adopted a further two decisions relating to the 
differentiation of landing charges according to 
the origin of the flight (domestic or interna-
tional). It found that the reductions for domestic 
flights of 50 % and 60 % respectively at Por-
tuguese and Finnish airports were in flagrant 
breach of the single transport market. 
89. The Commission's approach to competition 
in the airport sector is now clear and known to all 
parties. Other Community airports will have to 
adopt a charging policy which is in line with that 
approach if they are to avoid incurring heavy 
fines in the next round of cases that the Commis-
sion has to deal with in this area. A letter setting 
out the Commission's approach towards landing 
charges was sent to all the authorities or entities 
operating airports at which such discounts or dif-
ferentiated charges were applied, calling on them 
to alter their system of charges. 
Partial prolongation of block exemption 
Regulation (EEC) No 1617193 
90. On 26 May, the Commission adopted Regu-
lation (EC) No 1083/1999 (
2) partly prolonging 
Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 (
3), by which the 
Commission granted a block exemption for cer-
tain categories of restrictive agreements in four 
areas, i.e. joint planning and coordination of air-
line schedules, joint operation of a scheduled air 
service on a new or a low-density route, consul-
tations on tariffs for the carriage of passengers, 
and slot allocation and airport scheduling. While 
Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 has been pro-
longed for passenger tariff consultations and slot 
allocation at airports until 30 June 2001, it has not 
been renewed for joint planning and coordination 
of airline schedules and joint operations. The reg-
ulation entered into force on the date of its publi-
cation in the Official Journal. 
(') 1995 Competition Report, point 120. 
(
2) OJL 131, 27.5.1999. 
(
3) OJ L 155, 26.6.1993; as last amended by Regulation (EC) 
No 1523/96 (OJ L 190, 31.7.1996). 
91. The new regulation adapts the legal environ-
ment created by Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 to 
match it to the present state of development of the 
air transport industry. The Commission's own 
investigation and the extensive consultation 
exercise to canvas views from the industry and 
the Member States made clear that it was not 
appropriate to prolong the block exemption in 
respect of agreements on joint planning and coor-
dination of schedules and agreements on joint 
operations. Joint planning and scheduling within 
the limited meaning of the original definition in 
Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 appears to be of 
lesser importance. Where such agreements are 
concluded, they are mostly part of more compre-
hensive agreements, such as alliance agreements 
and cooperation agreements. Such wide-ranging 
agreements, however, fall outside the scope of 
Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93. It 
also became evident that little use has been made 
of joint operations and that such agreements are 
of little importance to the industry. Therefore, 
there was no longer any need to block exempt 
these types of operation. 
92. The Commission did, ho we ver, feel the need to 
further continue and intensify its investigation into 
passenger tariff consultations and slot allocation 
with the aim of verifying whether these two cate-
gories should continue to be exempted in future. It 
was therefore decided to extend Regulation (EEC) 
No 1617/93 for these two issues until June 2001. 
Álitalia/KLM 
93. During the year the Commission also ap-
proved an alliance between Alitalia and KLM. 
However, the alliance was so wide-ranging that 
the Commission regarded the agreement as 
falling under the merger regulation, and it was 
examined as a merger. The alliance was only 
cleared subject to extensive undertakings from 
the parties designed to prevent the creation of a 
dominant position on the market for non-stop 
travel between Amsterdam and Milan and 
Amsterdam and Rome. These undertakings, 
which are described in Chapter II.B.4 of this 
report, are designed to allow new entrants to 
compete on the Amsterdam-Milan and 
Amsterdam-Rome routes. They go further than 
the undertakings obtained at the time of the 
Sabena/Swissair merger (
4) or the remedies im-
f) OJ C 200.4.8.1995.  35 posed on the Lufthansa/SAS alliance ('). They 
are similar to the 'proposed remedies' published 
by the Commission for the ΒΑ/AA and 
Lufthansa/United/SAS alliances (
2). 
Virgin/British Airways 
94. The Commission set out its policy on com­
missions paid by airlines to travel agents in its 
decision on the Virgin/ΒΑ case (
3). This case is 
discussed in Chapter LB of this report. 
4.2. Maritime transport 
Liner conferences 
95. Following the Commission's TACA 
(Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) decision 
of 16 September 1998 (
4), several shipping lines 
withdrew from TACA, leaving eight members 
which at the beginning of 1999 notified an 
amended agreement ('revised TACA'). On 6 
May, the Commission published, pursuant to the 
competition procedures applicable in the trans­
port sector (
5), a summary of the revised TACA 
notification (
6). The Commission has 90 days 
from the date of such publication in which it can 
raise serious doubts and so continue its investi­
gation into the case. 
96. As regards the maritime transport aspects of 
the revised TACA, the Commission informed the 
parties within the 90-day period that it had seri­
ous doubts whether their revised agreement 
could be cleared in its current form. The Com­
mission's investigation centred on whether the 
parties' arrangements (particularly as regards the 
exchange of information) could harm competi­
tion between the parties when they negotiate and 
agree individual service contracts with shippers. 
97. As far as inland transport is concerned, the 
revised TACA no longer provides for inland 
36 
(') OJL 54, 5.3.1996. 
(
2) OJC 239, 30.7.1998. 
(') OJ L 30.4.2.2000. 
C) Commission decision of 16 September 1998 in Case No IV/35.134 
— TACA (OJ L 95, 9.4.1999); 1998 Competition Report, points 
105-109, 
C) For maritime transport: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 
22 December 1986 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 (now Articles 81 and 82) of the EC Treaty to 
maritime transport (OJ L 378, 31.12.1986). 
For inland transport: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of 19 
July 1968 applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road 
and inland waterway (OJ L 175, 23.7.1968). 
O OJC 125,6.5.1999. 
price-fixing. The parties have instead agreed 
that they could adopt a 'not-below-cost' rule. 
Under such a rule each line would agree, where 
they provide maritime transport services pur­
suant to the conference tariff, not to charge a 
price less than the direct out-of-pocket cost in­
curred by it for inland transport services sup­
plied within the EEA in combination with those 
maritime services. The Commission did not 
within the 90-day period raise serious doubts 
against the not-below-cost rule, with the conse­
quence that the rule is deemed exempt for three 
years (
7). The Commission accepted, in this 
case, that the possibility of implementing a 
not-below-cost rule was aimed at avoiding the 
risk that below-cost pricing on the inland leg 
would undermine the stability brought about by 
the conference maritime tariff which is permit­
ted under the block exemption for liner confer­
ences (
8). 
98. All major conferences serving Europe have 
now abandoned inland price-fixing. However, 
appeals from shipping lines to the Court of First 
Instance against the Commission decisions pro­
hibiting inland price-fixing are continuing. The 
Commission's approval of the not-below-cost 
rule is also the subject of an appeal from shippers 
to the Court of First Instance. 
Capacity management agreements 
99. On 30 April, the Commission adopted a deci­
sion prohibiting a capacity management pro­
gramme between conference and non-conference 
members, the Europe-Asia Trades Agreement 
(EATA), which operated in combination with di­
rect price-fixing agreements (
9). The purpose of 
the EATA was to increase prices by establishing a 
capacity management programme concerning 
scheduled maritime transport services for the car­
riage of containerised cargo from northern Europe 
to the Far East. A capacity management pro­
gramme is an agreement under which the parties 
agree not to use a proportion of the space on their 
vessels for the carriage of goods in a particular 
trade. The proportion set aside is part of the fore­
cast excess of supply over demand. In 1994 the 
Commission prohibited a similar arrangement on 
the transatlantic trades: the Trans-Atlantic Agree-
(
7) IP/99/620; Competition Policy Newsletter, 1999. No 3. October. 
(*) Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86. 
C) Commission decision of 30 April 1999 in Case No IV/34.250 — 
Europe-Asia Trades Agreement (OJ L 193.26.7.1999); IP/99/313. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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ment (TAA) ('). In the case of the E ATA up to 17 % 
of the capacity of certain vessels was withdrawn 
from supply. On all occasions only the supply of 
eastbound capacity was restricted, with the result 
that Community exporters bore the brunt of the 
anticompetitive effects of the EATA. 
100. The EATA decision confirmed that an indi-
vidual exemption for a capacity non-utilisation 
agreement is not possible when, as in the TAA 
case, it is a tool for maintaining excess capacity 
and artificially raising freight rates. Capacity reg-
ulation can only bring benefits if there was a real 
withdrawal of inefficient or outdated capacity so 
as to bring about a reduction of costs, leading to 
price reductions for shippers. 
Consortia 
101. Commission Regulation (EC) No 870/95 (
2) 
contains a block exemption for liner shipping 
consortia which expires in April 2000. As a first 
step in preparing for its expiry, the Direc-
torate-General for Competition prepared a 
'Report on Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 870/95' (
3). The report was sent for comment 
to industry associations. The Commission took 
into account the comments received when draw-
ing up a draft new regulation. The application of 
Regulation (EC) No 870/95 has worked well in 
practice and the reasons for its adoption are still 
valid. The Commission therefore published a 
draft new block exemption regulation (
4), largely 
replicating Regulation (EC) No 870/95. 
102. The most important change made in the 
preliminary draft regulation as compared with 
Regulation (EC) No 870/95 is that the trade share 
thresholds (i.e. the share of trade held by the con-
sortium between the pairs of ports that it actually 
serves) are replaced by market share thresholds. 
Market share is the usual indication of market 
power used in competition legislation. The trade 
share criterion was adopted in the existing regu-
lation because shipping companies had consid-
ered that market shares would be difficult to cal-
culate; experience has shown that shipping com-
panies are able to provide market shares. 
(') Commission decision of 19 October 1994 in Case No IV/34.446 
— Trans-Atlantic Agreement (OJ L 376, 31.12.1994). 
(
2) OJL 89, 21.4.1995. 
(■') DG IV working paper, 28.1.1999 
(http://curopa.cu.int/comm/dg04/entente/other.htm). 
f) OJC 379, 31.12.1999. 
5. Insurance 
P8d insurance 
103. P&I clubs are mutual non-profit-making 
insurers which offer shipowners insurance cover 
for their contractual and third party liabilities: 
injury or death of crew or passengers, loss of 
cargo, collision damage to vessels, damage to 
third-party property (harbour equipment), dam-
age to the environment, etc. Most of the P&I 
clubs are members of the International Group of 
P&I clubs (IG) and together they insure 90 % of 
worldwide tonnage. 
104. In 1995, the IG requested a renewal of the 
exemption which had initially been granted in 
1985 (
s) for a period of 10 years. This was 
granted in 1999 (
6). 
105. The IG members cooperate within the 
framework of a claims-sharing arrangement, the 
details of which are spelled out in a century-old 
pooling agreement and, since the beginning of the 
1980s, the International Group agreement (IGA). 
Under the pooling agreement, the IG members 
share each other's claims in excess of USD 5 mil-
lion. For the layer between USD 5 million and 
USD 30 million, each club makes a contribution 
which is roughly based on the number of claims it 
faces, the tonnage it covers and the total calls (i.e. 
premiums revenue from shipowners) it collects. 
Above USD 30 million, the clubs purchase togeth-
er reinsurance from commercial insurers, current-
ly up to USD 2 billion. Finally, the excess of any 
claim above USD 2 billion up to an upper limit (the 
so-called overspill) is again shared by the clubs. 
106. The IGA essentially lays down a number of 
rules concerning the procedures to be followed 
by clubs when a shipowner wishes to change 
clubs. A shipowner insured by an IG member 
club can only be offered a lower rate by another 
club in one or the other of two circumstances: 
either the new club can demonstrate to an expert 
committee that the old club's rate is unreasonably 
high, or the old club fails to demonstrate to the 
expert committee that the new club's rate is 
unreasonably low. 
107. When the IG applied for renewal of its 1995 
exemption, the Greek Shipping Cooperation 
(») Decision of 16 December 1985 (OJ L376, 31.12.1985). 
(") Decision of 12 April 1999 (OJ L 125, 19.5.1999).  37 38 
Committee (GSCC), an organisation represent-
ing Greek shipowners, drew the Commission's 
attention to the clause in the pooling agreement 
which — at that time — forced all clubs to offer 
an upper level of cover of USD 18 billion (the 
upper level for overspill claims). In its view, this 
clause severely restricted competition because it 
prevented shipowners from negotiating the level 
of cover which they actually want, given the 
nature of the risk represented by their fleet. 
108. During the course of the administrative 
procedure, the IG reduced the upper level of 
cover from USD 18 billion to USD 4.25 billion. 
The Commission considered that at this level the 
claims-sharing arrangement is not anticompeti-
tive because the participating clubs could not 
provide the same level of cover on their own. 
109. In contrast, the provisions in the IGA con-
cerning the procedures which clubs must follow 
to quote rates are anticompetitive within the 
meaning of Article 81(1). However, the IG has 
changed its rules so that charges for the club's 
administrative costs (e.g. claims handling cost, 
club manager fees) now fall outside the scope of 
the quotation procedures. Furthermore, the IG 
has inserted provisions in the IGA in order to 
enhance transparency for shipowners with regard 
to these administrative costs. Accordingly, these 
rules qualified for exemption and benefit from an 
exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) for 10 years. 
110. As far as Article 82 is concerned, the Com-
mission took the view that the P&I clubs which 
are members of the IG collectively hold a domi-
nant position on the worldwide market for the 
provision of P&I cover. It concluded, however, 
that neither the clause concerning a minimum 
common level of cover (objected to by the 
GSCC), nor the clauses concerning the condi-
tions at which individual clubs can offer reinsur-
ance to third parties constitute an abuse of that 
dominant position. 
///. Finally, in its decision, the Commission 
states that it 'will revoke the exemption ... if the 
members of the IG collectively hold a market 
share larger than twice the minimum scale eco-
nomically required to provide the level of cover 
agreed at any moment within the IG'. This 
reflects the fact that the level of cover offered by 
the IG requires at the present time the IG mem-
bers to have a market share of more than 50 %. If 
that was no longer the case, then the basis on 
which the decision was adopted would have 
changed and the exemption would need to be 
considered anew. 
Report on the operation of the block 
exemption in the field of insurance 
112. On 12 May, the Commission adopted a 
report (') to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on the operation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1534/91 (
2) and Commission Regula-
tion (EEC) No 3932/92 (
3), which applies Article 
81 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agree-
ments in the field of insurance. The report chiefly 
describes how the Commission has applied the 
exemption system over the last six years. It does 
not contain proposals for amendments, since the 
current exemption regulation will be valid for 
another four years, but it does set out a number of 
forward-looking ideas on which the Commission 
wishes to receive comments from the industry, 
national supervisory and competition authorities 
and national courts. 
113. Like any other exemption regulation, Reg-
ulation (EEC) No 3932/92 has cut down the num-
ber of individual cases which the Commission 
has had to examine. However, it has still had to 
assess numerous individual cases, either where 
the agreements were notified by operators who 
were aware that they did not meet the exemption 
conditions or were unsure of their scope, or in 
response to complaints. It had furthermore 
become clear that certain provisions of the regu-
lation could be interpreted in different ways, that 
others no doubt needed to be re-examined as to 
their substance and that some of the aims of the 
instrument had not been achieved. 
114. From a practical point of view, assessing 
pools for the common coverage of certain types of 
risks in the light of the regulation (Title IV) is the 
most complex task (
4). The report outlines the de-
velopments in the approach taken by the Commis-
sion, which has had to supplement the arrange-
ments set in place by the regulation. As reflected in 
recent cases (
5), the new approach essentially 
means that a pool which is necessary in order to at-
tain the minimum dimension for covering the 
(') COM(1999) 192 final. Text available on the Internet 
(http://europa.eu. int/comm/dg04/entente/other.htm#dgiv_pdf_ins 
_repl999). 
(
2) OJL 143, 7.6.1991. 
(
J) OJL 398, 31.12.1992. 
(
4) See above. 
(
5) 1998 Competition Report, points 111-119. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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risks concerned is now deemed to fall outside the 
scope of Article 81(1). At a procedural level, the 
Commission first ascertains whether the market 
shares of the pool or of its members are lo wer than 
the thresholds stipulated in the regulation. If so 
and if the other requirements of the regulation are 
met, the pool qualifies automatically for exemp-
tion. If the thresholds are exceeded, the Commis-
sion checks whether the pool is indeed necessary 
in order to attain the minimum dimension for cov-
ering the risks in question. If so, there is no restric-
tion of competition and Article 81(1) consequent-
ly does not apply, irrespective of the market share 
of the parties (')· Lastly, where the pool is not nec-
essary in order to attain the minimum dimension, 
it can still escape the purview of Article 81 ( 1 ) if its 
members remain genuinely free, de jure and de 
facto, to decide whether or not to bring the risks in 
question into the pool. 
115. The Commission's experience in the other 
areas has also shown that, while the economic and 
legal principles are now fairly clear, assessment of 
the technical and economic parameters in specific 
cases is often arduous and requires expert evalua-
tions that the Commission departments are not al-
ways in a position to conduct. As far as the joint 
compilation of statistics with a view to calculating 
risk premiums (Title II) is concerned, the problem 
is one of determining the extent of minimum co-
operation. The Commission therefore intends to 
focus primarily on gauging the concrete effects of 
the agreements concerned on the individual be-
haviour of insurers when they calculate their own 
risk premiums and/or commercial premiums. 
116. For the rest, experience has revealed certain 
problems in interpreting the requirements for 
exempting agreements on standard policy condi-
tions (Title III) which could prompt the Commis-
sion, once it has received more comprehensive 
reactions from the industry, to contemplate some 
amendments to the existing text. The report also 
raises the question of whether or not to continue 
allowing certain 'black clauses', which are cur-
rently exemptable where the insurer expressly 
declares that they are not binding. 
117. Agreements on security devices (Title V) 
have largely been concluded at national level, 
( ' ) In cases where the pool is necessary for some members but not for 
others, the approach is pragmatic. The 'smallest' pool necessary to 
enable those members who do not have the minimum individual 
dimension for covering the risk concerned to do so is regarded as 
not restricting competition. 
while Europe-wide agreements, explicitly pro-
vided for by the regulation, are fairly limited and 
Community harmonisation work has for the most 
part not yet borne fruit. This situation gives rise 
to a number of barriers to free movement of the 
products concerned and the freedom of fitters and 
repairers to provide their services. 
118. The report states that the Commission is not 
at this stage considering extending the block 
exemption system to two types of agreement 
which are not currently covered (claims settle-
ment and registers of aggravated risks) although 
they are mentioned in the regulation, since it has 
not gained sufficient experience with regard to 
the former (having received only one complaint, 
subsequently withdrawn, concerning an agree-
ment of that nature) and in view of the nature of 
the latter (which should not normally fall within 
the scope of Article 81). 
6. Energy 
119. Liberalisation of the electricity and gas 
industries made further progress in 1999. The 
electricity directive has been implemented at 
national level by most Member States, while the 
gas directive is still in the process of being trans-
posed. Liberalisation will result in electricity and 
gas being just like any other product for the sale 
of which suppliers compete. Accordingly, the 
general principles of competition law are, subject 
to certain limits, now applicable to electricity in 
the same way as they are applied to other product 
markets. The same will soon be true for gas mar-
kets. 
Electricity 
120. Ten of the twelve Member States which 
were required to implement the electricity direc-
tive in 1999 actually did so. Three Member States 
had a derogation (Belgium and Ireland until 
2000, Greece until 2001). Two Member States 
(France and Luxembourg) did not fulfil their 
obligation; the Commission therefore decided to 
initiate proceedings under Article 226 of the EC 
Treaty against them. 
121. Of those Member States which transposed 
the directive, most chose the directive's procom-
petitive options with regard to generation, access 
to the network and unbundling. All Member 
States but one opted for the authorisation proce- 39 dure instead of the tendering procedure for new 
power stations. Furthermore, 13 out of 15 Mem-
ber States chose regulated third party access 
(TPA) instead of negotiated TPA or the single 
buyer option in order to determine access to the 
grid. Thirdly, most Member States decided to 
legally separate the transmission system opera-
toris) (TSO) from the vertically integrated elec-
tricity supply business. They thus went further 
than the requirements of the directive, which 
required only the unbundling of management and 
accounts of transmission grid operations as well 
as the creation of 'Chinese walls' against any 
information flow between the grid and supply 
business. 
122. Many Member States opened up their mar-
kets to a greater extent than the minimum 
required by the directive. Instead of the 26.5 % 
minimum requirement, countries like the UK, 
Germany, Sweden and Finland committed them-
selves to 100 % market opening. Other countries 
opened up 90 % (Denmark), 33 % (Netherlands, 
Spain) or 30 % (Italy) of their requirements. As a 
result, more than 60 % of total EU electricity 
demand was liberalised in 1999. This should set 
free a sufficient number of electricity consumers 
to shop around and instigate competition among 
suppliers, particularly in view of the fact that the 
Union's largest consumers of electricity are 
among the so-called eligible customers ('). 
123. As regards competition law enforcement, 
in 1999 the Commission dealt mainly with net-
work issues, cooperation and joint ventures 
between suppliers, and stranded costs. The appli-
cation of the antitrust rules focused on cross-bor-
der issues and cases in order to foster the emer-
gence of trade between Member States. In one 
joint venture case (
2) the Commission took the 
delay of one Member State in opening up its mar-
ket to competitors from other Member States into 
account in its competition assessment. The par-
ties had to give an undertaking to the effect that 
the venture would not become active in the Mem-
ber State until the latter had fulfilled its obliga-
tions under the electricity directive. 
124. Since many Member States intend to grant 
financial aid to electricity companies to make up 
for investments or commitments which can no 
longer be recovered or honoured because of the 
introduction of competition, the Commission has 
decided to establish guidelines for the treatment 
of such stranded costs under the State aid rules. 
The Commission discussed draft guidelines with 
the Member States during a multilateral meeting 
in June 1999 and expects to be in a position to 
adopt final guidelines in the first half of 2000. 
125. Most Member States opted to establish an 
independent electricity regulator which will have 
to monitor the electricity industry and in particu-
lar TPA. The Commission is closely collaborat-
ing with these newly created authorities and 
indeed created an EU Electricity Regulation 
Forum, whose inaugural meeting was held in Flo-
rence (the so-called 'Florence process' (
3)), in 
which representatives from all Member States, 
TSOs and electricity producers participate. The 
Commission endeavours to reach consensus on 
measures to harmonise national regulation in 
order to bring about the internal electricity mar-
ket. In 1999 the forum dealt mainly with the issue 
of cross-border transmission tarification and con-
gestion (
4). 
126. In accordance with the case law of the 
Court of Justice (
5), national regulators have a 
duty not to approve any practice or agreement 
contrary to Community competition law. This 
contributes to the creation of the internal elec-
tricity market by providing a minimum standard 
for a level playing field throughout the EU. 
Gas 
127. The gas directive was adopted in 1998. It 
has to be incorporated into national law by 
August 2000. The Commission expects that all 
Member States will be able to meet this deadline 
and that the gradual opening-up of the gas mar-
ket will then begin. Derogations from the direc-
tive are limited, and can only be granted to Mem-
ber States fulfilling certain conditions, e.g. emer-
gent gas markets as in Greece and Portugal. 
128. The fundamental principles governing the 
liberalisation of the electricity market also apply 
40 
(') For further information, see the second report from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament on the state of lib-
eralisation of energy markets (COM( 1999) 198 final, 4.5.1999). 
(
2) EdFILouis Dreyfus, M. 1557, 28.9.1999. 
(
3) Subsequent meetings of the Electricity Regulation Forum also 
took place in Florence, most recently on 25 and 26 November 
1999. 
(
4) See the second report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on harmonisation requirements 
(COM(1999) 164 final, 16.4.1999). 
(
s) Paragraph 48 of the Court "s judgment in Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed 
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to the gas market, namely third party access, 
unbundling and eligible customers. These princi­
ples may allow the market to be gradually 
opened, although nearly all Member States are 
expected to choose to open their markets faster 
than required. It can be expected that the gas 
industry will benefit from experience gained in 
electricity liberalisation. In this respect, the Gas 
Regulatory Forum will play an important role, 
following the example of the Florence process 
for electricity liberalisation. 
129. As regards competition law enforcement, 
the Commission mainly dealt with cases of third 
party access (prior to liberalisation), allocation of 
scarce capacity in gas interconnectors and fore­
closure effects caused by long-term agreements. 
The proceedings are still under way. 
130. Another important aspect of gas liberalisa­
tion is the link between the electricity and gas 
markets. Gas is currently seen as the preferred 
fuel for new power plants and combined heat and 
power plants. Consequently, access to gas is 
essential for newcomers in the electricity market. 
7. Banking/financial services 
European Court judgments on Dutch 
supplementary pension funds 
131. On 21 September, the ECJ delivered judg­
ment in a number of Article 234 cases involving 
Dutch pension funds providing supplementary 
pensions (')· Affiliation to such funds had been 
made compulsory for the sectors at issue at the 
request of the relevant associations of employers 
and employees. Some of the undertakings active 
in those sectors had, however, refused to pay their 
contributions as they did not wish to be affiliated, 
and invoked the European competition rules. The 
ECJ was asked to give rulings on whether Article 
81 applies to collective agreements between 
labour and management, whether Articles 81 and 
82 apply to Dutch supplementary pension funds, 
and on the compatibility of the exclusive rights 
granted to such funds with Articles 82 and 86. 
( ' ) Case C-67/96 A lhany International ν Stichting Bedrijfsfonds Tex­
tielindustrie: Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97 
Brentjens' Handelsonderneming ν Stichting Bedrijfspensioen­
fonds voor de handel in houw materialen; Case C-219/97 
Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken ν Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven. 
132. The Court ruled that agreements concluded 
within the framework of collective negotiations 
between labour and management in order to 
improve conditions of work and employment do 
not, given their nature and purpose, fall within 
the scope of Article 81. It considered that, under 
the Treaty, the aim of the Community is not only 
to ensure competition but also to pursue a social 
policy. It took the view that the achievement of 
the social policy objectives of such agreements 
could be seriously hindered if the social partners 
had to comply with Article 81 when together try­
ing to improve labour conditions. 
133. The Court also ruled that Dutch sectoral 
pension funds are 'undertakings' within the 
meaning of the competition provisions of the 
Treaty. The pension fund itself determines the 
level of premiums and benefits and operates in 
accordance with the principle of capitalisation. 
The level of the benefits depends on the return on 
its investments, in respect of which it is, like 
insurers, supervised by the insurance supervisor. 
It follows that the fund carries on an economic 
activity and that it competes with insurers. 
134. The Court also considered that, in these cir­
cumstances, the fund's non-profit-making char­
acter and the fact of its having some aspects of 
solidarity (e.g. no medical selection and the fact 
that contributions do not reflect the risk) were 
insufficient bases on which to conclude that the 
fund is not an undertaking. The Court added that 
these latter aspects may well make the fund less 
competitive than insurers, but its activities never­
theless remain economic. These aspects may, 
however, justify the grant of exclusive rights to 
such a fund. 
135. The Court also ruled that the Netherlands 
does not infringe Article 82, read in conjunction 
with Article 86 of the Treaty, where it provided 
for compulsory affiliation to a specified sectoral 
pension fund and granted the pension fund an 
exclusive right to administer the collected contri­
butions. The Court considered that the decision 
by the public authorities to make affiliation com­
pulsory necessarily implied that the fund should 
be regarded as having an exclusive right within 
the meaning of Article 86(1). As it has a legal 
monopoly in a substantial part of the common 
market, it also occupies a dominant position. In 
the present cases, certain firms would like to offer 
their employees a better pension arrangement 
and, for efficiency reasons, would like to have all  41 their pension arrangements with a single insurer. 
However, they are prevented from doing this as 
they are required to take out a pension with the 
sectoral pension fund. The resulting restriction of 
competition is a direct consequence of the exclu­
sive right. 
136. The Court therefore considered it necessary 
to examine whether that exclusive right can be 
justified on the basis of Article 86(2). It ruled that 
the pension arrangement fulfils an essential 
social function in the Netherlands, because of the 
low statutory pension. The exclusive right is nec­
essary, i.e. without such a right the fund may well 
not be able to fulfil its tasks of general economic 
interest on acceptable economic conditions and 
its financial equilibrium may be endangered. The 
Court specifically referred to the dangers of the 
'good risks' leaving and the fund being left hold­
ing the 'bad risks', thereby increasing the cost of 
pensions for workers to whom the fund could no 
longer offer pensions at acceptable cost. This is a 
particular danger in funds such as in the present 
cases where there is a high level of solidarity. 
137. The Court thus ruled that the grant of the 
exclusive rights is justified in such cases, because 
it would not otherwise be possible for these pen­
sion funds to carry out under economically 
acceptable conditions a particular social task of 
general economic interest which is assigned to 
them. However, this does not prevent the Com­
mission from monitoring the behaviour of the 
pension funds at issue in the exercise of their 
exclusive rights under Articles 81 and 82. 
8. Professions 
138. The Commission is developing its 
approach towards the issues involved in applying 
the competition rules to the professions. In the 
case of several of the professions, services are as 
yet still provided on a national or even local level, 
and the condition that intra-Community trade 
must be appreciably affected for the EC Treaty 
rules on competition to apply is therefore not met 
in most of the cases encountered by the Commis­
sion. 
Box 5: Professions 
Competition policy in this area pursues two main objectives: (1) putting an end to restrictive practices; and 
(2) promoting forms of cooperation that facilitate access to other geographic markets, thereby enabling 
members of the professions to operate at Community or international level. The Commission's action 
focuses primarily on cases which have a Community dimension in that they concern the rules governing 
the same profession in all or at least several Member States or, in the case of the members of a profession 
in a single Member State, relate to a restrictive practice that has a significant impact in several Member 
States. 
The Commission is endeavouring gradually to draw the dividing line between purely ethical rules which 
lie outside the scope of the competition provisions and rules or practices whose object or effect is contrary 
to Article 81 of the Treaty. The goal of promoting competition in the professions is thus, in each individ­
ual case, reconciled with the objective of maintaining purely ethical rules specific to each profession. 
The Commission has so far published three decisions concerning the application of Article 81 of the Treaty 
to the behaviour of a professional body (CNSD, COAP1 and EPT) ('). In the first two decisions, the Com­
mission found that collective price-fixing was incompatible with the common market, irrespective of the 
national regulatory framework. An appeal against the first-named decision was brought before the Court 
of First Instance (
2), which has not yet ruled on the matter. The Commission also brought infringement pro­
ceedings against Italy with regard to the Italian legislation on customs agents, in which the Court of Jus­
tice delivered its judgment on 18 June 1998 (
3). The third decision relates to the code of conduct of the 
Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office (the EPI), and more particu-
42 
(') Commission decision of 30 June 1993 in Case No IV/33.407 — CNSD (OJ L 203. 13.8.1993); Commission decision of 30 January 
1995 in Case No IV/33.686 — COAPl (OJ L 122, 2.6.1995): Commission decision of 7 April 1999 in Case No IV/36.147 — EPI 
code of conduct (OJ L 106, 23.4.1999). 
(-) Case T-513/93 CNSD ν Commission. 
p) Case C-35/96 Commission v Halv [1998] ECR 1-3851. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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larly restrictions on advertising and unsolicited offers of services. The decision grants negative clearance 
for those rules which are necessary, in particular in order to ensure professional secrecy and impartiality 
or to avoid conflicts of interest and misleading advertising. On the other hand, the provisions which pro­
hibit members from carrying out comparative advertising under the conditions laid down by Directive 
97/55/EC (') and from actively offering their services to former clients of other representatives were found 
to be restrictions of competition in breach of Article 81 ( 1 ) of the Treaty. Those restrictions were exempted 
for a short period. The EPI made an application to the Court of First Instance (
2) for an annulment of the 
part of the decision relating to the exemption. 
The above cases have already made it possible to develop the main principles governing the application of 
the competition rules to the professions. 
— Members of the professions are normally undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty 
where they carry on their activities as self-employed persons, and their professional bodies or associ­
ations, to which all the members of a given profession belong, may according to the circumstances be 
regarded as associations of undertakings. 
— The collective fixing of prices and the prohibition of certain forms of advertising by a professional 
association may constitute restrictions of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
— Rules which are necessary, in the specific context of each profession, in order to ensure the impartial­
ity, competence, integrity and responsibility of the members ofthat profession or to prevent conflicts 
of interest and misleading advertising are not considered to be restrictions of competition within the 
meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
The legal framework within which agreements are made and the classification given to that framework 
under the various national laws are irrelevant as far as the applicability of the Community rules on com­
petition are concerned. The Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed this principle (
3). 
Even if by delegating to a professional association power to fix the prices to be charged by its mem­
bers a Member State may be infringing the rules of the Treaty, the association's exercise of that power 
does not escape the application of Article 81 of the Treaty (
4). 
(') OJL290, 23.10.1997. 
β) CaseT-144/99 EPI ν Commission. 
(
3) Inter alia Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB ν Commission [1984] ECR 19; Case 123/83 BNIC ν Clair [1985] ECR 
391 ; Case C-35/96 supra. 
C) Commission decision of 30 January 1995 (OJ L 122. 2.6.1995). 
9. Sport (i) the social, educational, cultural and integra-
tional role of sport, which should be preserved; 
0 ,. . , . , . and (ii) the economic dimension created by the  Preliminary approach to applying . , ... . ,
 J_ 
., .... , commercial activities generated by sport. The 
the competition rules _ „ ,. ., , 
first dimension normally lies outside the scope of 
139. The Commission's report to the European the Treaty rules on competition; the second is 
Council on sport (') contains a section setting out however subject to those rules, which are applied 
the Commission's preliminary thinking on appli- with due regard to the specific characteristics of 
cation of the competition rules in this area. The sport, namely the interdependence between 
report begins by stressing the social and cultural clubs, the principle of equal opportunities, the 
aspects of sport and its increasing economic uncertainty of the outcome and the sociocultural 
importance. There are two dimensions involved: objectives of sport. 
140. The report outlines preliminary conclusions 
O COM0999) 644 final. regarding the application of the competition rules ^3 in the field of sport, giving examples of practices 
of sports organisations under three headings: 
— Practices which do not come under the com-
petition rules: the regulations of sporting 
organisations drawing up rules without which 
a sport could not exist, or which are necessary 
for its organisation or for the organisation of 
competitions. The rules intrinsic to sport are, 
first and foremost, the 'rules of the game'. 
The aim of these rules is not to distort com-
petition. 
In an unpublished decision it adopted on 3 
December rejecting a complaint (the Mouscron 
case (')), the Commission took the view that the 
UEFA Cup rule requiring each club to play its 
home match at its own ground is a sporting rule 
which falls outside the scope of the competition 
rules laid down in the Treaty; 
— Practices that are, in principle, prohibited by 
the competition rules: these are restrictive 
practices in the economic activities generated 
by sport. They may concern, in particular, 
restrictions on parallel imports of sports prod-
ucts or sponsoring agreements that foreclose 
a market by excluding other suppliers for no 
objective reason. With regard to the sale of 
exclusive rights to broadcast sporting events, 
it is likely that any exclusivity which, by its 
duration and/or scope, resulted in the fore-
closing of the market would be prohibited. 
Lastly, it is likely that there would be a ban on the 
practice of a sporting organisation using its regu-
latory power to exclude from the market, for no 
objective reason, any economic operator which, 
even though it complies with the justified quality 
or safety standards, has not been able to obtain a 
certificate from this organisation attesting to the 
quality or safety of its products. 
Unjustified discrimination in the sale of entry 
tickets to stadiums, by organisers of sporting 
events enjoying a dominant position, between 
users who are resident in a particular Member 
State and those who live outside that Member 
State is prohibited. On 20 July, the Commission 
found that the Comité français d'organisation 
(CFO) for the 1998 Football World Cup had 
abused its dominant position by operating a dis-
criminatory system of ticket sales which 
favoured consumers resident in France (see 
Chapter LB.3 above) (
2); 
— Practices likely to be exempted from the com-
petition rules: the Bosman judgment (
3) 
recognised as legitimate the objectives 
designed to maintain a balance between 
clubs, while preserving a degree of equality 
of opportunity and the uncertainty of the 
result, and to encourage the recruitment and 
training of young players. Consequently, 
agreements between professional clubs or 
decisions by their associations that are really 
designed to achieve these two objectives 
would be likely to be exempted, provided that 
they did not infringe other provisions of the 
Treaty (in particular Article 39) and the 
restrictions were proportionate to those 
objectives. It is also likely that short-term 
sponsoring agreements based on an invitation 
to tender and with clear and non-discrimina-
tory selection criteria would be authorised. 
141. Any exemptions granted in the case of the 
joint sale of broadcasting rights must take 
account of the benefits for consumers and of the 
proportional nature of the restriction on competi-
tion in relation to the legitimate objective pur-
sued. The impact on the structure of the broad-
casters' market must also be taken into consider-
ation. In this context, there is also a need to exam-
ine the extent to which a link can be established 
between the joint sale of rights and financial sol-
idarity between professional and amateur sport, 
the objectives of the training of young sportsmen 
and women and those of promoting sporting 
activities among the population at large. 
142. The examples given of the three categories 
of practices by sporting organisations help to cre-
ate a clearer legal environment which is gradu-
ally ensuring the legal certainty which the sport-
ing world is legitimately seeking. 
10. Motor vehicles 
Motor vehicle distribution 
143. Article 81 prohibits agreements between 
producers and dealers who restrict inter-brand 
competition by partitioning markets. Moreover, 
44  (') Complaint by the Lille municipal authorities against UEFA. 
(
:) OJL 5. 8.1.2000. 
(■') Case C-415/93 [ 1995 ] ECR 1-4921. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 
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the block exemption regulation for motor vehicle 
distribution (Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 (')) 
contains several provisions aimed at intensifying 
competition in the markets for new cars and spare 
parts and improving the position of consumers by 
guaranteeing them the full benefits of the internal 
market. In accordance with these principles, in 
1999 the Commission initiated two proceedings 
against car manufacturers and/or their importers, 
based on evidence found during inspections. 
144. Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 
requires the Commission to evaluate on a regular 
basis the application of the regulation, particu-
larly as regards the impact of the exempted sys-
tem of distribution on price differentials of con-
tract goods between the different Member States 
and on the quality of service to final users. The 
evaluation of car price differences has been 
ongoing since 1993, with the twice-yearly publi-
cation by the Commission of its 'Report on car 
prices within the European Union' (
2), accompa-
nied by a press release. This report is aimed at 
analysing car price differentials across the Euro-
pean Union and improving price transparency for 
consumers. Analysis of these reports compiled as 
of 1 May and 1 November reveals that price dif-
ferentials are still too high for many models (
3). 
(') Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (OJ L 145, 
29.6.1995). See also 1996 Competition Report, points 54-56, and 
IP/00/121.7.2.2000. 
(
2) Available from the Commission offices in the Member States and 
on the home page of the Competition DG 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car). 
(') See Press Releases IP/99/60. 1.2.1999 and IP/99/554. 22.7.1999. 
145. In addition, the Commission has to draw up 
a general report on the evaluation of the regula-
tion before the end of 2000. The quality of ser-
vice to final users is a core aspect which has to be 
considered in this exercise. The principle of a sin-
gle market requires in particular that consumers 
must be able to purchase motor vehicles wher-
ever in the Community prices or terms are most 
favourable, and that effective competition on the 
maintenance and repair markets is ensured. Bear-
ing these aspects in mind, the Commission has 
addressed questionnaires to a number of parties 
directly affected by the regulation, such as car 
manufacturers, importers, consumer associa-
tions, independent resellers and intermediaries, 
producers of spare parts, independent repairers, 
franchised dealers, and companies active in elec-
tronic commerce. 
146. This will give the Commission a picture of 
what is happening in the sector as a whole and 
will enable it to check whether the objectives of 
the regulation have been attained. Many of the 
questions are therefore intended to provide the 
Commission with an insight into the practical 
transposition of clauses in the regulation. Finally, 
the Commission would like to know whether the 
technical evolution of cars and the introduction 
of new marketing and distribution methods does 
not call into question the basis for a specific reg-
ulation on car distribution. All parties have there-
fore been invited to submit their views on future 
developments in the car distribution sector, up to 
the end of 2010 and beyond that date. The results 
of their evaluation will form a major basis for the 
report which the Commission is to adopt by the 
end of 2000. 
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47 Il — MERGER CONTROL 
A— Introduction 
147. Merger activity continued to grow unabated 
in 1999. In 1999, 292 cases were notified, repre-
senting an increase of 24 % from last year and an 
overall increase of 70 % since 1997. There has 
been a fivefold increase in the number of cases no-
tified under the merger regulation since 1990. The 
Commission took a decision in 270 cases — 13 % 
more decisions than in 1998. A notable feature in 
1999 was that a total of five important operations 
were abandoned by the parties concerned after the 
Commission had raised serious competition con-
cerns. Moreover, in 1999 the Commission found it 
necessary to initiate the second stage of examina-
tion ('Phase II proceedings'), lasting fourmonths, 
in respect of 20 planned operations, as opposed to 
12 in 1998. A total of eight cases where Phase II 
proceedings were initiated were authorised sub-
ject to conditions, one was formally prohibited, 
five were withdrawn and nine were carried over to 
2000. Also, more cases were cleared in the initial 
phase of the merger procedure ( 19 decisions com-
pared to 12 last year) only after satisfactory under-
takings were given to ensure that potential compe-
tition problems were resolved. The main factors 
underlying the current merger wave are the glob-
alisation of markets, the introduction of the euro, 
the completion of the internal market and the 
forthcoming enlargement. These factors will con-
tinue to generate high levels of merger activity in 
Europe for the foreseeable future. 
148. A distinctive feature of today's merger con-
trol is that cases are becoming increasingly com-
plex. The structure of a large number of the oper-
ations notified in 1999 was extremely compli-
cated and required simultaneous analysis of sev-
eral different markets. 
149. The geographical scope of mergers is also 
increasing. To analyse these cases properly the 
Commission has to continue to liaise closely and 
exchange information with other antitrust author-
ities. The experience gained from such coopera-
tion in 1999 shows that it can significantly 
improve the outcome of investigations and the 
Commission attaches great importance to coop-
eration with other antitrust authorities. 
BP AmocolAtlantic Richfield (
2)) which the Com-
mission examined in close liaison with the US 
Federal Trade Commission. Cooperation with the 
American antitrust authorities also helped to iden-
tify common remedies in ¡metal/China Clays (
3), 
where many of the product markets affected by the 
operation were found to be worldwide in scope. In 
Honeywell·'AlliedSignal (
4), several of the com-
mitments entered into were similar to the divest-
ments ordered by the US Department of Justice. 
The Commission also cooperated closely with the 
US Department of Justice in Ahlström/Kvaern-
er (
5), which raised serious competition concerns 
in a number of worldwide chemical pulping mar-
kets. The increasing number of mergers with a 
global dimension and international effects means 
that coordination and information exchange is be-
coming increasingly important. 
151. 1999 also saw significant developments in 
relation to oligopolistic dominance issues. Not 
only did the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance confirm the Commission's decision in 
the GencorlLonrho case (
6), but it also accepted 
the Commission's approach in dealing with cases 
involving collective dominant positions. In 1999 
the Commission investigated oligopolistic domi-
nance in several cases (notably in AirtourslFirst 
Choice O, Exxon/Mobil and Danish 
Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier (
s)). While the analy-
sis of each case is based on the facts of that par-
ticular case, some commonalities exist and these 
are examined in more detail below. The Com-
mission recognises the need to further clarify its 
approach to dealing with oligopolistic domi-
nance in order to avoid uncertainty within the 
business community. It will continue to pursue its 
work in this area. 
752. The third keynote of the year was that, for 
the first time, the Commission imposed fines on 
a number of notifying parties for providing 
incomplete or misleading information in merger 
proceedings (see box below). The relatively short 
time periods within which the Commission has to 
investigate notified operations and the fact that 
transactions are becoming increasingly complex 
make it essential for the achievement of a proper 
150. Notable examples of cases which involved 
international cooperation in 1999 include two cases 
in the oil and chemicals sector (Exxon/Mobil ( ' ) and 
(') Case No IV/M. 1383. 
(
2) Case No IV/M. 1532. 
(') Case No IV/M.1381. 
(") Case No IV/M.1601. 
(') Case No IV/M. 1431. 
C') Case T-l02/96 Gemor ν Commission (25.3.1999). 
(
7) Case No IV/M. 1524. 
(") Case No IV/M. 1313.  49 outcome that notifying parties provide the Com­
mission with full and accurate information. By 
imposing these fines the Commission has 
emphasised the importance it attaches to compli­
ance with these requirements. It is also consider­
ing whether it may be appropriate to propose to 
the Council that the maximum amounts of fines 
should be increased. 
Β — New developments 
1. Market definition 
Oil and chemicals 
153. The wave of mergers in the oil and chemi­
cals sector was one of the most important features 
of 1999 and the Commission investigated a num­
ber of operations in this sector. While earlier trans­
actions in the oil and chemicals sector have essen­
tially concerned the combination of businesses in 
limited fields of activities through the constitution 
of joint ventures, a number of the latest mergers 
are more global in the sense that they combine the 
whole of the merging parties' activities. 
154. The Commission opened full investigations 
into three operations in the oil and chemicals sec­
tor (Exxon/Mobil, BP AmocolAtlantic Richfield 
and Totall Elf Aquitaine (')). The analyses cov­
ered the whole oil and gas chain, from oil explo­
ration to refining and retail fuel sales. Of partic­
ular interest is that, for the first time, the Com­
mission investigated in detail the upstream mar­
kets for the exploration and development of 
crude oil and natural gas. These investigations 
were carried out in order to establish whether the 
mergers between Exxon and Mobil and that 
between BP Amoco and Atlantic Richfield would 
result in too small a cluster of oil companies 
capable of searching for and developing the 
unexplored reserves that will be consumed 10 to 
15 years from now. They indicated that the 
so-called 'super majors' (the two merging com­
panies together with Shell) would still face com­
petitive constraints from smaller oil companies. 
Moreover, they revealed that the countries in 
whose territory oil and gas is found have no 
incentives to enable oil companies to restrict pro­
duction. In addition, the Commission found that, 
because of size differences, smaller explorers 
would not compete for the same type of explo­
ration rights as the larger explorers and would not 
be dependent on them to sell their oil. It therefore 
concluded that no dominant positions would be 
created or strengthened in these upstream mar­
kets. 
755. In Exxon/Mobil, the Commission also con­
cluded that there was a separate market for motor 
fuel retailing on toll motorways in France. It 
found that toll motorways in France constitute 
separate product markets by virtue of their spe­
cific characteristics. In particular, it found that 
demand on French toll motorways is captive in 
that the opportunity to leave the motorway to buy 
fuel at off-motorway stations is very limited, 
owing mainly to the payment of a toll. It also 
found that pump prices on toll motorways are 
generally higher than prices on ordinary roads. 
Finally, it found that a number of factors make 
entry to the toll motorway motor fuel retailing 
market more difficult than to the retail service 
station market as a whole. 
Transport and postal sector 
156. During the year, the Commission dealt with 
several cases in the postal sector, a number of 
them involving large national postal companies 
such as Deutsche Post, La Poste and the Dutch 
Post (TNT). The markets for express mail ser­
vices (
2), parcels (
3), freight forwarding (
4) and 
logistics (
5) were all considered. The goal of the 
acquisitions for national postal companies is a 
strategic positioning in a liberalised market envi­
ronment in order to diversify from their tradi­
tional monopoly activities in the face of declin­
ing profits. A 'one-stop shop' with extensive 
product and geographic coverage seems to be of 
advantage in view of the major role delivery ser­
vices will play in the growth of e-commerce. 
157. In the past, the Commission has distin­
guished between the markets for mail, for parcels 
50  (') Case No IV/M. 1628. 
(-) Case No IV/M.1347 — Deutsche PostlSecuricor, Case 
No I V/M .1405— TNT Post G roup/Jet Senices. 
(
3) Case No IV/M. 1371 — La Poste/Denkhaus: Case No IV/M. 1447 
— Deutsche Postitrans-o-fle.x (notification withdrawn); Case 
No IV/M. 1513 — Deutsche PostlDanzaslNedlloyd. 
(
4) Case No IV/M.1410 — Deutsche PostlDanzas; Case 
No IV/M. 1513 — Deutsche PostlDanzaslNedlloyd: Case 
No IV/M.1549 — Deutsche Posti ASG: Case No IV/M.1585 — 
DFDSIFLS IndustrieslDan Transport; Case No IV/M. 1649 — 
GefkolKN Elan. 
(
5) Case No IV/M. 1500 — TPGITecnologistka. Il — MERGER CONTROL 
and for freight forwarding services on the 
grounds that differences in size and format of the 
transported item require different handling and 
sorting equipment. These markets have been fur­
ther segmented according to the speed of deliv­
ery into the markets for express or standard mail 
(parcel, freight). Express services guarantee 
delivery within a certain time, whereas standard 
services only contain a general indication of the 
delivery time. All of the above postal and trans­
port services are offered for domestic and 
cross-border deliveries. However, the Commis­
sion has viewed national and international postal 
services as separate product markets because 
there are differences in price and product, and 
there are frequently different suppliers for 
domestic services on the one hand and interna­
tional services on the other. It has considered that 
the relevant geographic markets for all postal and 
transport services are national, primarily due to 
the national nature of the network infrastructure. 
158. There has recently been a certain shifting 
and blurring of the boundaries between these var­
ious services. Different providers are increas­
ingly tending to design and offer special and per­
sonalised packages of services so as to meet the 
specific needs of certain types of client. These 
services often combine different delivery ser­
vices with each other and with other value-added 
services such as 'track and trace' and they can 
also include features like warehousing, invoicing 
and transport. Depending on the centre of gravity 
of these activities, the Commission has classified 
them either as stand-alone logistics services (') or 
as an add-on service to the delivery services in 
question (
2). Another pattern that has been 
observed is that cooperative ventures between 
mainly regional providers are being replaced by 
integrated European and even wider networks 
both in the parcels and freight-forwarding mar­
ket. The Commission has analysed whether this 
tendency leads to the foreclosure of small and 
medium-sized competitors or to a lessening of 
potential competition (
3). 
159. The Commission has to ensure that the ac­
quisitions of private companies by former State 
monopolies will not serve as a basis to build up 
dominant positions in any particular segment 
and/or geographic area of this fast-developing 
sector. In recent cases involving national postal 
companies, the acquisitions mainly proved to be 
of a complementary nature, thus not leading to se­
rious competition concerns. So far, the Commis­
sion has initiated an in-depth enquiry into just one 
case (Deutsche Postitrans-o-flex (
4)). It should, 
however, be noted that the main concerns raised 
by competitors and customers relate to alleged 
cross-subsidisation and State financing of such 
acquisitions. The Commission is at present pursu­
ing these matters under the State aid rules. 
2. Dominance assessment 
Collective dominance 
160. Following the judgment of the European 
Court of Justice in the Kali und Salz (
5) case in 
1998, where the Court confirmed the application 
of the merger regulation to collectively dominant 
positions, the Commission's jurisdiction to deal 
with oligopolies and the approach adopted was 
confirmed by the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance in GencorlLonrho. The judgment, deliv­
ered in March, is significant in a number of 
respects. First, the Court confirmed the Commis­
sion's approach to tackling collective dominant 
positions. In particular, it accepted that market 
characteristics such as market transparency, 
homogeneity of the product, market maturity, 
low rate of innovation, cost structures and 
multi-market contacts can be used in identifying 
whether markets are prone to oligopolistic domi­
nance. Second, it upheld the Commission's 
analysis as to how the operation would have 
changed the competitive relations between the 
competitors and thereby made anti-competitive 
parallel behaviour more likely. Third, it con­
cluded that structural links are not necessary for 
a finding of collective dominance. Although the 
Court did not provide any guidance as to which 
of the above factors should be considered partic­
ularly important in order to find collective domi­
nance, it accepted that all these factors can be 
indicators of whether markets are prone to 
exhibit anticompetitive parallel behaviour. 
161. The Commission examined the issue of 
collective dominance in four Phase II cases, three 
( ' ) Case No I V/M. 1500 — TPGITecnologislica. 
(
2) Case No IV/M. 1513 — Deutsche PostlDanzaslNedlloyd. 
(
3) Case No IV/M.I513 — Deutsche PostlDanzaslNedlloyd; Case 
No IV/M. 1549 — Deutsche Posti ASG. 
('') Case No IV/M.1447 (notification withdrawn); see also box for 
fines proceedings. 
(') Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic. SCPA and 
EMC ν Commission [ 1998] ECR 1-1375.  51 of them subsequent to the Court's judgment. In minimum of three players in the UK to a maxi-
the AirtowslFirst Choice case, it eventually pro- mum of seven players in Luxembourg). Despite 
hibited the operation on the grounds that it would the relatively low levels of concentration in this 
have led to an oligopoly of three companies on an case, the markets were found to display all the 
already highly concentrated market (see box characteristics typical of markets conducive to 
below). In Exxon/Mobil, it found that the opera- oligopoly. Finally, in Danish CwwnlVestjyske 
tion would have led to a strengthening of the Slagterier, the Commission found that a duopoly 
existing oligopoly in the national long-distance
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many. It also found that, in view of the equity J62 In a„ these cases ^ Commission investi.  links between Exxon, BP/Mobil and Aral and the gated market characteristics such as market  other structural factors of the industry, the opera- transparencVi homogeneity of the product, matu-
tion would have created or strengthened oligopo- rky of the market rate of innovat¡oni similarity of 
listic dominant positions in the markets for the cost structures, multi-market contact, links 
distribution of fuels in Germany, Austria, the (structural or other) in order to establish whether 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK and on French tne markets in question are conducive to oligop-
toll motorways. A point of interest is the fact that, olistic dominance. The Commission has pro-
in motor fuel retailing, the Commission found ceeded on a case-by-case basis in its analysis of 
that the merger would have created or reinforced these characteristics. However, the relevance of 
an oligopoly in a number of national markets each of the market characteristics depends on the 
which were only moderately concentrated (a context of a specific market. 
Box 6: Collective dominance: Airtours/First Choice 
The Commission undertook a detailed investigation of this hostile bid in the UK package holiday sector, 
notified on 29 April. In the light of the results of its investigation, the Commission decided, on 22 Sep-
tember, to prohibit the proposed merger. The grounds for this decision were, in brief, that it would lead to 
the creation of a situation of collective dominance between the merged Airtours/First Choice and the two 
other large, vertically integrated suppliers that would remain (Thomson and Thomas Cook), which would 
substantially reduce competition in the short-haul package tour market in the UK. 
This was the first occasion on which the Commission had prohibited a merger on the grounds of collective 
dominance among more than two firms. However, the question of the applicability of the merger regula-
tion to dominant positions among several firms rather than just one has been considered before ('), and 
there have been a number of cases (including two which were the subject of review by the European Courts, 
see above (
2)) which have dealt with the issue of dominance by two firms (duopoly) and confirmed the 
principle that the regulation applies to collective dominance. 
The UK package holiday sector was found to exhibit a number of characteristics such as market trans-
parency, mature market, low rate of innovation, similarity of cost structures, commercial links between the 
oligopolists (and so on) which made it more likely, in the Commission's view, that the merger would lead 
to collective dominance with substantial adverse effects on competition. 
The structure was highly concentrated even before the merger; the four largest firms, each with a substan-
tial market share individually, had 80 % of the market between them and the merger would bring together 
the second and third largest. 
All four large companies (in contrast to the numerous, but much smaller, competitors who made up the 
remaining 20 % of the market) were fully vertically integrated, both upstream into charter airline opera-
tion, and downstream into distribution via the chains of travel agents which they owned. This tended to 
52 
(') For example, in 1998 in the Phase II cases Price WaierhouselCoopers & Lyhrand (Case No IV/M.1016) and EnsolStora (Case 
No 1V/M.1225) — see the 1998 Competition Report. 
(
2) See also the Commission's 1998 Competition Report. Il — MERGER CONTROL 
align their cost structures. It was also found that important commercial links existed between the four large 
companies — for example, significant supplies of seats on each other's airlines and arrangements to dis-
tribute each other's holidays through their travel agency chains. This increased the transparency of the mar-
ket and reduced the likelihood of strong competition between them. 
Another key feature of the market was the relative inflexibility of supply. Sales volume, and full use of the 
aircraft, was widely considered to be critical to commercial success, especially for short-haul packages 
(essentially those to the Mediterranean area) because unit profit margins are low. Moreover, a holiday is 
valueless if it is unsold by the departure date. But capacity (number of holidays for sale) has to be largely 
fixed well in advance of its being sold, and in particular it cannot be reduced at short notice without risk 
of substantial losses. A tour operator's range of destinations, flight schedule and seat allocations has to be 
set well before its brochure is issued and selling begins. For typical short-haul packages in the UK, this is 
as much as a year before the holiday season concerned. Charter airlines cannot easily reduce their capac-
ity at short notice; flights generally have to be made even if bookings on them are insufficient. This inflex-
ibility created an incentive for the larger, integrated tour operators to keep the market 'tight' and not to 
expand capacity in order to compete aggressively with each other for market share. Oversupply by one sup-
plier would increase the number of unsold holidays, threatening the profitability of all, whereas constrain-
ing capacity would, other things being equal, improve profitability for all. 
The Commission also found that there were potentially significant barriers to expansion by the many 
smaller tour operators to a size comparable to that of the four large firms, and at which economies of scale 
and scope could be maximised so that they could compete effectively with them. In particular, it was con-
sidered necessary for a tour operator wishing to reach such a size to integrate into travel agency, given the 
strength of the agency chains owned by the four large operators, in order to ensure adequate and cost-effec-
tive distribution of the operator's own holidays, and probably also into airline operation. Neither was likely 
to be easily or quickly achievable. In particular, establishing a national travel agency network (whether by 
a series of acquisitions or by organic growth) was likely to be a costly and long-term affair, and alterna-
tives to the traditional method of sales through travel agents' shops (e.g. via the Internet, telephone or mail 
order) did not seem likely to substantially displace them for some time to come, if at all. 
The Commission found that the risk of an oversupplied market, referred to above, would act as a deterrent for 
the oligopolists to compete for market share. It also found that there would be scope for retaliation among the 
oligopolists if one of them were to do so. Against this background, the removal of First Choice as a competi-
tor in tour operation and travel agency, and its likely loss as a major supplier of airline seats to third parties (in 
which it was, unlike some of the other large tour operators, a key player) would, in the Commission's view, 
lead to the creation of a collective dominant position among the three remaining large firms, with significant 
anticompetiti ve consequences. It would strengthen their interdependency, further marginalise the 'fringe' of 
smaller players, and increase market transparency. That would raise the incentives for the oligopolists to re-
strict their capacity, and facilitate the adoption of effective strategies for doing so. 
Single dominance where serious competition concerns arose, were 
abandoned before a formal decision was taken. 
163. The Commission also dealt with a number 
of cases involving single dominant positions. A 164. For example, the transaction which would 
notable feature in 1999 was the large number of have combined the pulping activities of Ahlström 
cases where the parties abandoned the merger and Kvaerner was withdrawn only one day 
plan before a formal prohibition decision was before the Commission could issue a decision 
adopted by the Commission. Even without a prohibiting the operation. The Commission had 
decision, the effect of the Commission's inter- opened a full investigation into this merger fol-
vention in these cases was to prevent the creation lowing a number of complaints and found that the 
or reinforcement of a dominant position to the operation raised serious competition concerns in 
detriment of European consumers. Four cases, a number of markets regarding the worldwide  53 supply of machinery, engineering and mainte-
nance services in the chemical pulping sector, 
where the parties' overlapping activities would 
have created or strengthened a dominant posi-
tion. In particular, the Commission was con-
cerned about the parties' strong position in the 
supply of chemical digesters, components of 
bleaching lines, washing equipment, recausticis-
ing equipment, evaporators, recovery boilers and 
lime kilns as well as the parties' position as 
regards green field operations. The operation 
would have raised similar concerns in relation to 
worldwide refurbishment and maintenance activ-
ities of chemical digesters, washers and recovery 
equipment. The Commission also sought to pro-
hibit the operation on the grounds that the parties 
would have become the only viable full-line sup-
plier in the chemical pulping sector, providing 
incentives and the ability to cross-subsidise in an 
anticompetitive manner between products where 
it would have had a dominant market position 
and those for which it would face more competi-
tion, and also to tie products in competitive mar-
kets to those for other pulp mill equipment, in 
which it would have had a dominant position. 
165. In KLM/Martinair ('), the Commission 
decided to open a full investigation based on 
competition concerns regarding the supply of 
seats to tour operators, for incorporation into 
package tours for Dutch customers, on flights 
from Amsterdam/Schiphol to destinations 
around the Mediterranean. Together, the two air-
lines would have become by far the largest single 
carrier from Amsterdam to these destinations. 
166. KLM is the largest and Martinair the sec-
ond-largest Dutch airline. Both companies are 
based at Amsterdam/Schiphol airport. The opera-
tion consisted of the acquisition by KLM of the 
50 % of those shares in Martinair which it did not 
already own. These shares are currently owned by 
Nedlloyd. The operation was a change from joint 
control of Martinair by KLM and Nedlloyd togeth-
er to one of sole control by KLM. In the circum-
stances of the case, this change would have materi-
ally reduced Martinair's remaining independence 
from KLM, with serious consequences for compe-
tition. The Commission considered that the opera-
tion would have allowed KLM to fully integrate 
the operations of Martinair with those of its sub-
sidiary Transavia. KLM (principally through its 
subsidiary Transavia) already supplied a substan-
tial share of the supply of 'holiday' flights — 
whether on chartered or scheduled services — to 
tour operators in the Netherlands. Martinair is an 
equally significant competitor in this market, and 
together the two airlines supply around two thirds 
of it. The Commission was therefore concerned 
that the operation would have created a dominant 
position, regardless of whether the relevant market 
consisted of individual routes, a bundle of routes to 
certain regions or of all flights to the Mediter-
ranean. A prohibition decision was proposed but 
the parties chose to abandon the operation before a 
decision was taken. 
767. Similarly, the proposed alliance between the 
Rotterdam Port Authority and the containertermi-
nal operators Hutchison and ECT (
2) would have 
led to a significant addition of capacity, given that 
the first, fourth and ninth largest container termi-
nal operations in northern Europe would have 
been brought under the joint control of Hutchison. 
The Commission's investigation showed that the 
merger would have created a dominant position 
for ECT/Hutchison on the market for stevedoring 
services to deep-sea container ships in northern 
Europe. As a result of the merger, ECT/Hutchison 
would have had a market share of 36 % on this 
market with the nearest competitors having less 
than half of the joint market share of the parties. 
However, ECT/Hutchison's combined market po-
sition would have been much stronger than re-
flected by their market share, given their strong 
joint position in transhipment, their leading posi-
tion in Far East cargo and the fact that their termi-
nals are particularly suited to serving larger 
deep-sea vessels. The operation was abandoned 
before a formal decision was adopted. 
In another case, Deutsche Postltrans-o-flex, the 
parties also abandoned their agreement following 
information from the Commission that a state-
ment of objections would be sent setting out seri-
ous competition concerns. 
3. Remedies 
Phase II 
168. In 1999, nine Phase II decisions were 
adopted. Of these, eight resulted in conditional 
clearance decisions. 
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Box 7: Assessment of potential dominance 
Recent merger cases demonstrate that market dominance may be established even at relatively low mar-
ket share (see, for example, RewelMeinl (37 %) and HutchisonlECTIRMPM (36 %). These cases highlight 
the fact that there is no formal threshold in Community merger control for potential market dominance. 
However, ECT/Hutchison's combined market position would have been much stronger than reflected by 
their market share, given specific features such as their joint position in transhipment, etc. The Commis-
sion's assessment in individual cases will be based on an assessment of all the specific features of the mar-
ket concerned. 
769. RewelMeinl (') is a significant retail case 
where the focus of concern was the procurement 
market. The takeover of Meinl, the fourth largest 
Austrian food-retail chain, by the market leader 
Rewe/Billa would have created a dominant posi-
tion on the Austrian food retail market and on 
nine regional procurement markets in Austria for 
daily consumer goods. The Commission consid-
ered the strong link between the retail market and 
the procurement side. A competitor having a 
strong position in retailing and a significant pur-
chasing volume will usually be able to achieve 
better purchasing prices and conditions from its 
suppliers, which in turn can be used to attack its 
rivals on the downstream side. In the present 
case, Rewe/Billa was already market leader, and 
the only retailer expanding at a rapid pace. As a 
result of the acquisition, the new entity would 
have achieved a market share of well over 30 %, 
considerably more than its nearest competitor, 
Spar. In order to evaluate the real strength of the 
new entity on the relevant markets, the Commis-
sion looked at the market shares in combination 
with a number of additional advantages the par-
ties have, such as, for example, their centralised 
structure, their high share of favourable loca-
tions, the high combined share of profitable 
shops, etc. The Commission concluded that the 
operation as notified in its original form would 
also have increased the already existing high 
entry barriers to the Austrian food retail market. 
The parties made comprehensive commitments 
removing the Commission's concerns on both the 
retail and procurement side of the deal. Follow-
ing the commitments, Rewe/Billa acquired only 
34 % of Meinl's food retail activities. Rewe/Billa 
also undertook not to acquire any outlets to be 
used for food retailing in eastern Austria. Fol-
lowing the undertakings, Rewe/Billa will not 
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strengthen its existing strong position and Meinl 
will remain active as a competitor. The reduction 
of market share on the retail market will also have 
a positive impact on the procurement markets by 
reducing the dependency of suppliers operating 
on that market. 
770. In the proposed merger between Danish 
Crown and Vestjyske Slagterier the operation 
would have led to the creation of a duopolisti-
cally dominant position of the parties together 
with another large Danish cooperative slaughter-
house, Steff-Houlberg. The duopoly would have 
accounted for about 70 % of the market for fresh 
pork meat sold through supermarkets. In this 
market, competitive actions by competitors are 
very transparent due to the weekly pig price quo-
tation. In addition, there were a number of struc-
tural links and other similarities between the par-
ties and the number two competitor, Steff-Houl-
berg. In particular, Steff-Houlberg was already 
channelling a large volume of meat through com-
panies controlled by the parties, and the merged 
entity and Steff-Houlberg would have had simi-
lar cost structures, technology and sales chan-
nels. The Commission consequently found that, 
owing to the market structure, neither of the 
duopolists would have had any incentives to 
compete with each other on the Danish market. 
To remedy these concerns, the parties committed 
themselves to abolishing the pig price quotation 
and the related rules concerning the basis on 
which farmers are paid. Furthermore, the parties 
undertook to sever all structural commercial 
links (common sales channels) with third parties, 
notably Steff-Houlberg. Finally, the parties 
undertook to sell slaughter capacity amounting to 
potentially more than 10 % of the Danish con-
sumption of fresh pork meat sold through super-
markets and to loosen the exclusive supply 
restrictions on their farmers to supply other 
slaughterhouses. The Commission found that  55 56 
these remedies would make the market less trans-
parent, allow divergent cost structures, sever the 
links between the parties and their Danish com-
petitors and provide an alternative to Danish 
supermarkets. On balance, the Commission 
found the remedies sufficient to remedy the com-
petition problem created by this merger. 
777. In ExxonlMobil, the operation as notified 
would have created or strengthened dominant 
positions in a large number of markets. Serious 
competition concerns arose, amongst others, on 
the markets for wholesale transmission of natural 
gas in the Netherlands and Germany, motor fuel 
retailing in several Member States, Group I base 
oils (an ingredient for the production of lubri-
cants) in the EEA and aviation lubricants world-
wide. In order to remedy these concerns, the par-
ties offered what is the most comprehensive rem-
edy package accepted under the merger regula-
tion to date. Several of these remedies raised par-
ticularly difficult issues. For example, Mobil 
agreed to withdraw from its joint venture with BP 
covering motor fuel and lubricants retailing in 
Europe. In relation to aviation lubricants, the 
Commission obtained the divestiture of Exxon's 
business after the parties had initially proposed to 
divest Mobil's aviation lubricants business. The 
Commission considered the sale of Mobil's busi-
ness to be inadequate because, even though it 
would have eliminated the overlap between the 
parties, the Commission found that Mobil's busi-
ness was more integrated with the Mobil group 
than that of Exxon. Therefore, Exxon's aviation 
lubricants business was considered to be more 
viable as a stand-alone entity, allowing the even-
tual purchaser to compete independently from 
the parties. 
772. At the same time as the Commission was 
investigating Exxon/Mobil, it was also investi-
gating another important merger in the oil and 
chemicals sector: the takeover by BP Amoco of 
Atlantic Richfield. To illustrate the rapid pace of 
consolidation in this sector, the BP Amoco Group 
had itself only been formed after the merger 
between The British Petroleum Company and 
Amoco Corporation in December 1998. As ini-
tially notified, the operation would have created 
dominant positions on the market for the trans-
port of unprocessed natural gas to the UK main-
land through off-shore pipelines from fields in 
the southern North Sea ('SNS') sector of the UK 
continental shelf and also on the market for pro-
cessing natural gas in processing facilities on the 
UK mainland servicing the SNS area. In order to 
eliminate the competitive concerns, BP Amoco 
undertook to divest certain pipeline and process-
ing interests, which had the effect that the merged 
entity's position remains similar to that of BP 
Amoco's beforehand. 
173. The Commission carried out an in-depth 
investigation into the merger between the 
Swedish Telia and the Norwegian Telenor ('), 
and concluded that the concentration as origi-
nally notified would have caused serious compe-
tition concerns in a number of telecommunica-
tions and related services markets in both Swe-
den and Norway. The operation would also have 
led to adverse competition effects in the Irish 
mobile telephony market, where the merged enti-
ties would have had control over both of the only 
two operators active on the Irish market. Lastly, 
there were serious competition concerns in a 
number of Nordic, Swedish and Norwegian tele-
vision services markets. The operation was sub-
ject to far-reaching commitments to open up 
access to the local access networks for telephony 
as well as to divest Telia and Telenor's respective 
cable-TV businesses and other overlapping busi-
ness. More particularly, Telia and Telenor com-
mitted themselves to divesting all existing over-
laps in the field of telecom services. The parties 
also undertook to sell either company's stake in 
one of the two existing Irish mobile telephony 
operators. The parties also undertook to divest 
their respective interests in cable-TV networks in 
Sweden and Norway and to implement a set of 
measures to promote competition, in the last link 
between the local exchange and the consumer 
(the local loop), in both countries. 
174. The Telia/Telenor case raises a number of 
interesting issues and although the merger has 
since fallen through, the issues of substance in 
the Commission's decision remain valid. Most 
importantly, the decision sets out the Commis-
sion's approach to operations between incumbent 
operators in the EU. In telecommunication ser-
vices and television distribution, the competitive 
analysis has to go beyond issues of direct over-
laps, and the significance of possible network 
effects and foreclosure must be analysed. One 
example of this is that the decision found Telia 
and Telenor to be each other's closest actual and 
potential competitor in Norway and Sweden. It 
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was therefore found that a merger between the 
two companies, even after the proposed divesti-
ture of the nationally overlapping activities, 
would have strengthened their respective domi-
nant positions. The finding that Telia and Telenor 
were each other's closest actual and potential 
competitor was based on past experience as well 
as on the fact that these two companies enjoyed a 
stronger degree of control over their respective 
network infrastructures than any competitor in 
the Nordic area. The pre-merger level of compe-
tition between Telia and Telenor was found to be 
an important price constraint in the relevant mar-
kets, which also benefited other market partici-
pants, owing to the non-discrimination provi-
sions in the applicable telecommunication regu-
lations. Following the merger, this constraint 
would have been removed, and the merged entity 
would have controlled a significant proportion of 
the transmission infrastructure, including access 
to all end-users in Norway and Sweden. The 
merged entity would also have become, to a 
higher degree than Telia or Telenor alone, a nec-
essary contracting party for its competitors. This 
would have enabled them to foreclose access to 
those competitors, thereby reducing the choice 
available to final users. In any future notifications 
of operations involving incumbent operators, the 
Commission will look very closely at access to 
local telecommunications and cable-TV net-
works and may require cable-TV network 
divestitures and/or local-loop unbundling (local-
loop unbundling enables other infrastructure 
providers to offer services over their own infra-
structure leased from the incumbent operator) in 
order to resolve competition issues in line with its 
approach in the telecommunications sector (see 
Chapter I.C.I, above). The decision also illus-
trates the Commission's commitment to main-
taining and developing a level playing field in the 
converging technology markets, télécoms, TV 
and the Internet. In these network industries it is 
particularly important to ascertain that mergers 
and other private initiatives will not foreclose the 
consumer's access to the increased choice made 
possible by the developing technologies. From a 
procedural viewpoint, this merger created issues 
in relation to the timetable for submitting com-
mitments (see box below). 
775. As the Commission's decision not to accept 
the proposed remedies in Airtours/First Choice 
demonstrates, appropriate remedies in oligopoly 
cases can amount, in effect, to attempting to cre-
ate (or recreate) a competing business capable of 
exerting sufficient competitive pressure. As such, 
it is particularly important to ensure that the 
divested assets, together with those (if any) of 
their ultimate acquirer(s), will prove sufficient to 
maintain competition at an acceptable level, 
given also that the market share and strength of 
the merged entity will also have increased as a 
result of the merger. Airtours' principal remedy 
proposal consisted of an undertaking to divest 
certain tour operating assets, including brand 
names and existing bookings, to a suitable third 
party. This proposal was found to be inadequate. 
In particular, it did not address the problem of 
access for the prospective buyer to a suitable 
channel of distribution for its holidays. It would 
not, therefore, remedy one of the main competi-
tion problems of the merger. 
776. This has a number of implications. The 
number of prospective purchasers is reduced by 
the need to exclude, as a rule, the other oligopo-
lists, although suitable acquirers may still be 
found. That will also, other things being equal, 
increase the scale of the divestment needed to 
resolve the competition problem, by comparison 
with cases of single-firm dominance, since the 
buyer's existing business is likely to be much 
smaller. Although this is not a problem confined 
to oligopoly cases, it may be difficult or impossi-
ble for the merging parties to sever a proportion-
ately sized, viable business, as opposed to a dis-
parate collection of assets, from the whole. This 
is not as a rule problematic in many cases where, 
for example, concerns arise in areas which are 
largely peripheral to the parties"core' busi-
nesses. In those cases the whole of the overlap 
can be divested without seriously prejudicing the 
commercial and economic rationale for the 
merger. But where the overlap arises in a core 
business, that may not be possible. In such cases, 
the merger may have to be prohibited. 
777. A more straightforward remedy was found 
in the merger between Sanitec and Sphinx (') in 
the European bathroom products sector. An 
in-depth inquiry into the transaction showed that 
the operation as notified would have led to 
adverse competition effects in ceramic sanitary-
ware and other bathroom products in the Nordic 
countries. The high market shares (up to 90 %), 
the absence of countervailing buying power and 
only marginally present competitors led the 
Commission to conclude that the operation 
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would have had a particularly negative effect on 
Nordic customers. Sanitec subsequently offered 
a full divestiture of Sphinx's Gustavsberg busi-
ness in the Nordic countries. A notable feature of 
these undertakings is that while the Commission 
did not find competition problems in taps and 
mixers as such, the possibility for the potential 
buyer to buy also this business was considered 
important for the viability of the divested busi-
ness. The option to acquire also the taps and mix-
ers business will ensure that the buyer will be 
able to offer a full range of products and compete 
fully with Sanitec on the Nordic market. 
178. In Honeywell·'AlliedSignal, the Commis-
sion's investigation focused on the markets for 
avionics for commercial applications (products 
generally found in aircraft cockpits, such as com-
munication and navigation equipment). The 
operation combined the first and the third largest 
worldwide suppliers of commercial avionics 
with major presence in all aviation segments. The 
combined market shares produced by the merger 
in some markets were as much as 100 % in 
weather radars for civil helicopters and terrain 
awareness warning systems (TAWS). The com-
bined entity would have reached market shares of 
up to 74 % in airborne collision avoidance sys-
tems (ACAS) processors and modeS transpon-
ders and there would have been only one remain-
ing competitor in a market which exhibited high 
barriers to entry. Furthermore, the parties' strong 
position in the market for TAWS would have had 
an effect on the future market for integrated haz-
ard awareness systems (IHAS), since the TAWS 
is a key part of this system. The new entity would 
have been able to technically link its engineering 
force and technology for the next generation of 
IHAS and thereby foreclose competition. 
/ 79. In order to remedy their resulting dominant 
positions, the parties offered to divest Honey-
well's entire ACAS business and AlliedSignal's 
weather radar business. With respect to TAWS, 
commitments were given to supply third parties 
open interface standards of other avionics prod-
ucts of the new entity, so that new suppliers can 
have their products installed on aircraft equipped 
with other avionics from the new entity. Regard-
ing IHAS, there will be an obligation to supply 
third parties with TAWS technology as well as 
interface data so that future product development 
by competing suppliers can continue to take 
place. 
180. These cases and the undertakings on which 
their clearance was conditional demonstrate the 
increasingly complex nature of transactions the 
Commission has to deal with. This, together with 
the fact that complicated undertakings need care-
ful monitoring on the Commission's part months, 
and even years, after the decision has been taken, 
means that the Commission is forced to devote 
more time and resources to the cases concerned. 
Moreover, when the nature of competition prob-
lems becomes such that they require elaborate 
undertakings and mechanisms to remove the con-
cerns, the Commission has to carefully consider 
whether accepting complex undertakings will 
lead to a truly satisfactory result from the com-
petition point of view or whether such transac-
tions should instead be prohibited. 
Phase I 
181. There was a significant upward trend in 
decisions where operations were cleared in Phase 
I only after undertakings were submitted. The 
number of decisions where first phase remedies 
were accepted clearly exceeded last year's total 
of 12 decisions. In 1999, 19 cases which would 
previously have been subject to second phase 
investigations were able to be cleared after six 
weeks with undertakings. 
182. As in cases where the Commission opened 
an in-depth investigation, cases where remedies 
were accepted in Phase I typically involve sub-
stantial and complex divestments. The most com-
prehensive undertakings in Phase I proceedings 
were accepted in the merger between Hoechst 
and Rhône-Poulenc into Aventis ('). Those 
undertakings included the divestment of the 
chemical businesses of Rhodia and Celanese as 
well as Hoechst's veterinary division, HR Vet. In 
addition, the parties submitted commitments in 
response to competition concerns in various 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical markets as 
identified by the Commission during its investi-
gation. 
183. The existence of Phase I remedies facilitates 
the speedy clearance of operations. This can, how-
ever, be done only if the Commission is certain 
that all potential competition problems are re-
solved. Moreover, it is essential that the Commis-
sion be given sufficient time to investigate noti-
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fied transactions, in particular if it is likely that the Commission before the operation was formal-
they could be cleared only subject to undertak- ly notified. Therefore, in cases where the parties 
ings. For instance, despite the need for substantial suspect that the transaction will lead to competi-
undertakings, the HoechstIRhône-Poulenc case tion concerns, it is important that they contact the 
was able to be cleared in Phase I because there Commission at the earliest possible stage, and be-
were detailed discussions between the parties and fore formal notification takes place. 
Box 8: Legal deadlines for submitting undertakings in Phase II cases 
Article 18(2) of the implementing regulation (') provides that commitments offered to the Commission in 
Phase II cases must be submitted to the Commission within not more than three months from the date on 
which the Phase II proceedings are initiated. The Commission may, in exceptional circumstances, extend 
the three-month period. The Commission had to take a stance on the issue of extending the legal deadline 
to accept remedies in Phase II proceedings twice in 1999. 
In Telia/Telenor, the Commission agreed to accept commitments one week after the expiry of the legal 
deadline. In reaching this decision, the Commission took into account the fact that the notifying compa-
nies faced additional and exceptional constraints in submitting the proposed commitments. These addi-
tional constraints were due, not to the companies' ownership structure as such, but to the fact that the 
Swedish and Norwegian Parliaments had to be consulted prior to the submission of the proposed remedies. 
The Commission also took account of the fact that the parties had already indicated what the additional 
commitments would be in their request for an extension and that this request was submitted within the legal 
deadline. The Commission further took note of the clear-cut character of the proposed undertakings, which 
enabled it to conduct a full and proper assessment of the modified proposal. 
In Airtours/First Choice, however, the Commission rejected the submission of undertakings outside the 
legal deadline. The Commission considered a package of possible remedies offered by Airtours shortly 
before the end of the three-month period, but these undertakings were found to be inadequate. Airtours sub-
sequently revised its proposal, but the proposal was submitted to the Commission only after the legal dead-
line to accept remedies had expired. No exceptional circumstances were found to exist in this case. There 
was nothing, in the Commission's view, in the new proposal which could not have been included in the 
original one. Moreover, in order to assess the revised proposal, it would have been necessary to consult 
third parties and liaise with Member States, and this could not have been completed within the short time 
remaining under the statutory period for a final decision. 
These two cases illustrate the difficulties relating to the extension of the time limit to accept undertakings. 
Article 18(2) aims to reconcile two equally important needs: first, the need properly to assess the under-
takings submitted by the parties for the Commission, Member States and interested third parties within a 
reasonable time and, second, the need to take account, in line with the principle of proportionality, of spe-
cific situations justifying a shortening of the time period that is considered necessary to carry out the assess-
ment. The Commission also has to liaise closely with the advisory committee of Member States and time 
may also be needed to negotiate any changes that may be necessary. Moreover, the Commission needs to 
complete the internal procedures leading to the adoption of a final decision by the College of Commis-
sioners within the statutory four-month deadline. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the 
three-month deadline will therefore be considered the strict final deadline for submitting undertakings in 
Phase Π proceedings in future cases. The Commission has outlined the reasons for this time limit in its 
draft notice on commitments, which was released to the general public for comments before the Air-
tours/First Choice case. 
(') Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of 1 March 1998 on the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council Reg­
ulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 
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184. The amendments to the merger regulation, 
which came into force on 1 March 1998, extended 
the regulation's scope to include full function co-
operati ve joint ventures. According to Article 2(4) 
of the merger regulation, a joint venture having as 
its object or effect the coordination of the compet-
itive behaviour of its parent companies also has to 
be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Ar-
ticle 81(1) and (3) of the EC Treaty. In 1999, 19 
such cases were investigated and 15 decisions tak-
en. Four cooperation cases were cleared only after 
the parties submitted undertakings. 
7c?5. In BT/AT&T ('), a Phase II case, there was 
a risk of parental coordination between ACC, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, BT and 
Telewest, in which AT&T, through TCI, holds a 
22 % stake regarding the distribution of 
AT&T/Unisource services in the UK. The Com-
mission raised concerns that the joint venture 
could lead to coordination of the parties' com-
petitive behaviour. In order to remove these 
concerns, AT&T offered to divest ACC UK. 
AT&T also committed itself to more structural 
separation between AT&T and Telewest. Fur-
thermore, AT&T undertook to give another dis-
tributor the option to distribute AUCS services 
(i.e. global telecommunications services offered 
by the company AUCS, a joint venture between 
AT&T and Unisource) in the UK, as AT&T UK 
will be wound up. The Commission declared 
the concentration compatible with the common 
market subject to full compliance with these un-
dertakings. 
186. In the Skandia, Storebrand and Pohjola 
case (
2), concerning the insurance sector, the 
Commission also approved the joint venture with 
commitments. The Commission concluded that 
the operation would have only minor effects on 
competition in the Nordic countries, with the 
exception of Norway, where Skandia has a sig-
nificant market presence through Vesta, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Skandia P&C Insurance 
Company Ltd (pubi). In order to remedy the com-
petition concerns arising from the combined mar-
ket shares of Storebrand and Vesta in Norway, 
Skandia agreed to divest its Vesta Forsikring A/S 
subsidiary there, thus avoiding a further strength-
ening of Storebrand's market position. 
787. In Alitalia/KLM (
3), the Commission autho-
rised the concentration during the first phase inves-
tigation in view of the companies' significant un-
dertakings to promote the entrance of new competi-
tors on two hub-to-hub routes, Amsterdam-Milan 
and Amsterdam-Rome, where the Commission 
found that the alliance between Alitalia and KLM 
would have created a monopoly. To remedy these 
concerns, Alitalia and KLM proposed a set of mea-
sures to facilitate entry in line with previous deci-
sions in the air transport sector (see Chapter I.C.4. 
above). The extensive undertakings offered includ-
ed: a commitment to make available slots to new 
entrants on the routes in question (up to 336 weekly 
slots); a commitment to reduce the parties' frequen-
cies on the Amsterdam-Milan and/or Amster-
dam-Rome routes when an entrant starts opera-
tions; a commitment to enter into interlining agree-
ments with the new entrant and to give any new en-
trant the opportunity to participate in KLM's and 
Alitalia's Frequent Flyer Programme; a commit-
ment to refrain from tying travel agents and corpo-
rate customers in Italy and the Netherlands respec-
tively with loyalty or other similar rebate schemes; 
and a commitment to ensure that, once a competing 
airline has entered on the route(s) in question, the 
first screen of the computer reservation system 
(CRS) is not filled with the flights of the Alliance 
and that consumers will be informed about the pre-
cise code-share arrangements. 
188. The cooperative joint venture between 
Fujitsu and Siemens (
4) was cleared subject to the 
companies' compliance with certain commit-
ments. This operation combines the European 
businesses of Siemens and Fujitsu for the devel-
opment, manufacture and sale of computer hard-
ware and related products, including desktop 
PCs, laptops, workstations, servers and storage 
systems. However, the Commission found that 
there was a risk of parental cooperation on the 
financial workstations market. To address the 
Commission's serious competitive concerns in 
that market, Siemens undertook to divest 
Siemens Nixdorf Retail and Banking Systems 
GmbH, a subsidiary active on that market. 
189. Joint venture cases of this kind involve the 
application of Article 81 and, therefore, are 
mostly dealt with by the antitrust directorates 
within the Directorate-General for Competition 
rather than by the merger task force. 
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Box 9: Fines for supplying incorrect or misleading information in the 
notification 
An important development in merger control was that, for the first time, the Commission used its powers 
to fine companies for supplying incorrect or misleading information in their notifications or during the sub-
sequent investigations. The merger regulation stipulates that the Commission can impose fines of between 
EUR 1 000 and EUR 50 000 where a company provides intentionally or negligently incorrect or mislead-
ing information in a notification or in response to a request for information. 
The Commission fined four companies for infringing the merger regulation. In February 1999, Deutsche 
Post AG notified its planned acquisition of sole control over the German high-speed delivery service, 
trans-o-flex GmbH. According to Deutsche Post, it had acquired a minority shareholding in trans-o-flex in 
1997 but the notification contained facts that pointed to an acquisition of sole control during that time. If 
that had been the case, the Commission would have had no jurisdiction to assess the transaction as noti-
fied in 1999 but, instead, the evaluation of the acquisition of the shares in 1997 would have had to be car-
ried out by a number of national authorities. On the basis of these indications, the Commission requested 
additional information from Deutsche Post and others concerning the 1997 transaction. In the course of 
this investigation, it became apparent that Deutsche Post had deliberately supplied incorrect and mislead-
ing information to deceive the Commission. The Commission's investigation suggested that Deutsche Post 
had exercised control over trans-o-flex since 1997 through its largest shareholder, a company called Indus-
trial Information. Deutsche Post thus committed a serious infringement of two provisions of the merger 
regulation. The Commission therefore imposed two separate fines, the maximum amount of EUR 50 000 
permitted under the merger regulation for each. 
The Commission also imposed a fine on KLM for supplying incorrect and misleading information. KLM 
notified the Commission of its planned acquisition of Martinair in September 1998. The notification was 
subsequently withdrawn. The operation was re-notified to the Commission in December 1998 but aban-
doned in May 1999 after the Commission raised objections against the operation. The Commission started 
proceedings in that case because KLM supplied incorrect information in its first notification, the one issued 
on September 1998. In that notification, KLM submitted incorrect information on the charter destinations 
of its subsidiary Transavia and withheld relevant information on scheduled flights of Transavia. In partic-
ular, KLM gave an incorrect description of the destinations of Transavia and failed to list 10 important 
Transavia destinations. KLM presented the operations of Transavia and of Martinair as 'largely comple-
mentary' while, in reality, both airlines operated to all Mediterranean destinations. Furthermore, KLM 
failed to inform the Commission about the fact that Transavia had substantial scheduled operations to 
Mediterranean destinations and sold a significant number of seats on these flights to Dutch tour operators, 
thereby giving a misleading description of the activities of Transavia. The Commission considered the 
behaviour of KLM to be grossly negligent, at the very least, and imposed a fine of EUR 40 000. 
The Commission decided to impose the maximum fine of EUR 50 000 on Sanofi and Synthelabo (') for 
providing incorrect information. In this case the Commission had to revoke its original clearance decision 
following the discovery that the parties had not provided information on all their overlapping activities. 
The Commission found that possible competition concerns were created also in the area of stupefying 
active substances, which the parties had not described in the notification. As it became clear that the orig-
inal clearance decision was based on incorrect information, it was revoked. A new decision was subse-
quently issued, taking into account the divestment of Synthelabo 's activities in stupefying active sub-
stances. 
These decisions underline the Commission's determination to ensure that firms comply fully with their 
legal obligations. By imposing fines in these particular cases, the Commission emphasises the importance 
it attaches to the requirement under the merger regulation that complete and correct information be sup-
plied. This is essential to enable the Commission to adopt its decisions within the strict deadlines of the 
(') Case No I V/M. 1397. 
61 merger regulation and in full knowledge of the relevant facts. Incorrect or misleading information can lead 
the Commission to take incorrect decisions, with potentially serious effects on businesses and consumers 
in the EU. Therefore, the Commission will continue to strictly apply its procedural rules and to impose 
fines if these rules are broken. In view of the gravity of the infringement of the procedural rules in merger 
cases, the Commission is also considering whether it may be appropriate to propose to the Council that the 
amounts of the. fines, which are currently relatively low, be increased. 
5. Referrals to Member States 
790. Under Article 9 of the merger regulation, a 
case may be referred to a particular Member State if 
the concentration threatens to create or to strength-
en a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition will be significantly impeded on a 
market within a particular Member State which 
presents all the characteristics of a distinct market. 
797. In 1999, three cases were referred in full 
and two partially to Member States. One request 
for referral was refused. In Rabobank-
Beeck/Homann ('), the Commission accepted a 
request for referral made by the German compe-
tition authorities. The case, which concerned the 
German delicatessen food sector, risked creating 
a dominant position in Germany or in part of it. 
As this threat was limited to a distinct market in 
Germany, the Commission referred the case to 
the Bundeskartellamt. The Commission granted 
a referral to Spain in the Heineken/Cruzcampo 
case (
2), which concerned beer distribution in 
Spain.' The grounds for referral were that compe-
tition issues were either regional or national in 
nature. The Commission further decided to refer 
to the French national authorities the proposed 
concentration notified by the two rock-salt pro-
ducers in France, Compagnie des Salins du Midi 
et des Salines de l'Est (CSME) and 
MDPA/SCPA (
3). The planned joint venture 
threatened to create or strengthen a dominant 
position on the market for ice-control salt in the 
north-east of France. In this sector, the dimension 
of the geographic markets is limited by the high 
proportion of transport costs in the final price of 
ice-control salt. An initial analysis of the markets 
showed that the north-east of France could be 
defined as a distinct market. The other French 
regions using ice-control salt were also likely to 
be affected by the operation. On the basis of this, 
the Commission decided to refer the case to the 
French authorities. In addition, the takeover of 
Petrofina by Total was partially dealt with by the 
French competition authorities. The French dealt 
with the effects of the operation on the petroleum 
storage infrastructure in the southern part of 
France (i.e. Languedoc-Roussillon), where the 
transaction raised serious doubts. The Total-
fina/Elf Aquitaine case (
4) was also partially 
investigated by the French authorities. 
792. The UK competition authorities requested a 
referral of part of the Exxon/Mobil case, namely 
that concerning motor fuel retailing in the 
north-west of Scotland. However, the Commission 
had already raised concerns in the motor fuel re-
tailing market covering the whole of the UK. Giv-
en that the request to deal with the effects of the 
merger in the north-west of Scotland fell within the 
scope of this enquiry, the Commission decided to 
deal with these concerns as part of its overall as-
sessment of the UK motor fuel retailing market. 
795. In EDF/London Electricity (
5) the United 
Kingdom authorities requested a referral under 
Article 9(4). The UK authorities were concerned 
that the Director-General of Electricity Supply, 
the statutory electricity industry regulator, should 
remain able to take certain measures to ensure reg-
ulatory transparency and protect consumers. The 
Commission found, however, that the Article 9 re-
quest did not meet the criteria for referral of a case 
to a Member State, because the operation did not 
strengthen a dominant position on either of the 
distinct markets concerned (Article 9(2)(a) of the 
merger regulation). 
6. Decisions under Article 21 
794. In the BSCH/A. Champalimaudcase (
6), the 
Republic of Portugal opposed the operation even 
though it had been cleared by the Commission. 
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By two decisions (of 20 July and 20 October), the 
Commission took action against the Portuguese 
measures. The decisions were adopted pursuant 
to Article 21 of the merger regulation, which 
grants the Commission exclusive powers to 
assess concentration operations having a Com-
munity dimension. In these decisions, and in par-
ticular the final one adopted on 20 October, the 
Commission indicated that the measures of the 
Portuguese authorities could not be regarded as 
protecting legitimate interests within the mean-
ing of Article 21 of the merger regulation. In par-
ticular, these decisions indicate that, in so far as 
the measures of the Portuguese authorities are 
based on the protection of national and strategic 
interests, they are contrary to Article 21 of the 
merger regulation, both because the Portuguese 
authorities failed to notify them to the Commis-
sion and because such interests could not be con-
sidered legitimate. The decision also states that 
the alleged prudential interests advanced by the 
Portuguese authorities could not be considered 
justified. 
795. With the first Article 21 decision of 20 July 
1999, the Commission requested the suspension 
of the decision by the Portuguese Minister for 
Finance to oppose the operation and the measures 
deriving therefrom, such as the suspension of 
voting rights of BSCH and A. Champalimaud in 
Mundial Confiança. The Commission subse-
quently decided to open an accelerated infringe-
ment procedure against Portugal for not suspend-
ing the measures against the BSCH/A. Champal-
imaud operation. This decision was necessary in 
order to reach a prompt solution. The operation 
between BSCH and A. Champalimaud, although 
approved under the EC merger rules, could not be 
put in place. Moreover, Banco Comercial Por-
tuguês announced its intention to launch bids 
over the companies of the Champalimaud group, 
which required that the legal situation concerning 
the control of these companies be clarified 
quickly. 
796. BSCH and Mr Antonio Champalimaud 
subsequently concluded a new agreement which 
replaced the previous one. This operation has 
been notified under the merger regulation and is 
not expected to be opposed by the Portuguese 
authorities. The case is very important for Com-
munity law and the business community, as it 
shows that the Commission can act speedily and 
with determination to reaffirm its exclusive com-
petence in merger matters. In addition, the case 
underlines the importance of transnational oper-
ations in the financial and banking sectors. 
797. In EDFILondon Electricity, as well as sub-
mitting an Article 9 request, the UK authorities 
also submitted a request for the recognition of 
certain 'legitimate interests' under Article 21(3) 
of the merger regulation. Article 21(3) provides 
that Member States may take appropriate mea-
sures to protect 'legitimate interests' other than 
those taken into consideration by the merger reg-
ulation, provided they are compatible with the 
general principles and provisions of Community 
law. Interests relating to public security, plurality 
of the media and prudential rules are expressly to 
be regarded as 'legitimate' interests. Any other 
public interest must be communicated to the 
Commission by the Member State concerned, 
and recognised after an assessment of the inter-
est's compatibility with Community law, before 
the measures referred to may be taken. 
198. The UK authorities argued that the UK had 
a public interest in maintaining the integrity of 
the regulatory system for the electricity sector. 
The UK considered it to be in its public interest 
to be able to make modifications to the statutory 
licence of a public electricity supply company 
('PES'), even in cases where such a company is 
a party to a concentration with a Community 
dimension. The UK therefore proposed modifi-
cations to the licence of London Electricity. The 
Commission, however, concluded that there was 
no need to recognise a 'legitimate interest' as the 
modification to London Electricity's licence pro-
posed by the UK electricity regulator (the Direc-
tor-General of Electricity Supply — DGES) con-
stituted the application of regulatory provisions 
of national law and the modifications were aimed 
not at the concentration itself but at the conduct 
of the merged undertakings after the concentra-
tion, to ensure that the regulator would be able to 
continue to carry out his duties. 
7. Revocation of a Commission decision 
799. In Sanofi/Synthelabo, the Commission re-
voked its clearance decision of 15 March 1999 
pursuant to Article 6(3)(a) of the merger regula-
tion. After receiving third parties' observations, 
the Commission had to consider possible compe-
tition concerns being created in the area of stupe-
fying active substances which the parties had not 
described in their notification. Therefore, the  63 clearance decision was considered to be based on 
incorrect information and the parties were subse-
quently fined (see box). Following the revocation 
decision, the parties submitted to the Commission 
the relevant information relating to stupefying ac-
tive substances. The parties further undertook to 
divest the Synthelabo activities in the area of stu-
pefying active substances and, consequently, the 
Commission adopted the final clearance decision. 
8. Guidance notices 
200. As part of its objective of ensuring the 
transparency and clarity of European merger 
control, the Commission has adopted a number 
of guidance notices in recent years relating to 
various aspects of the merger regulation. These 
guidance notices had previously been the sub-
ject of widespread consultation with Member 
States, industry and the legal profession before 
their final adoption by the Commission. Similar 
consultation exercises were carried out in 1999 
on three draft notices (')· The first was a revi-
(') Draft Commission notices regarding the treatment of ancillary re-
straints, commitments and routine cases under the merger regula-
tion were published on the Competition DCs website 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/lawmerg/draft_notices7tndex.html). 
sion of the current notice on restrictions directly 
related and necessary to the implementation of 
the concentration, which has been in operation 
since the merger regulation first came into 
force. The new draft notice takes into account 
the refinements made to the Commission's prac-
tice since that time. The second is an important 
new draft notice on remedies, which have be-
come a vital tool in addressing competition 
problems raised in a large number of cases. The 
proposed notice sets out the general principles 
applicable, summarises the main types of com-
mitment adopted to date and sets out the sub-
stantive and procedural requirements for sub-
mitting commitments to the Commission and 
their subsequent implementation by the parties 
concerned. The third notice concerns a proposal 
to simplify the handling of routine cases noti-
fied to the Commission. This is essential in or-
der to ensure that the Commission's resources 
are utilised as efficiently as possible. The pro-
posed notice sets out and explains the simplified 
procedure, which provides for approval of rou-
tine cases without a formal decision of the 
Commission. At the same time a number of 
safeguards are introduced to ensure legal cer-
tainty and transparency. The Commission in-
tends to adopt the three notices during the first 
half of 2000. 
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C — Statistics 
Figure 4 
Number of final decisions adopted each year since 1993 and number of notifications 
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66 Ill — STATE AID 
A — General policy 
207. 1999 saw the appointment of a new Com-
mission determined to keep a tight control on 
State aid in all its forms, with the clear goal of 
reducing even further the amount of aid granted 
in the Community. Activities undertaken in pre-
vious years continued, namely work on mod-
ernising and simplifying the procedural rules, 
improving transparency and concentrating 
resources on important cases. 
202. The seventh survey on State aid in the 
Union ('), adopted by the Commission in March, 
covers the period 1995-97. Over this period, an an-
nual average of EUR 95 billion was granted in 
State aid by the 15 Member States (EU-15) to the 
manufacturing, agricultural, fisheries, coal min-
ing, transport and financial services sectors. 
1993-95  1995-97  1995-97 
Geographic area 
Overall aid (million EUR) 
Aid to tbe manufacturing sector (million EUR) 
Aid per person employed (EUR) 
EU-12C) 
101 464 
41 809 
1 460 
EU-12 
88 466 
36 365 
1 298 
EU-15 (") 
95 064 
37 680 
1 261 
(*) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
(") EU-12 + Austria. Finland and Sweden. 
Overall, aid was down significantly (by 13 %) on 
the period 1993-95 (EU-12). In the manufactur-
ing sector alone, EUR 38 billion, or 2.8 % of 
value added, was granted in aid in the Union of 
Fifteen. The amount of aid per employed person 
fell from EUR 1 460 in 1993-95 to EUR 1 298 
(EU-12) in 1995-97. 
203. Over the period 1995-97, regional objec-
tives (
2) were behind 57 % of aid granted to the 
manufacturing sector, while horizontal objec-
tives (
3) and aid to particular industries (
4) 
accounted for 31 % and 12 % respectively. It is 
also noteworthy that aid granted on an ad hoc 
basis to individual firms is now stabilising at 
around 10 % of total aid to the manufacturing 
sector, whereas previous reports emphasised the 
increase in this type of aid. 
204. However, despite the downward trend, the 
seventh survey stresses that, in absolute terms, 
the level of aid remains high. Moreover the sur-
vey also shows, that when expressed for example 
in terms of aid per person employed or aid as a 
percentage of GDP, there are differences in the 
amounts of aid that are granted by different 
Member States. These differences should be 
reduced further. A tough State aid policy, together 
with an appropriate monitoring mechanism, must 
therefore be maintained in order to reinforce the 
C) COM0999) 148 final. 
(
2) Regions assisted under Article 87(3)(a) and (c) of the EC Treaty. 
(·') Research and development, environment, SMEs, trade, energy 
saving and other objectives (principally rescuing and restructuring 
firms). 
(
4) Shipbuilding, steel and other industries. 
competitiveness of the Community on world 
markets and to reap the benefits of the single mar-
ket and of economic and monetary union. 
1. Modernising State aid control 
205. For around two years now, the Commis-
sion, with the support of the Council, has been 
taking various steps to modernise the conditions 
in which State aid is monitored. An overall sys-
tem, which is coherent and effective, provides the 
Commission with a body of legislation and rules 
that allows it to focus on cases with a real impact 
on the common market and eases the administra-
tive burden on firms while ensuring legal cer-
tainty and improving transparency. 
206. Thus the procedural regulation (
5) laying 
down detailed rules on the application of Article 
88 entered into force on 16 April. It sets out and 
codifies established practices and the case law of 
the Court of Justice regarding, for example, dead-
lines within which the Commission must take 
decisions, definitions of existing aid, new aid, 
misuse of aid, individual aid and aid schemes, 
and the rights of interested parties. It will result 
in the State aid rules being better understood. 
207. The procedural regulation also tightens aid 
control. It gives the Commission additional pow-
ers, in particular with regard to the recovery of 
(
5) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty (OJL 83, 27.3.1999).  67 68 
unlawful and incompatible aid. Thus, whereas 
the recovery of incompatible aid used often to be 
delayed by appeals to the national and European 
courts, the procedural regulation stipulates that 
from now on Member States must take all mea-
sures available under their respective legal sys-
tems, including provisional measures, to obtain 
immediate and effective execution of the deci-
sion ordering recovery. Firms in the Member 
States should thus all be dealt with in a similar 
way as regards the repayment of incompatible 
aid. Moreover, the Commission may carry out 
on-site monitoring visits where it has serious 
doubts about whether an individual decision is 
being complied with. Lastly, where it is misused, 
i.e. where it is used by the recipient in a way 
which contravenes a Commission decision, the 
Commission is entitled to initiate the procedure 
laid down in Article 88(2) of the Treaty. 
208. Lastly, the procedural regulation goes some 
way towards speeding up procedures, for example 
by placing a time limit on taking a final decision 
following the initiation of proceedings under Arti-
cle 88(3) of the EC Treaty or by laying down strict 
rules on requests for additional information by the 
Commission and replies sent by the Member 
States in the context of the investigation of a case. 
209. Another aspect of the modernisation of 
State aid control was introduced by Regulation 
(EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998, which enables 
the Commission to adopt block exemption regu-
lations for State aid. These regulations may 
declare certain categories of State aid compatible 
with the Treaty if they fulfil certain conditions, 
thus exempting them from the requirement of 
prior notification and Commission approval. On 
28 July 1999, the Commission adopted three 
draft block exemption regulations concerning 
respectively State aid to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, training aid and the de minimis rule. 
The regulations set out clear rules along the lines 
of existing EU State aid guidelines and frame-
works. The Commission's main objective is to 
free resources from assessing numerous standard 
cases the compatibility of which with EU rules is 
normally not problematic. This will increase effi-
ciency and give the Commission's departments 
more room to concentrate on important cases. 
Member States will take greater responsibility 
for applying EU State aid rules. Businesses will 
benefit from administrative simplification and 
increased transparency. On 24 and 25 November 
the advisory committee on State aid (consisting 
of representatives of Member States) was con-
sulted on the drafts. 
270. A proposal (') for an amendment of the 
transparency directive (
2) was agreed by the 
Commission on 30 March (see below). On 24 
November, the Commission adopted a notice on 
State guarantees (
3), which sets out its approach 
to State aid in the form of guarantees (see below). 
In addition, on 8 July it adopted new guidelines 
on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty (
4) (see below), with a view to tight-
ening control. The validity of the Community 
guidelines on State aid for the environment (
5), 
which entered into force in 1994, expired on 31 
December. In December the Commission 
adopted a decision (
6) extending the validity of 
these guidelines until 30 June 2000. Lastly, on 7 
July the Commission adopted a notice on the ref-
erence and discount rates (
7), which is essentially 
concerned with adapting the relevant rules in the 
light of the introduction of the euro. Thus, the ref-
erence rate for the 11 euro-zone Member States 
will from now on be identical, being defined as 
the average of the five-year interbank swap rates, 
plus a premium of 75 basis points. 
2. State aid and tax policy 
277. There is a general consensus on the need to 
combat harmful tax competition. In accordance 
with the Council conclusions of 1 December 
1997 (
8), the Code of Conduct Group identified 
close on 280 potentially harmful measures. Fol-
lowing a thorough examination by the group of 
all of these measures, 66 have been classed as 
harmful within the meaning of the code of con-
duct. The criteria used to assess whether mea-
sures are harmful or not in the context of the code 
of conduct may, of course, differ from those used 
to make an assessment under Article 87(1) EC. 
The Commission has therefore undertaken to 
study all these measures attentively, in keeping 
with its notice on the application of the State aid 
rules to measures relating to direct business tax-
ei OJ C 377. 29.12.1999. 
(
2) Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the trans-
parency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings (OJ L 195. 29.7.1980). 
(-
1) OJC 71, 11.3.2000. 
C) OJC 288. 9.10.1999. 
(') OJC 72, 10.3.1994. 
(
6) OJC 14, 19.1.2000. 
(
7) OJC 241, 26.8.1999. 
(") OJC 2, 6.1.1998. — STATE AID 
ation (')· Requests for additional information on 
around 50 of these measures have already been 
sent to the Member States. The remaining mea-
sures will be examined thoroughly in the near 
future. 
272. Apart from this general initiative, the Com-
mission closed its formal investigation into the 
scheme offering State aid to non-residential 
building tenants in the customs house docks area 
(CHDA) in Dublin (
2) after the Irish authorities 
limited the period during which tenants may ben-
efit from tax relief under the scheme, bringing the 
deadline forward from a potential 2010 to 2003. 
The decision states that tax exemptions constitute 
operating aid where they relieve an undertaking 
of the expenses it would normally have to bear as 
part of its day-to-day running or normal activi-
ties. The continuous nature of operating aid, in 
particular, points to the conclusion that such aid 
should not, in principle, be authorised for peri-
odic costs that continue to accrue for a significant 
period after the date on which a region ceases to 
fall under Article 87(3)(a). Furthermore, as aid 
schemes, periodic tax exemptions are subject to 
the appropriate measures procedure laid down in 
Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty. 
27J. As regards tax aid for investment in Portu-
gal (
3), the Commission found compatible, with the 
common market, aid whose intensity was limited in 
relation to the costs of carrying out the assisted pro-
jects and which was granted as an incentive to firms 
to undertake specific investment projects. The 
scheme lays down transparent rules which make it 
possible to quantify the advantage conferred on 
each firm. This kind of aid is no different from a 
subsidy and qualifies for the regional exemptions 
under Article 87(3)(a) and (c) of the Treaty, in ac-
cordance with point 31 of the Commission notice 
on the application of the State aid rules to measures 
relating to direct business taxation (
4). 
3. Transparency directive 
274. On 30 March, the Commission adopted a 
draft amendment (
5) to Directive 80/723/EEC (
6) 
(') OJC 384. 10.12.1998. 
(
2) Case C-l/99 (ex NN-133/99). not yet published. 
(
3) Case N-97/99 (OJ C 375, 24.12.1999). 
f) OJC 384, 10.12.1998. 
(') OJC 377, 29.12.1999. 
(*) Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the trans-
parency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings (OJ L 195, 29.7.1980). 
(the transparency directive). In its present form, 
this directive allows the Commission to investi-
gate the financial relations between Member 
States and public undertakings. It requires the 
public authorities to supply information to the 
Commission, on an annual basis for enterprises in 
the manufacturing sector and at the Commis-
sion's request for other enterprises. 
275. The proposed amendment has become nec-
essary in the light of progressive market liberali-
sation in Europe. In recent years the Commission 
has been confronted with a growing number of 
complaints about the behaviour of enterprises 
which have special or exclusive rights and/or 
receive compensation payments for rendering 
services of general economic interest but which 
also operate in competition with other compa-
nies. When dealing with such complaints under 
the State aid rules the Commission has had to 
assess whether or not aid is compatible with the 
common market or qualifies for the derogation 
provided for in Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty. 
276. The amendment aims to create trans-
parency in the accounts of (private and public) 
companies which operate such different activi-
ties. It does not apply to sectors for which another 
Community instrument already requires separa-
tion of accounts (
7), to cases where the contract to 
provide the service of general economic interest 
has been awarded and/or the special or exclusive 
right has been granted by means of an open and 
transparent procedure, or to undertakings with an 
annual total net turnover of less than EUR 40 mil-
lion. 
4. Notice on State guarantees 
277. On 24 November, the Commission adopted 
a notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guar-
antees (
8). The Commission's intention is to make 
its policy in this area as transparent as possible, 
thereby ensuring that its decisions are predictable 
and that equal treatment is guaranteed. The doc-
ument does not lay down any new rules but sets 
out the existing principles of assessment. 
278. State guarantees are usually associated with 
a loan or other financial obligation to be con-
O For example, in the postal, Iclccoms or electricity sectors, accord-
ing to the relevant directives. 
(") OJC7I, 11.3.2000.  69 70 
traded by a borrower with a lender and may be 
granted either as individual guarantees or under 
guarantee schemes. If aid is involved, the benefi­
ciary is in most cases the borrower because he 
can raise funds at a lower cost than would be pos­
sible without the guarantee. The notice explains 
how the aid element of a guarantee should be cal­
culated and sets out several methods for making 
this calculation. 
279. Under certain circumstances (e.g. if a guar­
antee is granted subsequently to cover an existing 
loan without the terms of the loan being 
changed), there may also be aid to the lender. 
This has to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
220. The notice also lists some circumstances in 
which the Commission assumes a priori that no 
aid element is contained in a guarantee. These are 
that the borrower is not in financial difficulty and 
could in principle obtain a loan on market condi­
tions from the financial markets, that the guaran­
tee is linked to a specific financial transaction, is 
for a fixed maximum amount, does not cover 
more than 80 % of the outstanding loan and that 
the market price is paid for the guarantee. Simi­
lar considerations apply to guarantee schemes, 
including that the premium paid by the recipient 
firms should be calculated in such a way as to 
make the scheme, in all probability, self financ­
ing. However, this list does not mean that guar­
antees automatically include aid if not all of the 
conditions are met. 
227. The notice does not address the question of 
compatibility. In that respect the same rules apply 
as to State aid in other forms. 
222. The principles explained in the notice apply 
to all forms of State guarantee, regardless of 
whether they are fixed in a contract or by law. The 
Commission also defines as aid in the form of a 
guarantee the more favourable funding terms 
obtained by enterprises whose legal form pro­
vides an explicit State guarantee or coverage of 
losses by the State. The same applies to the acqui­
sition by a State of a holding in an enterprise if 
unlimited liability is accepted instead of the usual 
limited liability. 
223. Furthermore, the notice explains the conse­
quences of failure to notify State aid in the form 
of guarantees. Guarantees differ from other State 
aid measures (e.g. grants) in that, in the case of a 
guarantee, the State enters into a legal relation­
ship not only with the beneficiary but also with 
third parties, e.g. the provider of a loan which is 
guaranteed by the State. Therefore, it has to be 
examined whether the fact that State aid has been 
unlawfully granted has consequences for these 
third parties also. However, this is a matter which 
has to be assessed under national law. 
Β — Concept of aid 
224. Any State measure that meets the criteria in 
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty constitutes State 
aid and may be incompatible with the common 
market. More specifically, to be caught by Arti­
cle 87( 1 ), the aid must (i) be granted by the State 
or through State resources, (ii) confer an eco­
nomic advantage on the recipient, (iii) be granted 
selectively to 'certain undertakings' or to 'the 
production of certain goods' and thus distort 
competition, and (iv) affect trade between Mem­
ber States. The form in which the aid is provided 
(grant, interest rebate, tax relief, loan guarantee, 
etc.) is not relevant to its assessment under Arti­
cle 87(1). 
225. The qualification of a planned measure as 
State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) is of 
importance to national authorities, obliged as 
they are under Article 88(3) EC and Article 2 of 
the procedural regulation (') to notify it to the 
Commission. Guidance on the definition of State 
aid is also crucial to potential aid recipients inas­
much as they are required to examine the legality 
of the aid they hope to receive. Should a Member 
State be in any doubt as to whether a planned 
measure qualifies as aid, it is strongly advised to 
notify it to the Commission. Otherwise, the recip­
ient runs the risk of having to reimburse the aid 
received, with interest. 
1. Origin of resources 
226. To qualify as aid, the support measure must 
derive from State resources. In Kinderkanal and 
Phoenix (
2) the Commission found that the 
receiver fees collected in Germany from each 
owner of a television set had to be classed as State 
funds. They are mandatory and have to be paid 
irrespective of whether the receiver actually 
watches the programmes of the public broadcast-
(') Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty (OJL 83, 27.3.1999). 
(
:) Case NN-70/98 (OJ C 238, 21.8.1999). — STATE AID 
ers. The funds are collected and distributed on the 
basis of State regulations. 
227. Similarly, the Commission considered pub-
lic funds the amounts that French notaries in rural 
areas have to deposit at the Crédit Agricole 
bank ('). Under French law, these notaries are 
obliged to deposit at the Crédit Agricole funds 
they receive from their clients in connection with 
transactions that have to be carried out by 
notaries. In return, they receive a 1 % commis-
sion for the deposits. The Commission noted that 
the Member State used its discretionary power to 
grant the Crédit Agricole exclusive rights to 
receive financial resources, and that these funds 
came from notaries, who, in France, are 
appointed by a minister and exercise a public 
office. The Commission therefore concluded that 
the amounts deposited by the notaries had to be 
classed as State resources. 
228. In its judgment of 17 June in Industrie 
Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio and 
Dornier Luftfahrt (
2), the Court of Justice found 
that special insolvency proceedings may burden 
State resources. Authorisation to continue pursu-
ing economic activity under special protection 
might involve an additional burden for the public 
authorities if the State or public bodies were 
among the principal creditors of the undertaking 
in difficulties. The latter would enjoy advantages 
at the expense of the State, such as a State guar-
antee, a reduced rate of tax, exemption from the 
obligation to pay fines, or a de facto waiver of 
public debts. 
2. Advantage to a firm or firms 
229. It is the economic advantage conferred on a 
firm by a State aid measure that may lead to a dis-
tortion of competition within the meaning of 
Article 87(1) EC. This advantage may be con-
ferred through a variety of means and circum-
stances and is not derived from the operation of 
the market. Where there is no such advantage, the 
measure does not constitute aid. Accordingly, in 
one case the Commission found that reducing the 
concession fees payable by a public broadcasting 
enterprise did not constitute aid (
3). The reduction 
did not confer an advantage on the firm because 
in this specific case it simply reduced the advan-
tage of its private competitors, which paid even 
lower fees. In a case where a Spanish wine-grow-
ing company received aid for the restoration of 
historic monastery buildings in its possession, the 
Commission also found that no aid was 
involved (
4). The buildings were not used for the 
economic activities of the company, and the sup-
port received covered only a small part of the 
restoration costs. The Commission concluded 
that the recipient did not derive any economic 
advantage linked to its business activities that 
could lead to a distortion of competition. 
230. According to well-established case law, 
partially reducing social security charges for a 
particular industrial sector constitutes aid within 
the meaning of Article 87(1) EC (
5). On 5 Octo-
ber, the Court of Justice ruled in its decision on 
the French textile plan (
6) that there is also an 
advantage where the State grants a reduction in 
social security charges as compensation for addi-
tional costs which the undertakings are incurring 
as a result of collective agreements with the 
unions. These agreements have been voluntarily 
concluded by the companies concerned on the 
basis of the economic evaluation of the parties to 
the agreement. 
231. The advantage is not always apparent 
where it is conferred by means other than a direct 
grant. In its 24 November notice on State guar-
antees (
7) the Commission undertook to assess to 
what extent State guarantees may constitute an 
advantage for the enterprises affected. Where the 
guarantee is given on market conditions the 
Commission assumes a priori that no aid element 
is involved. In its decision in Hoogovens-Usines 
Gustave Boel (
g), for example, the Commission 
found that the intervention of the Belgian author-
ities in the context of the takeover of Hoogovens-
Usines Gustave Boël by Duferco occurred under 
market conditions and therefore did not consti-
tute aid. 
232. In the Tubacex case (
9), however, the Court 
of Justice found that in certain circumstances 
market rates for bank loans are not the appropri-
ci Case C-89/97. 
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tage has been conferred. The Court held that the 
rates a creditor asks for when rescheduling repay-
ment of a debt are determined by criteria other 
than market rates for bank loans. In such a case 
the creditor is not seeking so much to make a spe-
cial profit as to secure recovery of the amount due 
without suffering any loss, e.g. through inflation. 
The Court focused on the question of the back-
ground against which the Commission had to 
assess the presence of aid. Fogasa, an institution 
under the supervision of the Spanish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, has the task of pay-
ing the salaries of employees of companies that 
are not able to pay them owing to insolvency. The 
Court held that this cannot be compared with the 
granting of loans to undertakings in difficulties. 
The debts of the enterprises concerned are auto-
matically run up just as a result of Fogasa taking 
over payment of salaries. Tubacex is legally 
obliged to repay these amounts. Only the repay-
ment arrangements are subject to negotiation. In 
order to quantify possible aid elements, the 
Commission consequently has to analyse a com-
parable market situation in order to determine an 
appropriate reference interest rate. Fogasa there-
fore has to be compared with a private creditor 
trying to recover a loan by means of rescheduling 
the debt and negotiating conditions of repayment. 
The Commission, the Court held, was wrong in 
comparing the interest rate of 9 %, which was 
actually paid, with normal market rates for bank 
loans instead of looking at the rates a private 
creditor in a comparable situation would ask for, 
which presumably would be lower than those 
market rates. 
233. The conditions under which public enter-
prises contract out services to dependent compa-
nies operating on the market may also constitute 
State aid. In the Sécuripost case ('), however, the 
Commission found that the contractual relations 
between the French Post Office and Sécuripost 
respected market prices and therefore did not 
confer an economic advantage on Sécuripost. 
234. A specific situation in which the State's 
behaviour can be compared with market condi-
tions is where it injects capital into its undertak-
ings. Here the Commission applies the private 
investor criterion. On the basis of this criterion, 
the Commission assesses whether the State, 
when assisting public undertakings or private 
undertakings partially owned by it, does so on 
more favourable terms than would a private 
investor operating under normal market condi-
tions. If so, the State's action involves State aid 
within the meaning of Article 87(1). This 
approach was confirmed by the Court of First 
Instance (
2). The Court acknowledged, however, 
that even in private business a parent company 
may, for a limited period, take over the losses of 
its subsidiary companies. This behaviour could 
be motivated by a desire to protect the image of 
the group or to redirect its activities. However, 
the Court found that there had to be a prospect of 
the subsidiary finding its way back to profitabil-
ity. A private investor could not afford to inject 
further capital after years of continuous losses if 
this were more costly than winding up the com-
pany. The private investor principle also applies 
in cases where the State foregoes a return on 
investment that a private investor would seek. In 
its Westdeutsche Landesbank decision, the Com-
mission concluded that the 0.6 % return required 
by the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia was 
below the level a private investor would expect 
when injecting such funds into the capital base of 
a bank. The surrender of appropriate income con-
stitutes aid (
3). 
235. On the other hand, no discriminatory 
advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) is 
conferred on a firm where the State simply buys 
a product or a service from it at the market price. 
Consequently, the Commission has found that 
public support for infrastructure managers 
enabling them to offer a certain service (e.g. the 
construction and operation of toll roads) does not 
constitute aid if the infrastructure manager is 
selected through a non-discriminatory, competi-
tive tender procedure open to all actual and 
potential bidders. It has taken the view (
4) that 
such a procedure is the best means of ensuring 
that the public support corresponds to the mini-
mum needed to carry out the project, thereby 
reflecting the market price for its execution. 
Where there is no call for tenders, the Commis-
sion may, in exceptional circumstances, find that 
public-sector funding represents the market price 
if the State support has been evaluated by an 
independent expert on the basis of generally 
accepted market indicators and valuation stan-
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dards and has been found to represent the mini-
mum price to be paid for a service or good ('). 
236. In a case where a Member State bought 
from a ferry line a predetermined number of 
travel vouchers for a predetermined price (
2), the 
Court of First Instance considered that the price 
did not necessarily reflect the market price. The 
number of vouchers bought was higher than the 
numbers actually used in previous years. In addi-
tion, the vouchers could be used only during the 
low season, thereby relieving the ferry line from 
possibly having to increase its capacity during 
the high season. The transaction was therefore 
considered to confer an advantage within the 
meaning of Article 87(1) EC. 
3. Specificity 
237. In order to determine whether a measure 
constitutes aid, a distinction has to be drawn 
between the situation where the support is 
directed at certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods, as specified in Article 87( 1 ) EC, 
and the situation where the measures in question 
have a cross-sectoral impact, are equally applic-
able throughout the Member State and are 
intended to favour the whole of the economy. In 
the latter case, there is no State aid within the 
meaning of Article 87(1). 
238. Accordingly, the Commission decided on 
11 May that, as a general tax measure, a Dutch 
tax measure involving partially accelerated 
depreciation for R & D laboratories did not con-
stitute State aid (
3). Under the measure, part of the 
investment in an R & D laboratory is eligible for 
accelerated depreciation. The Dutch authorities 
do not have discretionary powers in relation to 
the application of the measure. The measure is 
not sector-specific, it will be open to all compa-
nies on an equal access basis and it is not regional 
or local in scope. It therefore lacks any speci-
ficity. 
239. However, even if a measure is not confined 
to a single sector, it can be considered specific. In 
its judgment of 17 June in Industrie Aeronautiche 
e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio ν International 
Factors Italia and Others (
4), the Court of Justice 
found that the Italian special insolvency proceed-
ings, which derogate from the normal insolvency 
proceedings, had to be considered a specific mea-
sure. The Court noted that the relevant law was 
intended to apply selectively to large industrial 
undertakings in difficulties which owed particu-
larly large debts to certain, mainly public, classes 
of creditors. It also noted that the decisions of the 
Minister for Industry to place the undertakings in 
difficulties under special administration were 
influenced by national industrial policy consider-
ations and were therefore discretionary. In these 
circumstances the legislation related to specific 
undertakings. Likewise, in its Déménagements-
Manutention Transport (
5) decision of 29 June, 
the Court underlined that, where the body grant-
ing financial assistance enjoys a degree of lati-
tude enabling it to choose the beneficiaries or the 
conditions under which the financial assistance is 
provided, the assistance cannot be considered a 
general measure. 
240. The Commission considered a Spanish tax 
credit scheme to be specific because it was 
restricted to large investors. The minimum 
investment (EUR 15 million) required under the 
scheme in order to qualify for the credit was high 
enough to restrict its application in practice to 
investments involving the raising of large 
amounts of capital. This was not justified by the 
nature or overall structure of the tax system to 
which an exception was being made (
6). The fact 
that only large investors could qualify for the tax 
credit made it a specific measure, which in turn 
classified it as State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87( 1 ) of the Treaty (
7). 
241. On 17 June, the Court of Justice confirmed 
the Commission's decision (
8) that the reduction 
of social security charges under the Belgian 
Maribel bis/ter scheme was a selective mea-
sure (
9). Undertakings belonging to sectors of 
manufacturing industry not specified in the royal 
decrees establishing the scheme and undertak-
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C') Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission.  73 ings in the tertiary sector and the building sector 
were not eligible for the reductions under the 
scheme. Neither the large number of eligible 
undertakings nor the diversity and importance of 
the industrial sectors to which those undertakings 
belonged warranted the conclusion that the Mari-
bel bis/ter scheme constituted a general eco-
nomic policy measure. 
4. Effect on trade between Member 
States 
the Commission insisted that State aid must not 
be used for the purpose of compensating border 
companies for differences in taxes between two 
countries (
4). The decision concerned the stations 
not caught by the de minimis rule. The Court of 
Justice confirmed that the fact that a Member 
State seeks to approximate, by unilateral mea-
sures, the conditions of competition in a particu-
lar sector of the economy to those prevailing in 
other Member States cannot deprive the mea-
sures in question of their character as aid (
5). 
242. When the State confers even a limited 
advantage on an undertaking which is active in a 
sector characterised by competition, there is a 
distortion or risk of distortion of competition. In 
order to establish the impact of this distortion on 
trade between Member States, it is sufficient to 
conclude that the beneficiary pursues, even par-
tially, activities involving trade between Member 
States. The Commission thus concluded in 
Marina di Stabia (') that a marina on the south-
ern Italian Tyrrhenian coastline might also attract 
limited demand from as far up as the southern 
French coast and thereby affect trade between 
Member States. For purely local services this 
possibility may sometimes be ruled out. In the 
case of aid to public transport in the lagoon area 
of Venice, the Commission found that a local ser-
vice without potential competition, thanks to an 
exclusive right enjoyed by the operating enter-
prise, does not affect trade between Member 
States (
2). 
243. In a Spanish scheme involving early retire-
ment subsidies for self-employed road 
hauliers (
3) the Commission found no potential 
for distortion of competition. The scheme allows 
self-employed road hauliers aged over 60 to ben-
efit from a subsidy if they definitively leave the 
profession. Since the beneficiaries will terminate 
their business activities, the measure does not 
confer any advantage on undertakings operating 
on the market and cannot have an impact on trade 
between Member States. 
244. In its decision on the payment of compen-
sation to Dutch petrol stations located close to the 
German border for an alleged decline in turnover 
resulting from an increase in Dutch excise duties, 
C — Assessing the compatibility of 
aid with the common market 
1. Horizontal aid 
1.1. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
245. In general the Commission takes a 
favourable view of aid to small and medium-
sized enterprises, given their structural handicaps 
as compared with large undertakings and their 
potential for innovation, job creation and growth. 
On 28 July, the Commission adopted a draft 
block exemption regulation on aid to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The draft fol-
lows the line taken in the existing guidelines on 
aid to SMEs. It furthermore allows investment 
aid to be calculated as aid for job creation linked 
to investment. This means that investment aid 
may be calculated as a percentage of the costs of 
the additional employment created by the invest-
ment. This concept was introduced for the first 
time in the regional aid guidelines. The Commis-
sion has proposed applying it also to SMEs out-
side assisted areas because it favours 
labour-intensive industry more than it does aid 
measured merely as a percentage of investment 
in fixed assets. It might notably help enterprises 
in the services sector. 
246. In its decision on the Danish undertaking 
VaekstFonden (Business Development 
Finance) (
6), the Commission approved a public 
fund the purpose of which is to hand out partici-
patory loans and inject capital into innovation 
and risk capital funds. Investment in the latter is 
74 
(') Case N-582/99. 
(
2) Case C-81/97. 
(■') CaseN-491/99. 
C) CaseC-43/98. 
C) Judgment of 19 May 1999 in Case C-6/97 Italy ν Commission. 
(") Case N-668/98. STATE AID 
undertaken in conjunction with private investors. 
The funds' decisions are based on commercial 
considerations. The Commission found that the 
scheme did not confer an advantage on the pri-
vate investors participating in the funds such as 
might distort competition to an extent contrary to 
the common interest, since it was designed to 
provide them with the minimum incentive neces-
sary to persuade them to take the additional risks 
involved in investing in innovative SMEs. It con-
cluded that any advantage to the SMEs in which 
the funds invested would be within the allowable 
thresholds of the SME and R&D guidelines. 
1.2. Research and development 
247. Aid for research and development is in the 
Community interest and may also be approved in 
the form of ad hoc aid to individual undertakings. 
In the Dornier Luftfahrt case ( ' ), the Commission 
approved a State guarantee for an R & D project 
involving the development of a new family of 
regional aircraft. The measure was considered to 
rank as pre-competitive development and to be in 
line with the Community framework for State aid 
for research and development (
2). Similarly, the 
Commission approved a Dutch aid measure to 
stimulate a long-term research programme at 
Shell Chemicals BV (
3). The programme is a joint 
initiative by the Dutch Government and Shell 
Chemicals. It will focus on three themes: cataly-
sis, pervasive analytical methods and molecular 
toxicology. The research could result in new 
materials, a better understanding of the nature 
and/or composition of materials and product 
streams and a better understanding of how certain 
molecular structures interact with human cells. 
The aid serves inter alia as a catalyst to intensify 
cooperation between Shell Chemicals and the 
academic world and consequently has an incen-
tive effect. The Commission concluded that the 
programme was a combination of basic and 
industrial research and complied with the Com-
munity framework on State aid for research and 
development. 
1.3. Employment and training 
248. One of the major challenges facing the 
Community is finding ways of improving the 
employment situation. The new title on employ-
ment in the EC Treaty requires Member States to 
develop a coordinated strategy for employment 
and for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable 
workforce and labour markets responsive to eco-
nomic change. The important part played by 
training, both in enhancing the Community's 
competitiveness and in creating and maintaining 
jobs, has encouraged Member States to promote 
investment in training. To underline the impor-
tance of this category of aid the Commission 
adopted on 28 July a draft block exemption reg-
ulation on training aid. It is intended to apply the 
provisions of the Community framework on 
training aid (
4). 
249. The Union's interest in assisting job cre-
ation relates, of course, to regular employment. 
The Commission therefore approved on 3 March 
an Italian proposal to grant a reduction in social 
security contributions and a tax amnesty to 
employers who regularise the position of their 
undeclared workers (
5). The Commission 
acknowledged the Community interest in fight-
ing the underground economy. 
250. Aid to maintain employment is similar to 
operating aid. It may therefore be approved only 
under certain conditions in regions eligible for 
regional aid under Article 87(3)(a). In a case con-
cerning the reduction of social security contribu-
tions in the towns of Venice and Chioggia (
6), the 
Commission took a negative decision on aid for 
the maintenance of jobs in the lagoon area, while 
approving that part of the scheme which related 
to aid for the recruitment of disadvantaged work-
ers and for job creation. 
257. In the case of individual aid for employee 
training granted to Eli Lilly Ltd in the United 
Kingdom (
7), the Commission approved a project 
to train the workforce of Eli Lilly, a bio-pharma-
ceutical company. The Commission identified 
the project as a general training project within the 
meaning of the Community framework on train-
ing aid. The project provides skills that are trans-
ferable to other firms in the same industry or to 
firms in related areas of work. Their transferabil-
ity is underlined by the fact that the scheme 
results in nationally recognised qualifications. 
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252. On 22 December, the Commission decided 
to extend the guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection (') until 30 June 2000. After 
that date, new guidelines should become applic-
able. In 1999 the Commission had various oppor-
tunities to clarify its interpretation of the existing 
guidelines. 
253. On 21 April, the Commission decided not 
to raise any objections to several special tax pro-
visions in the German law of January and Febru-
ary 1999 introducing an ecological tax reform (
2). 
The scheme introduced a new tax rate for elec-
tricity and mineral oil but contains several tax 
exemptions, in particular reduced tax rates for 
manufacturing industry, the agriculture and 
forestry sector and rail transport services. 
According to the guidelines on State aid for envi-
ronmental protection, the introduction of envi-
ronmental taxes and charges may under certain 
conditions justify State aid in the form of relief 
from environmental taxes, for example if some 
sectors would not be able immediately to bear the 
extra financial burden and required temporary 
relief. The Commission found that the conditions 
for such an approval were met. It took into 
account the fact that at present not all Member 
States of the Community or third countries 
impose such energy taxes and the introduction of 
environmental taxes therefore affects the com-
petitive position of the undertakings concerned. 
The Commission also took into account the fact 
that the German Government had committed 
itself to renotifying the measures for approval 
after three years at the latest. Similarly, the Com-
mission approved this aid also for the sectors 
falling under the ECSC Treaty (
3). 
254. The Commission insists that aid for invest-
ment in environmental improvements may be 
based only on the additional costs necessary to 
meet the environmental objectives. It therefore 
approved only part of an environmental invest-
ment aid measure proposed by the Dutch Gov-
ernment to support investment in the construc-
tion of a process-integrated gas turbine at the 
Nerefco refinery (
4). It furthermore requires, in 
order to apply the guidelines, that the intended 
aid really serve the objective of environmental 
protection. In the Ferriere Nord case, the Com-
mission had serious doubts about whether the 
environmental protection concern was the pri-
mary goal of the alleged eligible investments and 
opened proceedings (
5). 
1.5. Rescue and restructuring aid 
255. On 8 July, the Commission adopted revised 
guidelines for State aid granted to rescue and 
restructure firms in difficulty (
6). In several 
respects the new wording represents a tightening 
of the rules, in line with the commitment made by 
the Commission in the single market action plan 
in 1997. Aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty has been at the centre of some of the 
largest and most controversial State aid cases in 
recent years. The Commission has repeatedly 
expressed concern at the level of such aid in the 
European Union, which is often given on an ad 
hoc basis in response to a sudden crisis and has a 
particularly distortive effect on the single market. 
256. The new guidelines, which replace the pre-
vious ones adopted in 1994, strengthen the rules 
in several areas. One is that of repeated restruc-
turing aid. The 'one time, last time' principle 
rules out a second payment of restructuring aid to 
a company for 10. years after the end of its first 
restructuring. The text clarifies which firms can 
be considered firms in difficulty, stressing that 
new firms (including firms formed out of the 
assets of previous ones) are excluded. It also 
restricts the ability of Member States to give aid 
approved for other purposes (such as regional 
aid) to companies undergoing assisted restructur-
ing. At the same time, it maintains the basic prin-
ciples of the old guidelines: rescue aid is a 
short-term holding operation while the future 
prospects of the enterprise are assessed, and can 
be granted only in the form of loans or guaran-
tees. Restructuring aid can be granted only in the 
context of a detailed restructuring plan which 
will restore the company to viability. In return, 
the company has to contribute some form of quid 
pro quo such as a capacity reduction. 
257. The new rules cover the special situation of 
the new German Lander. In recent years the 
Commission has made special allowance for 
cases arising there in view of the particular diffi-
culties associated with the region's emergence 
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from a non-market economy. In 1999 as well, the 
Commission had to assess numerous cases con-
cerning companies in the new Länder. The new 
guidelines set clear time limits on this special 
treatment, the Commission being of the view that 
the justification for it is now at an end. The 'one 
time, last time' principle will, in particular, apply 
in full after 31 December 2000. 
258. In many of the German restructuring cases 
the Commission raised no objections. In several 
cases, however, it had reason to insist on viable 
and realistic restructuring plans, for example in 
its decisions in Spindelfabrik Hartha ('), Diesel-
motorenwerk Rostock (
2), Weida Leder (
3) and 
Pittler/Tornos Werkzeugmaschinen (
4). In the 
Graphischer Maschinenbau case (
5) the Com-
mission reduced the proposed amount of aid 
because it exceeded the minimum needed to 
restructure the company. 
259. Restructuring plans may be approved only 
where private investors contribute substantially. 
In Verlipack/Heye-Glas (
6) the Commission had, 
at an earlier stage, concluded that the participa-
tion of the company Heye-Glas in the restructur-
ing of Verlipack constituted the required signifi-
cant private investor's contribution. It turned out 
subsequently, however, that Heye-Glas had itself 
received public funding precisely for the purpose 
of investing it in Verlipack. In this case it is ques-
tionable whether the investment was dependent 
on a private investor's business decision. The 
Commission therefore reopened the proceedings 
under Article 88(2). 
1.6. Aid to outward foreign direct 
investment 
260. Government support measures for foreign 
direct investment constitute State aid. Neverthe-
less, they may be compatible with the common 
market if, apart from their effect on the competi-
tiveness of Community industry, they promote 
other Community objectives such as the devel-
opment of SMEs. When assessing aid to outward 
foreign direct investment by SMEs, the Commis-
sion therefore applies the guidelines on aid to 
SMEs. The Commission approved a Portuguese 
tax aid scheme that provided for aid to be granted 
for direct foreign investment by Portuguese com-
panies (
7). The scheme excluded any direct or 
indirect export aid and required individual notifi-
cation of any aid to a large enterprise and any 
measure in favour of SMEs that provided for 
intensities beyond the 7.5/15 % threshold for 
investment aid. The draft block exemption regu-
lation on aid to SMEs clarifies this approach by 
expressly authorising aid for investment 'inside 
or outside the European Community' (
8). 
2. Regional aid 
267. The guidelines on national regional aid (
9) 
adopted by the Commission in 1997 introduced a 
stricter method for determining the areas eligible 
for regional aid and the associated aid intensities 
or regional ceilings. The Commission wishes in 
this way to demarcate assisted areas more objec-
tively, increase geographical concentration and 
reduce regional aid intensities. The new regional 
aid maps will apply for the period from 2000 to 
2006, which corresponds to the next period of 
Structural Fund operations. 
262. The year 1999 was devoted to implementing 
this reform. The Commission had requested the 
Member States to notify their draft regional aid 
maps before 31 March, but most did so late. The 
Commission was nevertheless able to approve be-
fore the end of the year the regional aid maps for 
Germany's five new eastern Lander ("'), Fin-
land ("), Denmark (
l2), Ireland, Greece and the 
Portuguese regions assisted under Article 
87(3)(a) C
3). In the case of France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands (
l4) and the Article 87(3)(c) re-
gions of Germany (
l5) and Portugal (
16), the Com-
mission found that the draft maps did not comply 
fully with the guidelines, in terms of the bound-
aries of eligible regions and/or the aid intensities 
specified, and decided to initiate the procedure un-
Ci Case 58/97 (ex NN-I35/96) (OJ L 145. 10.6.1999). 
(
2) Case C-6/97 (OJL 232, 2.9.1999). 
(
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C) Case NN-178/97 (OJ C 288, 9.10.1999). 
(
7) Case N-96/99 (OJ C 375, 24.12.1999). 
(
K) Article 3( I ) of the regulation. 
(") OJC 74, 10.3.1998. 
0°) Case N-195/99 (OJ C 340, 27.11.1999). 
(") Case N-238/99 (OJ C 33, 5.2.2000). 
C
2) Case N-229/99 (not yet published in the Official Journal). 
(") Cases N-523/99, N-469/99 and N-305/99 respectively (not yet 
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C
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351, 4.12.1999 and OJC 326. 13.11.1999). 
(") Case C-47/99 (ex N-195/99) (OJ C 340, 27.11.1999). 
0")Case C-78/99 (ex N-305/99), not yet published in the Official 
Journal.  77 der Artide 88(2). The maps for Austria, Spain, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Swe-
den were still being examined under the Article 
88(3) procedure at the end of the year. 
263. The Commission warned Member States 
that any aid granted under schemes that did not 
comply with the regional aid guidelines would be 
unlawful and incompatible with the common 
market; any regional aid disbursed after 1 Janu-
ary 2000 outside regions recognised as qualify-
ing for one of the regional exceptions in Article 
87(1) would also be illegal. Early finalisation of 
the regional aid maps and implementation of the 
appropriate measures accepted by the Member 
States in 1998 is essential in order to enable 
Structural Fund operations under the new pro-
gramming period to begin. 
264. The multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects ('), which en-
tered into force on 1 September 1998 for a period 
of three years, was applied for the first time: the 
Commission decided on 21 April not to raise any 
objection to regional aid which Spain planned to 
grant to the firm Rockwool Pennisular SA (
2). The 
multisectoral framework aims at achieving 
stricter control of cases with a high distortive po-
tential (
3). It awards a 'bonus' to aid for invest-
ments which directly or indirectly create jobs, and 
reduces the amount of aid allowed where the in-
vestment creates an increase in capacity in a de-
clining sector or where overcapacity exists, or in 
cases where the recipient firm holds, before the as-
sisted investment is carried out, a market share of 
at least 40 %. It also takes into account the capital 
intensity of the supported project. The Commis-
sion has shown that it is able to meet the very tight 
deadlines for vetting aid under this framework. 
265. The Commission closed the formal investi-
gation procedure concerning the scheme offering 
State aid to tenants of non-residential buildings in 
the customs house docks area of Dublin (
4), as 
modified by the Irish authorities. The Commis-
sion was concerned about the long-lasting effect 
of the tax benefit involved, which was initially 
planned to extend well beyond 31 December 
1999, i.e. after the expiry of the current more 
favourable map of assisted areas, and potentially 
until 2010. The Commission's concerns were 
heightened by the fact that the case involved both 
tax and operating aid, with regard to which it is 
making special efforts to ensure fair conditions of 
competition. Since the Irish authorities brought 
forward the expiry date of the tax reliefs granted 
by the scheme to tenants from the potential 2010 
to 2003, the Commission concluded that it was 
compatible with Article 87(3)(a). 
3. Sectoral aid 
3.1. Sectors subject to specific rules 
3.1.1. Shipbuilding 
266. Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 
establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding (
5) 
entered into force on 1 January. The regulation 
maintains the possibility of granting operating 
aid for shipbuilding contracts signed before the 
end of 2000. The notifications received by the 
Commission show that the Member States chose 
to continue their existing operating aid pro-
grammes. In accordance with Article 12 of the 
regulation the Commission submitted a report on 
the situation in world shipbuilding (
6), which was 
discussed by the Council on 9 November. The 
report focuses on the critical developments on the 
shipbuilding market in 1998 and early 1999. This 
period was marked by a reduced number of new 
building orders and very low prices. The Council 
adopted the report's recommendations and 
invited the Commission to inform it of develop-
ments as soon as was necessary. 
267. The restructuring period of the State-owned 
shipbuilding group AESA in Spain and of 
MTW-Werft and Volkswerft in eastern Germany 
ended on 31 December 1998. The restructuring 
aid granted to these yards was governed by the 
rules of Council Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 (
7). 
The last tranche of aid to Volkswerft was 
approved on 8 September 1999 (
8). In October, 
the Commission submitted the last report to the 
Council under Article 2 of the regulation (
9). It 
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concluded that in all cases the restructuring pro-
grammes had effectively been completed. The 
two German yards were privatised and sold in 
early 1998 to major shipbuilding groups. These 
yards reported positive results for the first year 
after privatisation. With the exception of one yard 
privatised during the restructuring period, the 
remaining public yards in Spain made substantial 
losses in 1998 and thus failed to achieve their via-
bility target. The Commission will continue to 
monitor compliance with the capacity limitations 
applicable to the yards in Germany and Spain. 
268. In October, the Commission took a nega-
tive final decision on State aid amounting to EUR 
110.9 million in the form of tax credits to the 
Spanish public shipbuilding group AESA('). The 
Commission found that this aid was not compat-
ible with the conditions of the 1997 Commission 
decision on the abovementioned restructuring aid 
for these yards. The aid package approved in 
1997 had included a maximum amount of aid in 
the form of special tax credits of EUR 349 mil-
lion during the period 1995-99, to compensate 
the yards for the fact that they could not benefit 
from tax credits under Spain's general tax con-
solidation system. However, the yards were sub-
sequently integrated into the State-owned hold-
ing company Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones 
Industriales, which was able to obtain tax credits 
under the general tax consolidation system by 
offsetting losses in one part of the group against 
profits elsewhere. These changed circumstances 
resulted in the yards receiving in 1998 a general 
tax credit corresponding to their entitlement to 
such credits on the basis of their 1997 results. 
Nevertheless, despite this, the yards received in 
July 1998 a special tax credit of EUR 110.9 mil-
lion. The Commission concluded that this pay-
ment, although it did not result in the maximum 
amount of special tax credits approved in 1997 
being exceeded, was not justified and was there-
fore incompatible with the original decision. 
269. In July, the Commission found that 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft in eastern Germany had 
exceeded its authorised new building capac-
ity (
2). The Commission decided that the yard has 
to repay EUR 41.5 million plus interest for its 
substantial capacity excess in 1998. During its 
investigations, the Commission discovered that it 
had also breached its capacity restriction in 1997 
and opened the Article 88(2) procedure on that 
matter in July (
3). 
3.1.2. Steel 
270. The sixth steel aid code (
4), which governs 
the grant of aid to the steel industry, remains in 
force until the ECSC Treaty expires in July 2002. 
The code stipulates that only aid granted for 
research and development purposes, for environ-
mental improvements and for social purposes in 
connection with the permanent closure of plant 
can be compatible. 
277. The Commission adopted a final decision 
based on Article 88 ECSC concerning Germany's 
failure to take effective action to recover incom-
patible aid granted to Neue Maxhütte (
5). This 
decision, the last stage in a procedure which 
started in 1998, confirmed that Germany had 
failed to fulfil its obligations under the ECSC 
Treaty. 
272. The Commission is also working closely 
with the candidate countries to ensure that their 
steel industries' restructuring plans are in line 
with the rules followed in the EU during the 
1993/94 restructuring process. The Commission 
ensures that the Council is kept informed of rele-
vant matters as they arise. 
3.1.3. Coal 
273. A number of cases concerned the European 
coal industry. On 22 December 1998, the Com-
mission authorised Germany to grant financial 
assistance to its coal industry for the 1999 finan-
cial year totalling EUR 4 607.3 million (DEM 9 
195.3 million) (
6). Of this amount, EUR 4 226.8 
million (DEM 8 436 million) was linked to cur-
rent production, while EUR 380.4 million (DEM 
759.3 million) went to cover inherited liabilities. 
274. On 20 January 1999, the Commission is-
sued a letter of formal notice to France con-
cerning the aid paid to Charbonnages de 
France (CdF) and authorised by the Commis-
sion in support of production for the financial 
years 1994 (Decision 95/465/ECSC), 1995 
(Decision 95/579/ECSC) and 1996 (Decision 
(') Case C-3/99 (ex NN-145/98) (OJ C 37, 12.2.2000). 
(
2) OJL 274, 23.10.1999. 
(') OJC 245. 28.8.1999. 
(
4) Commission Decision No 2496/96/ECSC of 18 December 1996 
establishing Community rules for State aid to the steel industry 
(OJL 338, 28.12.1996). 
(
5) OJL230, 31.8.1999. 
C) OJL 117, 5.5.1999.  79 96/458/ECSC) (')· It also addressed the years 
1997 and 1998, for which State aid has not yet 
been authorised. The Commission issued the 
letter in response to a complaint from five 
French undertakings concerning the alleged 
misuse of State aid which France grants on an 
annual basis to the public undertaking CdF. It 
claims that the CdF group sells coal at a price 
which is generally lower than the world market 
price, a practice supported by State aid. On 9 
July, the Commission issued a further letter of 
formal notice to France concerning the produc-
tion support aid paid to CdF for the 1997, 1998 
and 1999 financial years and not authorised by 
the Commission (
2). The question arises as to 
whether the loans issued on the financial mar-
kets by CdF, which, in the light of a financial 
analysis carried out by the Commission depart-
ments, appear to be issued exclusively to cover 
operating losses, and the interest charges result-
ing from previous loans fall within the defini-
tion of aid for the purposes of the Community 
rules. Notwithstanding its critical financial con-
dition, CdF enjoys the highest credit rating on 
the international financial markets for its short-
and medium-term loans (Standard & Poor's 
AAA, confirmed by Moody's). In the absence 
of a formal guarantee, the Commission consid-
ers that the confidence thus shown by the inter-
national financial markets can only be explained 
by a tacit guarantee of the French State covering 
loans issued by CdF, which in tum may be con-
sidered undeclared State aid. 
275. On 4 May, the Commission authorised Spain 
to grant financial assistance for the 1999 financial 
year totalling EUR 1 071.3 million (ESP 178 250 
million) (
3). Of this amount, EUR 727.4 million 
(ESP 121 030 million) is linked to current produc-
tion, while EUR 343.9 million (ESP 57 220 mil-
lion) covers inherited liabilities. 
276. On 18 January, a British coal producer 
(RJB Mining pic) lodged an application before 
the Court of First Instance (
4) for annulment of 
the decision concerning the grant of State aid to 
the German coal industry (
5) for the 1998 finan-
cial year. On 3 March, the same producer lodged 
an application before the Court of First 
Instance (
6) for annulment of the decision con-
cerning the grant of State aid to the German coal 
industry (
7) for the 1999 financial year. 
277. Also on 3 March, the same producer lodged 
an application before the Court of First 
Instance (
8) complaining that the Commission 
had failed to consider whether undeclared State 
aid had been involved in the acquisition of Saar-
bergwerke GmbH and Preussag Anthrazit GmbH 
by Ruhrkohle AG. Already on 25 January, a Ger-
man power producer (VASA Energy GmbH & 
Co.) had lodged an application, which has several 
points in common with the one just mentioned, 
before the CFI (
9) against the Commission for 
allegedly failing to take action following its com-
plaint about this issue. 
278. On 9 September, the Court of First Instance 
ruled against RJB Mining on two points of law 
relating to Case T-l 10/98 (
10) with respect to the 
annulment of the Commission decision on State 
aid granted to the German coal industry for the 
1997 financial year (")· 
3.1.4. Motor vehicle industry 
279. The Commission adopted 16 decisions 
relating to the motor vehicle industry during the 
year, including 10 decisions to initiate proceed-
ings under Article 88(2). It authorised EUR 107 
million in regional aid and training aid, and took 
negative or partly negative decisions prohibiting 
EUR 28 million in regional aid. 
280. As far as regional aid is concerned, the need 
for assistance is examined in particular on the 
basis of project mobility, which must be demon-
strated by several factors including a location 
study by the investor. The proposed alternative 
location must be credible in the light of the firm's 
commercial policy, the risks to its image, its 
industrial strategy, etc. If mobility is not proven, 
no aid may be allowed. The Commission also 
checks whether the investor took account of the 
possibility of receiving aid in the decision to 
locate the project in an assisted area. If that is not 
the case, as for example in the negative decision 
it adopted on 22 December on the Fiat Mirafiori 
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Meccanica project ( ' ), the aid is deemed not to be 
necessary for achieving the objectives referred to 
in Article 87(3) and cannot therefore be autho-
rised. 
2S7. The proportionality of regional aid is 
assessed by means of a cost-benefit analysis. This 
takes into account all the factors determining the 
investor's choice of site, giving special attention 
to the production cutback or closure costs that 
would result from a theoretical choice not to 
locate the investment at the selected site. The 
decision taken by the Commission on 29 Sep-
tember on the Mercedes Vitoria project (
2) illus-
trates this practice. The economic risks, for 
example of delay in launching commercial pro-
duction, must also be included in the cost-benefit 
analysis, as can be seen from the decision taken 
on 22 December to initiate proceedings in the 
Rover Longbridge case (
3). 
282. In its judgment of 15 December (
4), the 
Court of First Instance dismissed the applications 
lodged by the Land of Saxony and Volkswagen 
for annulment of the Commission decision of 26 
(') Case C-9/99 (ex N-838/97), not yet published in the Official Jour-
nal. 
(
2) CaseN-697/98(OJC351,4.12.l999). 
(
3) Case C-79/99 (ex N-48I/99) (OJ C 62.4.3.2000). 
(
4) Joined CasesT-I32/96andT-143/96,/
rrmfcrø/5ai7wen, Volkswa-
gen and Volkswagen Sachsen ν Commission. 
June 1996 (
5) on aid granted for the Mosel and 
Chemnitz plants. In addition to its assessments of 
the conditions under which Article 87(2)(c) and 
Article 87(3)(b) apply, the Court confirmed the 
Commission's classification of the investments 
as greenfield or extension projects, which took 
into account the existence on the spot of adequate 
infrastructure, organised logistics, a suitably 
trained workforce and a well-established net-
work of subcontractors. The Court also stressed 
that the Commission was entitled to refer to 
excess production capacities in the motor vehicle 
industry, and therefore to take the Community 
interest into consideration, in refusing to autho-
rise payment of part of the aid in question. 
3.1.5. Synthetic fibres industry 
283. In 1999 the Commission continued to be 
vigilant in applying the code on aid to the syn-
thetic fibres industry (
6) and in actively following 
up enquiries regarding possible breaches brought 
to its attention. In that connection, it took a neg-
ative final decision concerning aid that the Ger-
man authorities proposed to grant to Saxonylon 
Textil GmbH (
7), a subsidiary of the Singaporean 
Tolaram Group. The Commission took into 
(
5) OJL 308, 29.11.1999. 
(") OJC 24. 29.1.1999. 
C) Case C-63/98 (ex N-362/98) (OJ L 268, 16.10.1999). 
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cant countries. It firmly intends to ensure that the existing Community competition rules are applied in each 
of those countries. 
(') OJC 279, 15.9.1997. 
81 account the fact that the project results in a sig-
nificant capacity increase in polyamide filament 
yarn, a product for which there is no structural 
shortage of supply and that the proposed aid 
intensity was double the maximum allowed 
under the code for large enterprises. 
3.1.6. Transport 
Road transport 
284. In the road transport sector, the Commis-
sion decided to propose appropriate measures 
with a view to eliminating, from the end of the 
year, a toll exemption system on the Tauern 
motorway in Austria and an Italian aid scheme 
for helping SMEs to purchase special transport 
vehicles. The latter decision strengthens the 
Commission's policy stance that aid for the pur-
chase of means of transport is not in the Commu-
nity interest in markets suffering from overca-
pacity. 
285. The Commission adopted a favourable 
decision on an aid scheme for restructuring road 
haulage and developing combined transport in 
Italy (')· It took the view that aid for combined 
transport was compatible with the common mar-
ket in so far as it was aimed at promoting opera-
tions that would prove economically viable in the 
medium term and were not liable to cause distor-
tions of competition between operators or 
between combined transport terminals. As far as 
road haulage was concerned, the Commission 
found that the allowances granted to 
self-employed hauliers voluntarily ceasing their 
activity did not constitute aid and authorised inter 
alia the measures designed to encourage the 
upgrading of the vehicle fleet in line with more 
stringent environmental standards. 
286. The Commission approved an Italian aid 
scheme for groupings of businesses ('), which 
forms part of the above measures for restructur-
ing the road haulage industry. In its assessment 
the Commission took note in particular of the 
structural weakness of the sector, which is frag-
mented into over 100 000 mostly small and very 
small operators. 
287. The Commission authorised Spanish indi-
vidual regional aid measures enabling certain 
transport undertakings to obtain ISO 9000 certi-
fication (
2) and found compatible with the com-
mon market a Spanish aid scheme for invest-
ments in IT equipment enabling the recipients to 
connect to infrastructure co-financed by the 
Structural Funds. 
288. In the passenger transport sector, the Com-
mission gave its approval to two schemes in the 
Netherlands, one concerning pilot projects for 
developing innovative, more efficient transport 
systems and the other for restructuring public 
transport in large cities. 
289. It is also worth mentioning that, by dis-
missing the application for annulment brought by 
Italy, the Court of Justice upheld the Commis-
sion's 1996 decision finding that the tax credits 
granted by Italy to professional road hauliers in 
1993 and 1994 constituted State aid that was 
incompatible with the common market and had to 
be recovered (
3). 
Rail transport 
290. In the rail transport sector, the Commission 
authorised a Danish aid scheme for goods trans-
port (
4) intended to compensate for the handicap 
suffered by the railways in relation to road trans-
port and to create a more level playing field 
between the two modes. The aim of the measures 
was to encourage the transfer of goods traffic 
from road to rail by neutralising the external costs 
and infrastructure costs which are not borne by 
road transport. The aid scheme was examined in 
connection with the introduction of infrastructure 
charges payable by train operators using the Dan-
ish rail network. The amount of the grant was 
much lower than the estimated amount of the 
costs not paid by the road haulage sector. Since 
the grant applied without discrimination to all 
goods transport operators and did not affect the 
development of trade to an extent contrary to the 
Community interest, the Commission found that 
the aid scheme was compatible with the Treaty 
rules. 
297. In the context of the introduction of a sys-
tem of energy taxation (Ökosteuer) in Germany, 
the Commission authorised a partial reduction in 
82  ( ' ) Case C-21 /98 (OJ L 227. 28.8.1999). 
(
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a new electricity consumption tax for firms 
engaged in transport by rail or trolleybus. 
Inland waterway transport 
292. In this sector the Commission authorised 
several aid schemes designed to help carriers 
adjust to the opening-up of the market. 
Sea transport 
293. In the maritime transport sector, the Com-
mission continued to develop the approach set 
out inthe Community guidelines on State aid to 
maritime transport (')■ It thus authorised a num-
ber of schemes granting aid in the form of tax 
relief in order in particular to reduce the wage 
costs of crews of vessels operated under the flag 
of a Member State. The approach is designed to 
reverse the trend towards the re-registration of 
vessels outside the Community and stop the 
decline in employment and know-how in the 
maritime transport sector. 
294. The Commission also devoted increasing 
attention to ascertaining whether and under what 
conditions compensation to offset public service 
obligations constitutes State aid within the mean-
ing of Article 87(1) of the Treaty. In this context, 
the Commission opened an investigation into 
finance granted to the Italian group Tirrenia. 
295. In the port sector the Commission autho-
rised tax measures intended to facilitate the 
replacement of obsolete facilities in French 
ports (
2), but found incompatible with the com-
mon market other measures forming part of the 
same aid scheme which concerned the acquisi-
tion of additional new equipment by handling 
firms operating in the ports of Dunkirk and Le 
Havre. 
Air transport 
296. In the air transport sector, the Commission 
cleared an ESP 20 billion (EUR 110 million) cap-
ital injection into the Spanish airline Iberia on the 
grounds that the operation was carried out under 
conditions that would be acceptable to a private 
investor and did not therefore constitute aid 
within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty. 
The Commission based its assessment mainly on 
the principles spelt out in the December 1994 
guidelines (
3) and took account of the improve-
ment in the company's performance since 1996 
and the expectation that it would return to profit 
in the medium term. 
297. On 20 July, the Commission opened pro-
ceedings in respect of a training project for staff 
of the Belgian airline Sabena, taking the view 
that the amount of funding granted far exceeded 
the maximum intensity that may be accepted by 
the Commission under the Community frame-
work on training aid. 
298. On 3 September, the Commission found 
that the scheme involving the award of aid of a 
social character for services to the smaller Sicil-
ian islands was compatible with the common 
market under Article 87(2)(a) of the Treaty. The 
existence of such schemes for assisting the inhab-
itants of remote islands is one of the specific fea-
tures of State aid in the air transport sector. 
299. In the airport sector, the Commission 
authorised public grants for improving infra-
structure at the airports of Manchester and Elba, 
on the grounds that the measures concerned did 
not constitute State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87 of the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, in view of the increasingly impor-
tant commercial role played by airports, the 
Commission is conducting a rethink which could 
call into question its traditional approach 
whereby aid for building or operating airport 
infrastructure does not fall within the scope of the 
Treaty rules on State aid. This rethink is linked 
inter alia to the issues of combined transport and 
transport infrastructure user charges. 
3.1.7. Agriculture 
300. As far as policy developments during the 
year are concerned, following multilateral con-
sultations with the Member States the Commis-
sion adopted a new comprehensive set of Com-
munity guidelines for State aid in the agricultural 
sector (
4). The need to provide a clear account of 
the Commission's practice with regard to the dif-
ferent types of aid that may be considered com-
patible with the common market, together with 
(') OJC 205, 5.7.1997. 
(
2) Case C-42/99. 
(■') Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 
of the EEA agreement to State aids in the aviation sector (OJ 
C350, 10.12.1994). 
(
4) OJC 28. 1.2.2000.  83 the entry into force of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1257/1999 ('), prompted the initiative to 
revise, update and consolidate the rules followed 
by the Commission when assessing Member 
States' proposals to grant State aid in the agricul-
tural sector and applying any of the exemptions 
established by Article 87(2) and (3) EC. In pro-
viding a new, clear framework for the different 
types of State aid allowed, the guidelines take 
particular account of the new developments in 
agricultural policy and especially the need, on the 
one hand, to improve and promote the quality of 
agricultural products and, on the other hand, to 
preserve the environment and the traditional her-
itage in the countryside. 
301. The starting point for the new guidelines is 
that any State aid for the agricultural sector must 
be compatible with the Community's common 
agricultural and rural development policies and 
with its international obligations, in particular the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In particular, 
any State aid which would interfere with the 
mechanisms of the common market organisa-
tions is prohibited because the Member States 
decided, when adopting the CMO regulations, to 
ban any unilateral aid measures which interfere 
with Community support for product prices. Fur-
thermore, in accordance with the principles laid 
down by the Court of Justice, State aid must 
make a real contribution to the development of 
certain economic activities or certain regions. 
State aid which is simply intended to improve the 
financial situation of the recipient, without any 
quid pro quo from the latter, can never be con-
sidered compatible with the EC Treaty. In the 
light of these general principles, the guidelines 
then describe the main types of aid which the 
Commission can accept and the conditions 
attaching to authorisation of the aid. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
— aid for investment on farms can normally be 
permitted at up to 40 % of eligible expenses, 
or 50 % in the less favoured areas; higher 
rates of aid may sometimes be allowed for 
investments linked to the conservation of tra-
ditional landscapes, the relocation of farm 
buildings in the public interest, or the 
improvement of the environment, animal 
welfare or hygiene; similarly, aid for invest-
ment in the processing and marketing of agri-
84  (') OJL 160, 17.5.1999. 
cultural products can normally be permitted 
at rates of up to 40 %, with an extra 10 % for 
Objective 1 areas, provided that it can be 
shown that normal market outlets exist for the 
products concerned; 
— aid granted in return for agri-environmental 
undertakings given by farmers and other 
environmental aid; 
— aid to compensate for handicaps in the less 
favoured areas; 
— aid to help the setting-up of young farmers; 
— aid for early retirement, the cessation of farm-
ing activities, or the closure of production, 
processing and marketing capacity; 
— aid for the establishment of producer groups; 
— aid to compensate for damage caused to agri-
cultural production or the means of produc-
tion by natural disasters or exceptional occur-
rences, adverse weather conditions or out-
breaks of animal or plant disease, and aid 
granted to encourage insurance against such 
risks; 
— aid to encourage the production and marketing 
of quality agricultural products, the provision 
of technical support for producers and im-
provement of the genetic quality of livestock; 
— aid to grant specific support for the outermost 
regions and the Aegean islands. 
302. In addition to these categories of aid, which 
are specifically covered in the guidelines, aid 
may as before also be granted, in accordance with 
other Community provisions, for research and 
development, promotion and advertising of agri-
cultural products, short-term operating loans, 
rescuing and restructuring farms in difficulty, and 
supporting employment. 
303. The guidelines will apply to all new State 
aid measures introduced after 1 January 2000, 
and Member States will be allowed one year to 
adjust their existing aid schemes to comply with 
the new rules. Individual aid already granted to 
farmers under existing aid schemes will not be 
affected by these changes. 
3.1.8. Fisheries 
304. The Commission examined the compatibil-
ity of national aid schemes in the light of the — STATE AID 
guidelines for the examination of State aid to 
fisheries and aquaculture ('), which are based, to 
a large extent, on Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2468/98 of 3 November 1998 laying down the 
criteria and arrangements regarding Community 
structural assistance in the fisheries and aquacul-
ture sector and the processing and marketing of 
its products (
2). The Commission authorised a 
larger number of schemes than in 1998. 
3.2. Specific sectors not subject to special 
rules 
3.2.1. Financial sector 
305. In the course of 1999 the Commission 
approved two cases of restructuring aid in the 
banking sector. The two ailing banks (Crédit 
Foncier de France (
3) and Banco di Sicilia (
4)) 
had received State aid in the context of a restruc-
turing operation carried out by their governments 
(') OJC 100.27.3.1997. 
(
2) OJL312, 20.11.1998. 
(
3) Case C-30/96 (ex NN-44/96). not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
(
4) Case C-16/98 (ex NN-10/98). not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
with a view to their future privatisation. In both 
cases the Commission reaffirmed its policy of 
requiring, as a condition for the approval of 
restructuring aid, an adequate reduction of capac-
ity. The latter took the form of a reduction of 
assets for the mortgage bank Crédit Foncier and 
a cutback of the network for the retail bank Banco 
di Sicilia. 
306. The Commission also applied the 'market 
economy investor principle' in order to decide 
whether a capital injection into a public under-
taking constitutes State aid. Finding that the 
return on the capital provided by the Land of 
North Rhine-Westphalia to Westdeutsche Lan-
desbank Girozentrale (
5) did not correspond to 
what a market economy investor would have 
demanded, the Commission decided that the 
transaction involved State aid. Since this aid 
could not be found compatible the Commission 
required the German Government to recover the 
aid from WestLB. The Commission is currently 
investigating similar transactions by other public 
German Landesbanks. 
(') Case C-64/97 (ex NN-175/95), not yet published in the Official 
Journal. 
3.2.2. Audiovisual sector 
Box 11: State aid to public broadcasters 
Since 1992 more than 10 complaints have been lodged with the Commission, alleging that the financing 
of certain public broadcasters in several Member States is incompatible with the EC Treaty rules. In 
November 1996, the Commission adopted its first decision in this field (RTP — Portuguese public televi-
sion service) ('). The Commission's task was made easier by the fact that RTP had a very clear public ser-
vice mandate and a transparent analytical accounting system. The Commission decision has been chal-
lenged before the Court of First Instance (
2). 
In September, the CFI ruled against the Commission for failing to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty 
by not taking a decision following the two complaints lodged by the applicant in a Spanish case (
3). On 3 
June, it ruled against the Commission for a second time in the similar case Télévision Française I (TF1) 
ν Commission (
4). The Court held that since the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the com-
patibility of State aid with the common market, it must, in the interests of sound administration and the 
fundamental Treaty rules on State aid, conduct a diligent and impartial examination of any complaint alleg-
ing that State aid is incompatible with the common market. Following this judgment for failure to act, in 
October 1998 the Commission departments presented a discussion paper to the Member States in an 
attempt to develop a common framework for dealing with State aid in broadcasting. 
(') Case NN-I4I/95 (OJ C 67,4.3.1997). 
(
2) Pending Case T-46/97. 
(
3) Case T-95/96 Gestevision Telecinco ν Commission. 
(") Case Τ-17/96. 
85 In this discussion paper, the Commission departments tried to address the main issues raised by the pend-
ing State aid cases involving public broadcasters, while presenting some ideas on how fair competition 
between public and private broadcasters can best be ensured, with a view to stimulating discussion with 
the Member States. 
However, most Member States were opposed to the adoption of guidelines and expressed their preference 
for a case-by-case approach; the Commission therefore began to deal with the pending cases, in order of 
receipt. In February, it sent three requests for information to Italy, France and Spain, requiring them to pro-
vide all the data needed to assess whether the aid was new or existing, i.e. introduced before the entry into 
force of the Treaty. In respect of these cases, it also opened the formal investigation procedure for some ad 
hoc measures granted to the Italian and French public broadcasters, as they could not be considered exist-
ing aid (having been introduced and granted in the 1980s and 1990s). 
In 1999, the Commission also approved the funding of two newly launched special-interest channels 
(Phoenix and Kinderkanal) (') by the German public broadcasters, entirely financed with a licence fee, and 
of a 24-hour news service by the BBC (
2), also funded solely by a licence fee. In both cases, the Commis-
sion, taking into account the specific features of the services, did not detect any abuse of the Member 
States' powers to define the public service remit. It considered that the broadcasters were entrusted with 
those tasks by an official act of the authorities, that the funding system would not distort the development 
of trade to an extent contrary to the common interest and that the exemption for undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest provided for in Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty 
therefore applied. 
In the coming months, the Commission will have to conclude its analysis of the pending cases taking into 
account the relevant provisions laid down in the Treaty, and the Protocol of Amsterdam. Regardless of 
whether the aid is found to be existing or not, the Commission will direct its action to ensuring that public 
service mandates as defined by Member States are transparent and that the funding scheme, as decided by 
the Member States, shall respect the principle of proportionality and not affect trading conditions and com-
petition in the Community to an extent contrary to the common interest while the realisation of the remit 
of that public service shall be taken into account. 
( > ) Case NN-70/98 (OJ C 238, 21.8.1999). 
, (
2) Case NN-88/98. not yet published in the Official Journal. 
D — Procedures 
307. With regard to procedure, 1999 was marked 
by the entry into force of the procedural regula-
tion on 16 April ('). While the regulation codifies 
and clarifies the rules on procedure which up to 
now were enshrined only in Commission practice 
and decisions, the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance had several occasions to further 
elaborate on the procedural aspects of State aid 
control. 
1. Ex post authorisation of aid already 
paid 
308. In RJB Mining ν Commission (
2) the Court 
of First Instance (CFI) confirmed that the ruling 
given by the Court of Justice in Boussac (
3), 
namely that the Commission may also approve 
illegal aid which has been paid prior to approval, 
applied to the coal sector. It stated that there is 
nothing in the code on State aid for the coal 
86 
(') Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty (OJL 83. 27.3.1999). 
(
2) Judgment of 9 September 1999 in Case T-UO/98. not yet reported. 
(■') Case C-301/87 France ν Commission [ 1990] ECR 1-307. — STATE AID 
industry (') to prevent the Commission from 
examining the compatibility of planned aid with 
the common market where the Member State 
which notified that planned aid has already paid 
it without waiting for prior authorisation. 
Although the prohibition in Article 4(c) of the 
ECSC Treaty is more strictly worded than that in 
Article 87 EC, the CFI held that the substantive 
and procedural provisions in the coal aid code of 
1993 and the system established by Articles 87 
and 88 EC do not differ in principle. The Com-
mission therefore has the power to give ex post 
facto approval to aid paid prior to authorisation. 
2. Rights of third parties 
309. In several decisions (
2) the Court of First 
Instance had to deal with the start of the time limit 
for lodging an application for judicial review of 
Commission decisions. According to the terms of 
Article 230(5) EC the date of publication of the 
measure or of its notification to the complainant 
is relevant for the start of the time limit. Only in 
the absence thereof, the Court held, may the date 
on which it came to the knowledge of the appli-
cant, for example through publication in the 
press, be seen as the start of the time limit. This 
is notably the case where the Commission has 
committed itself to publishing the decisions. 
310. In an application for annulment brought by 
the regional authorities of Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
against a Commission decision not to authorise 
aid which the region planned to grant, the Court 
of First Instance ruled on 15 June (
3) that such 
applications may be brought by any parties that 
fulfil the objective conditions laid down, i.e. any 
parties that have the necessary legal personality 
and are individually and directly concerned by 
the decision being challenged, in accordance 
with the criteria laid down in Article 230(4) EC. 
This applies also where the applicant is a regional 
administrative entity. The aid measures con-
cerned by the contested decision are measures 
taken by virtue of the independent legislative and 
financial powers directly conferred on the region 
by the Italian constitution. The applicant is indi-
vidually and directly concerned because the deci-
sion affects the acts of the region and prevents it 
from exercising its own powers as it sees fit. The 
contested decision furthermore prevents the 
applicant from continuing to apply the legislation 
in question, cancels its effects and requires the 
applicant to initiate the administrative procedure 
for recovering the aid from the recipients. 
377. The Court of First Instance (
4) confirmed, 
on the other hand, that an association formed to 
further the collective interests of a category of 
persons cannot be considered to be individually 
concerned within the meaning of Article 230(4) 
EC by a measure affecting the general interests of 
that category. The Court held that, in the absence 
of special circumstances such as the role which it 
could have played in the procedure leading to the 
adoption of the measure in question, such an 
association is not entitled to bring an action for 
annulment where even its members may not do 
so individually. The Court considered that to hold 
such an association's action admissible in the cir-
cumstances of this case, in which its members are 
not individually concerned and in which the 
applicant has no standing on its own, would have 
the consequence of allowing natural and legal 
persons to circumvent Article 230(4) of the 
Treaty by means of a collective action. 
572. As in a similar case in 1998 (
5), a television 
broadcasting company won an action for failure 
to act brought before the Court of First Instance. 
In the judgment it delivered on 3 June (
6), the CFI 
confirmed that the Commission cannot prolong 
indefinitely its preliminary examination of gov-
ernment measures which have been denounced 
as incompatible with Article 87(1) EC, where it 
has agreed to initiate such an examination. The 
Court has consistently held that the Article 88(2) 
procedure must be initiated whenever the Com-
mission has serious difficulties in determining 
whether an aid measure is compatible with the 
common market. The CFI considered that the 
application was well founded because when the 
Commission was given formal notice to act its 
preliminary examination had lasted for 31 
months and it was unable to demonstrate that 
(') Commission Decision No 3632/93/ECSC of 28 December 1993 
establishing Community rules for State aid to the coal industry (OJ 
L329.30.I2.1993). 
(
2) Cases T-l4/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande (BAI) v Commission, 
T-110/97 Kneissl v Commission, T-123/97 Salomon v Commission 
and T-89/96 British Steel v Commission, not yet reported. 
(
3) Case T-288/97 Regione autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia v Com-
mission, not yet reported. 
(
4) Case T-86/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-
Unternehmen v Commission (1999] ECR 11-179. 
(') Case T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission [ 1998) ECR II-
3407. 
C') Case T-17/96, Télévision française I (TFI)v Commission, not yet 
reported.  87 there were exceptional circumstances explaining 
why it had taken so long. 
ery decision cannot be shown to be impossible 
where no attempt to recover the aid has even been 
made. 
3. Recovery of aid 
313. At nearly 18 % of all cases dealt with by the 
Commission, the number of State aid measures 
that have not been notified to the Commission is 
still too high. It is therefore significant that the 
Court has confirmed the Commission's policy of 
consistently ordering the recovery of aid that has 
been granted in violation of the notification 
obligation and is incompatible with the common 
market. Article 14 of the new procedural regula­
tion requires Member States to execute recovery 
decisions immediately and effectively (')· This 
policy should increasingly induce recipients of 
State aid to verify whether the support they 
receive is in line with Community State aid rules, 
this being the only way to avoid the risk of recov­
ery. To be convincing, recovery orders need to be 
genuinely executed. In the Magefesa case (
2) the 
Commission therefore decided on 13 October to 
refer to the Court of Justice the matter of 
non-compliance of the Spanish authorities with 
the recovery order. 
314. Furthermore, the Commission applied the 
principle that, in appropriate circumstances, 
effective execution of its decisions may require 
the lifting of the corporate veil and recovery of 
aid not just from the original recipient, but also 
from other undertakings controlled by the same 
persons to which the beneficiary's assets have 
been transferred. This principle is based on con­
siderations of economic attribution of the benefit. 
575. In Italy ν Commission (
3) the Court of Jus­
tice confirmed that implementation of the recov-
4. Cooperation with national courts 
576. In 1999, the Commission received four 
information requests from the Pamplona Court of 
First Instance in the context of civil proceedings. 
The requests concerned details of the same 
alleged State aid received by a Spanish company. 
They also asked for copies of any complaints and 
decisions taken so far. In its joint response of 1 
June to the Spanish court the Commission 
recalled that, on the basis of the notice on coop­
eration between national courts and the Commis­
sion in the State aid field (
4), national courts may 
ask the Commission for information of a proce­
dural nature to enable them to discover whether a 
particular case is pending before the Commission 
or has been the subject of a notification, or 
whether the Commission has officially initiated 
proceedings or taken any other decision. National 
courts may also consult the Commission where 
the application of Article 87(1) or Article 88(3) 
causes particular difficulties. In accordance with 
the notice the Commission will not go into the 
substance of the individual case or the compati­
bility of the measure with the common market. 
577. The Commission consequently informed 
the Spanish court that it had in 1996 received 
three complaints in the matter, that the case was 
still being examined and that, since the case was 
not closed, it was not possible to forward a copy 
of the complaints or of the other documents and 
information which existed in the file, including 
the amounts of aid granted, or to communicate 
the contents thereof, until the Commission had 
taken a decision. 
(') Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty (OJL 83. 27.3.1999). 
(
2) CaseC-44/97. 
(
3) Case T-6/97, not yet reported.  C) OJC 312, 23.11.1995. 
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E — Statistics 
Figure 6 
Trend in the number of aid cases registered (other than in agriculture, fisheries, transport and 
coal) between 1994 and 1999 
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Trend in the number of decisions taken by the Commission (other than in agriculture, fisheries, 
transport and coal) between 1994 and 1999 
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90 IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
A — Enlargement 
1. Pre-accession 
1.1. Implementing rules 
318. With a view to further completing the legal 
framework for relations between the Community 
and the 10 associated countries of central and 
eastern Europe (CEECs) in the field of competi-
tion, two sets of implementing rules have been 
subject to negotiations with the CEECs. The first 
concerns the implementation of the competition 
provisions of the Europe agreements applicable 
to undertakings. The second relates to the rules 
concerning State aid. 
579. Implementing rules for the competition 
provisions applicable to undertakings have 
already been adopted for seven CEECs, namely 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic (')· 
The European Commission has presented its pro-
posal to the Council for implementing rules with 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (
2). These are 
expected to be adopted in early 2000. The word-
ing of the implementing rules is basically the 
same for all of the associated countries. They 
contain mainly procedural-type rules, i.e. rules 
regarding competence to deal with cases, proce-
dures for notification of cases to the other party, 
consultation, comity and the exchange of infor-
mation. 
320. The Czech Republic is the only associated 
country where the implementing rules for State 
aid are currently in force (
3). The implementing 
rules constitute a two-pillar system of State aid 
control. On the Community side, the European 
Commission assesses the compatibility of State 
( ' ) Decision No 2/97 of the association council of 7 October 1997 (OJ 
L 15, 21.1.1998). Decision No 1/96 of the association council of 
30 January 1996 (OJ L 31, 9.2.1996). 
Decision No 1/99 of the association council of 28 April 1999 (OJ 
L 144,9.6.1999). 
Decision No 2/96 of the association council of 6 November 1996 
(OJL295, 20.11.1996). 
Decision No 1/96 of the association council of 16 July 1996 (OJ 
L208, 17.8.1996). 
Decision No 1/99 of the association council of 16 March l999(OJ 
L96, 10.4.1999). 
Decision No 1/96 of the association council of 15August I996(0J 
L 295, 20.11.1996). 
(
2) COM0998) 68 final, 4.3.1998; COM0998) 119 final, 4.3.1998; 
COM( 1999) 353 final, 14.7.1999. 
(
3) Decision No 1/98 of the association council of 24 June 1998 (OJ 
LI95, 11.7.1998). 
aid granted by EU Member States on the basis of 
the Community State aid rules. On the side of the 
Czech Republic, the Czech national monitoring 
authority is to monitor and review existing and 
new public aid granted by that country, on the 
basis of the criteria arising from the application 
of the Community State aid rules. The imple-
menting rules include procedures for consulta-
tion and problem solving, rules on transparency 
(i.e. the Czech Republic is to draw up and there-
after update an inventory of its aid programmes 
and individual aid awards), and rules on mutual 
exchange of information. During 1999, the Euro-
pean Commission presented proposals for State 
aid implementing rules (
4) with regard to seven 
CEECs: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovenia (
5). 
527. Generally, the adoption and proper applica-
tion of implementing rules for State aid is, apart 
from wider policy considerations, also seen as an 
important step towards reducing any possible 
trade friction between the Community and the 
third country in question, because it may, if prop-
erly implemented, eliminate the need for either 
party to have recourse to action under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM). 
1.2. Enhanced pre-accession strategy 
322. A major element of the enlargement 
process is the so-called enhanced pre-accession 
strategy, which centres on accession partnerships 
and increased pre-accession aid. The accession 
partnerships, which are revised regularly, bring 
together in one document the priority areas in 
which each candidate country needs to make 
progress in order to prepare itself for membership 
in the EU. They also define ways in which EU 
financial assistance of various types and through 
different programmes, in particular the Phare 
programme, will support their efforts to do so. On 
6 December, the Council adopted the principles 
and priorities of the new accession partnerships 
for the 10 central and east European candidate 
countries (
6). On 22 December, the European 
Commission adopted accession partnerships for 
each of these 10 candidate countries. Legislative 
C) Bull. 7-8/1999. 
(') COM(1999) 354 final, 14.7.1999-COM(1999) 357 final, 
14.7.1999; COM(1999) 359 final, 14.7.1999; COM(l999) 360 
final, 14.7.1999; C0M(I999) 362 final, 14.7.1999. 
(") COM(1999)521 final-COM(1999) 532 final, 13.10.1999.  91 alignment, enforcement, institution building and 
transparency in the fields of antitrust and State 
aid are among the most important priorities iden-
tified by the European Commission in the differ-
ent accession partnerships. 
323. The accession partnerships are comple-
mented by the national programmes for the adop-
tion of the acquis (NPAA), drawn up by each of 
the 10 candidate countries. The NPAAs give 
details of these countries' commitments with 
regard to making progress in accordance with the 
priorities laid down in the accession partnerships. 
1.3. Progress in alignment of competition 
rules 
324. The European Commission reports regu-
larly to the European Council on progress made 
by each of the candidate countries towards acces-
sion. The second regular reports for the 10 
CEECs, Cyprus and Turkey ('), adopted by the 
European Commission in October, assess 
progress made since the previous reports deliv-
ered by the European Commission in 1998. In 
1999, the European Commission adopted a regu-
lar report also for Malta (
2) alongside its updated 
opinion on Malta's application for member-
ship (
3). 
325. In the past year, most of the candidate coun-
tries have taken decisive steps in preparing or 
passing new competition legislation, or have 
amended existing laws, in order to further align 
these with Community law. The competition 
authorities in these countries have also gained 
further experience in the enforcement of their 
competition legislation. However, on several 
occasions the European Commission has empha-
sised the need for the competition authorities of 
the candidate countries to further strengthen their 
independence, investigative powers, powers to 
impose fines, and the need for them to increase 
their resources. 
326. In contrast with the progress made in the 
field of competition, the introduction of proper 
State aid control in the candidate countries has 
92 
(') COM(1999) 500 final-COM(l999) 507 final, 13.10.1999; 
COM(1999) 509 final-COM (1999) 513 final, 13.10.1999. See 
also (http://www.curopa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ 
rcport_ 10_99/intro/indcx.htm). 
(
2) COM( 1999) 508 final, 13.10.1999. 
(■') COM(1999) 69 final, 17.2.1999. 
been slow or inadequate. While a number of 
countries have introduced or are now in the 
process of adopting rules on the control of State 
aid, a lot of work remains to be done. As a matter 
of priority, many candidate countries still need to 
establish comprehensive inventories on existing 
aid in order to ensure transparency in this field. 
Despite the fact that the CEECs have submitted 
annual reports to the European Commission on 
the volume of aid granted in these countries, as is 
required under the Europe agreements, the Euro-
pean Commission still remains concerned about 
the lack of a comprehensive picture of the State 
aid situation in most CEECs. 
327. A second priority for the candidate coun-
tries is to set up or strengthen their State aid mon-
itoring authorities, and to ensure an effective 
monitoring of State aid. This is of the utmost 
importance in order to establish a sound and sys-
tematic State aid control in these countries. Most 
of the candidate countries have already clearly 
designated a monitoring authority. However, 
legal procedures and the necessary powers, 
and/or resources to ensure genuine control of 
new and existing State aid in these countries, are 
still lacking in many respects. 
328. Finally, with regard to approximation of 
legislation, while certain countries have adopted 
or are currently preparing substantive and proce-
dural rules in this field, the European Commis-
sion notes that most candidate countries are gen-
erally lagging behind the level that is required at 
this stage in the run-up to accession. 
1.4. Technical assistance 
329. In view of these remaining shortcomings, 
technical assistance in the field of competition 
remains an essential tool to prepare the candidate 
countries for accession. Specific actions are 
being undertaken in the framework of the Phare 
programmes. Under the institution building 
('twinning') arrangement, EU Member State 
experts are now also providing advice on a 
long-term basis to the competition and State aid 
authorities in the CEECs. 
330. The European Commission has pursued a 
proactive policy of further intensifying its con-
tacts with the competition authorities of the 
CEECs and between those authorities. On 28 and 
29 June, the fifth competition conference of the 
CEECs and the European Commission took IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITES 
place in Krakow, Poland. The delegations 
included high-level officials from the competi­
tion and State aid authorities of the CEECs and 
the Commission. The annual conference serves 
as a forum for the exchange of views and experi­
ence in the field of approximation of legislation 
and enforcement. It also serves to establish and 
strengthen professional contacts between offi­
cials responsible for competition in the European 
Commission and in the CEECs. 
557. The Competition DG continued to con­
tribute to workshops and study visits organised 
by the European Commission's Technical Assis­
tance and Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) 
in the field of competition. The annual joint train­
ing sessions on competition were organised by 
the Competition DG, in cooperation with TAIEX, 
for officials from the candidate countries in 
November and December. 
332. The Competition DG continued to hold 
various bilateral meetings with the competition 
and State aid authorities of the candidate coun­
tries. Technical discussions at expert level were 
held on competition law approximation, institu­
tion building and enforcement. Discussions on 
specific State aid issues, such as the set up of a 
State aid inventory, regional aid maps, assess­
ment of individual cases in sensitive sectors, 
were also held during ad hoc meetings with the 
candidate countries. 
334. In the context of the enlargement negotia­
tions on the competition chapter, the European 
Commission assessed the negotiating positions 
submitted by Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Esto­
nia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The Euro­
pean Commission's evaluation of these appli­
cants' capability to meet the accession criteria in 
the field of competition was reflected in the com­
mon positions adopted by the EU in May. The 
common positions identified a number of issues 
that warranted further information and/or clarifi­
cation from the applicants. Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia sub­
mitted to the accession conference modifications 
and/or supplementary information to their initial 
negotiating positions in summer 1999. On the 
basis of these, the EU adopted revised common 
positions on the competition chapter in Novem­
ber. Poland submitted an addendum to its negoti­
ating position in October and a revised common 
position still needs to be adopted by the EU. For 
all six countries, the competition chapter remains 
open, mainly due to insufficient progress made in 
the field of State aid. 
Β — Bilateral cooperation 
1. North America 
1.1. United States 
2. Accession negotiations 
333. In order to identify potential problems with 
the candidate countries in view of their capabil­
ity to implement Community law upon acces­
sion, a number of screening meetings on the com­
petition acquis were organised with the applicant 
countries in 1998. The multilateral screening 
meeting took place with all candidate countries in 
May 1998. In autumn 1998, the competition 
acquis was screened bilaterally with the six coun­
tries, with which negotiations had started in 
March 1998 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Esto­
nia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). With the for­
mer 'pre-in' applicant countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Repub­
lic) the bilateral screening exercise was carried 
out in March and April 1999. The first round of 
multilateral and bilateral screening of the compe­
tition acquis was held with Malta in November 
1999. 
1.1.1. Implementation of the 1991 
cooperation agreement (') and of the 1998 
positive comity agreement (
2) 
335. Every year, the Commission reports to the 
Council and the European Parliament on its 
cooperation activities with the US under the 1991 
agreement. The last report covered the period 
from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998 (
3). 
336. During 1999, the Commission cooperated 
with the Antitrust Division of the US Department 
(') Agreement between the European Communities and the Govern­
ment of the United States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws (OJ L 95. 27.4.1995, as corrected by OJ 
L 131, 15.6.1995). 
(
2) Agreement between the European Communities and the Govern­
ment of the United States of America on the application of posi­
tive comity principles in the enforcement of theircompclilion laws 
(OJL 173, 18.6.1998). 
(') Adopted on 13 September 1999, COMO 999) 439 final; see 1998 
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of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) in a substantial number of cases. 
Beyond the specific case-related benefits arising 
out of this intensive cooperation for both compe-
tition authorities and private parties involved (in 
terms of a more rapid and coherent management 
of cases on both sides of the Atlantic), the close 
daily contact between case teams in the Commis-
sion (Competition DG) and the US DoJ and FTC 
is conducive to mutual confidence building, 
accrued knowledge of the substantive and proce-
dural rules in each other's jurisdictions, substan-
tial convergence in competition analysis, and the 
development of 'best practices' in both substan-
tive and procedural matters. 
337. Bilateral cooperation was particularly 
intensive with regard to the large oil merger 
cases, most notably with regard to the 
Exxon/Mobil merger. Informal contacts between 
the FTC and the Commission started soon after 
the announcement of the Exxon/Mobil transac-
tion (December 1998), long before the formal 
notification occurred in May 1999. This allowed 
the EU and US authorities to discuss the particu-
lar competition concerns for future oil and gas 
output which they feared might stem from the 
creation of so-called 'super majors'. Following 
notification, and having obtained waivers from 
the merging parties which permitted the EU and 
US authorities to exchange confidential informa-
tion, assessment of much of the substance of the 
case was carried out in close cooperation 
between the agencies. Commission staff visited 
their FTC counterparts, reviewed documents at 
FTC premises, and there were regular telephone 
calls, exchanges of documents, and other con-
tacts between the two case teams. Discussion 
between staff on both sides focused most closely 
on the assessment of the effects that the proposed 
transaction was likely to have on competition in 
the upstream markets (exploration, development, 
production and sale of crude oil and natural gas). 
The likely impact of the merger on the market for 
aviation lubricants was also the subject of close 
discussion. Indeed, cooperation still continues 
with regard to the implementation of the reme-
dies that were agreed in both jurisdictions. 
338. Other cases which involved close transat-
lantic cooperation included inter alia the Allied 
Signal/Honeywell, Hoechst/RPR, Astra/Zeneca, 
and Air Liquide/BOC merger cases. Case-related 
EC-US cooperation is discussed in further detail 
in the fifth report to the Council and the European 
Parliament for the year 1999, which will be pub-
lished during 2000. 
1.1.2. Administrative arrangements on 
attendance at hearings in individual cases (') 
339. The Commission adopted on March 31a 
text setting forth administrative arrangements 
between the competition authorities of the Euro-
pean Communities and of the United States con-
cerning mutual attendance at certain stages of 
proceedings in individual cases involving the 
application of their respective competition rules. 
The arrangements are bilateral and reciprocal in 
nature. They provide that a request for attendance 
at a hearing or meeting may be granted in appro-
priate cases, subject to confirmation of satisfac-
tory assurances or arrangements regarding confi-
dentiality and the use of information. Attendance 
will be possible only with the express consent of 
the persons concerned by the enforcement pro-
ceedings in either jurisdiction, and the arrange-
ments do not in any way limit the rights enjoyed 
by those persons. 
340. The arrangements will contribute to 
improving mutual understanding by the competi-
tion authorities of their respective procedures, as 
well as to enhancing coordination, cooperation 
and avoidance of conflicts in appropriate cases of 
mutual interest. Neither these administrative 
arrangements, nor the letters exchanged between 
the Commission and the US competition author-
ities, constitute a binding international agree-
ment. 
1.1.3. EU-US working group on cooperation 
in global merger cases 
547. At a bilateral meeting held on 5 October 
between the Commission's Competition DG, the 
US DoJ and the US FTC, it was agreed to set up 
a working group designed to intensify transat-
lantic cooperation in the field of merger control. 
This working group has been mandated to focus 
on: (i) the scope for further convergence of analy-
sis/methodology in merger cases being treated in 
both jurisdictions, particularly regarding the 
respective EU and US approaches towards oli-
gopoly/collective dominance; and (ii) an 
in-depth study of the respective EU and US 
approaches to the identification and implementa-
(') Bulletin of the European Union (March 1999). IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITES 
tion of remedies (in particular, divestitures), and 
to post-merger compliance-monitoring. The 
working group is expected to conclude its delib-
erations during 2000. 
1.2. Canada 
342. On 17 June, a competition cooperation 
agreement was signed between the European 
Communities and the Canadian Government. It 
entered into force immediately. The draft agree-
ment had been approved by the European Parlia-
ment in February, and by the Council of Minis-
ters in May. 
343. The agreement will facilitate increased 
cooperation between the European Communities 
and Canada with respect to the enforcement of 
their respective competition rules. An increasing 
number of cases are being examined by both 
competition authorities, and there is conse-
quently a growing recognition of the importance, 
on the one hand, of avoiding conflicting deci-
sions and, on the other, of coordinating enforce-
ment activities to the extent that this is considered 
mutually beneficial by both parties. 
344. In substance, the agreement is very similar 
to the one entered into between the EU and the 
US in 1991. Essentially, it provides for (i) the rec-
iprocal notification of cases under investigation 
by either authority, where they may affect the 
important interests of the other party; (ii) the pos-
sibility of coordination by the two authorities of 
their enforcement activities, and of rendering 
assistance to each other; (iii) the possibility for 
one party to request the other to take enforcement 
action (positive comity), and for one party to take 
into account the important interests of the other 
party in the course of its enforcement activities 
(traditional comity); and (iv) the exchange of 
information between the parties, while not affect-
ing either party's confidentiality obligations with 
respect to such information. 
345. There has already been active cooperation 
in a number of merger cases since the entry into 
force of the agreement. The first post-agreement 
bilateral meeting between the Commission's 
Competition DG and the Canadian Competition 
Bureau was held in Ottawa in September. As with 
the EU-US agreement, the Commission will 
report annually to the Council and Parliament 
detailing cooperation under the agreement with 
Canada. 
2. Other countries 
2.1. Japan 
346. The Commission finalised a new list of pro-
posals for further deregulation in Japan. The list in-
cluded a series of proposals in the area of competi-
tion. The new EU proposals focused on 3 points: 
(i) more effective enforcement of the 
Anti-monopoly Act (AMA); 
(ii) further suppression of exemptions and 
exceptions under specific laws and the 
AMA, and clarification regarding excep-
tions and exemptions that will remain in 
force; and 
(iii) examination by the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (JFTC) of all administrative 
guidance — written and oral — to check for 
conformity with anti-monopoly guidelines 
coupled with publication of the results. The 
new package was officially given to Japan 
during an EU-Japan high-level meeting on 
3-5 November in Tokyo. 
347. The annual bilateral meeting between the 
Commission and the JFTC took place in Tokyo on 
28 and 29 October. Commission officials stressed 
that progress has been made towards deregulation 
of competition in Japan, adding, however, that a 
great deal of regulatory reform is still needed to 
create an open, transparent and fully functioning 
competitive market economy, fully accessible to 
domestic and foreign business. Particularly, in the 
field of competition policy, Japan needs to enforce 
existing anti-monopoly rules more vigorously, 
eliminate exemptions, challenge cartels notably 
in the wholesale distribution system and subject 
'administrative guidance' to rigorous scrutiny for 
compatibility with competition law. The tolerance 
of anticompetitive practices cannot be in the 
long-term interest of promoting efficiency in and 
helping restructuring of the Japanese economy. It 
will also be important to ensure and perhaps 
strengthen the independence of the JFTC when it 
is placed under the Ministry of General Affairs 
(MG A) in 2001, as part of the central government 
reorganisation, and to maintain the integrity of its 
personnel system and budget. 
348. Further, the Commission delegation stated 
its interest in reinforcing bilateral relations with 
Japan in the area of competition. The two sides 
envisaged exploring the possibilities for a coop- 95 96 
eration agreement similar to the EU agreements 
with the US ( 1991 ) and Canada ( 1999), as well as 
to the recent US-Japan agreement (1999). 
Besides talks on the possibilities for closer coop-
eration, the two sides discussed recent develop-
ments in the area of competition policy in the EU 
and Japan, and exchanged views on selected car-
tel and merger cases. They also discussed the 
progress of preparations for the WTO ministerial 
conference in Seattle, where they will both push 
for negotiations to be launched towards a multi-
lateral framework for competition rules. 
2.2. Turkey 
349. Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey association 
council, implementing the final phase of the cus-
toms union being created between the Communi-
ty and Turkey, and Article 7 of the Turkey-ECSC 
free trade agreement require the adoption of rules 
for the implementation of the competition provi-
sions. These implementing rules should establish 
a framework for the application of the antitrust 
and State aid rules by inter alia specifying the re-
spective functions of the Community's and 
Turkey's competition authorities, and by putting 
in place a structure for consultation and coopera-
tion between those authorities. It is expected that 
substantive discussions between the Commission 
and the Turkish authorities will be launched in the 
near future, aimed at the adoption of such rules. 
2.3. Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS 
350. The partnership and cooperation agree-
ments (PCAs) which the EU has concluded with 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and most of the other 
former Soviet Republics contain — to a greater 
or lesser extent — a commitment by these coun-
tries to move towards an approximation of their 
competition and State aid legislation with that of 
the Community. Although progress is slow, the 
EU-Russia, EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova PCA 
joint committees have now established subcom-
mittees, with the task of overseeing inter alia the 
fulfilment of the commitments in the field of 
competition and State aid; these subcommittees 
met on several occasions during 1999. A number 
of Tacis projects, with the task of providing rele-
vant expertise, are also being undertaken. 
2.4. Mediterranean countries 
351. An association agreement was concluded 
between the EU and Egypt during the course of 
1999. Agreements have already been concluded 
with Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority. Others are being negotiated with Alge-
ria, Lebanon, and Syria. The provisions on com-
petition contain clear commitments aimed at 
bringing the competition policies of the countries 
concerned into line with the Community arrange-
ments. Proposed implementing rules for the com-
petition provisions in the association agreements 
are being prepared, and it is expected that these 
will be forwarded to the Community's Mediter-
ranean partners during the course of 2000. Like-
wise, in the context of 'the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership and the single market', seminars 
aimed at furthering cooperation with the MED 
countries are planned for next year. 
2.5. South Africa 
352. The European Union and South Africa con-
cluded a free trade agreement in 1999. The agree-
ment contains provisions concerning competition 
and State aid, including provisions on coopera-
tion between the EU and South African competi-
tion agencies, and provides in particular for pos-
itive and traditional comity. This means that the 
EU and South Africa have the possibility of 
requesting each other to take enforcement action, 
and that they must take into account each other's 
important interests in the course of their enforce-
ment activities. 
353. New South African competition legislation 
came into force during 1999. The legislation 
includes provisions relating to merger control, as 
well as prohibitions on anticompetitive restric-
tive arrangements and on the abuse of a dominant 
position. A new independent enforcement 
agency, the Competition Commission, has been 
established, as well as a specialised Competition 
Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court. 
2.6. Latin America 
354. A free trade agreement between the EU and 
Mexico was concluded during 1999. The agree-
ment provides for a mechanism of cooperation 
between the competition authorities of both par-
ties. This mechanism provides for: coordination 
of certain enforcement activities; the exchange of 
information; the investigation of allegedly anti-
competitive behaviour in one party's territory 
when it prejudices the interests of the other party; 
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mechanism will ensure more transparency in 
competition enforcement, and should improve 
the effectiveness of that enforcement. 
355. During 1999, the Commission received a 
mandate from the Council of Ministers to open ne-
gotiations with Mercosur and Chile aimed at the 
conclusion of a free trade agreement. It is envis-
aged that this agreement should contain provi-
sions on competition, and on cooperation and co-
ordination between competition authorities. Ne-
gotiations commenced in November, and will 
continue for some time. Moreover, proposals for 
technical assistance to Mercosur and the Commu-
nidad Andina will be made during the course of 
next year, on the basis of a report compiled during 
1999. It should also be added that, thanks to the in-
tervention of the Commission, a first meeting was 
held during 1999 between the member countries 
of Caricom, to examine draft competition rules for 
the Caribbean common market. 
C — Multilateral cooperation 
1. WTO: Trade and competition policy 
356. The WTO working group on the interaction 
between trade and competition policy held three 
formal meetings in 1999 (19-20 April, 10-11 
June and 14 September). At the meetings in April 
and June, consideration was given to the full 
range of topics called for in the decision of the 
WTO General Council: 
(i) the relevance of fundamental WTO princi-
ples of national treatment, transparency, and 
most-favoured-nation treatment to competi-
tion policy and vice versa; 
(ii) approaches to promoting cooperation and 
communication among Members, including 
in the field of technical cooperation; and 
(iii) the contribution of competition policy to 
achieving the objectives of the WTO, includ-
ing the promotion of international trade. 
357. The principal purpose of the meeting held 
on 14 September was to review and adopt the 
working group's report (1999) to the General 
Council. 
358. In preparation for the third WTO minister-
ial conference in Seattle (3.12.1999) the EU 
tabled proposals for the launching of negotiations 
towards a multilateral framework of competition 
rules. Negotiations should focus on three main 
elements: 
— first, all WTO members should introduce 
basic competition rules and enforce them; 
— second, core common principles should guar-
antee a degree of coherence and commonality 
between WTO members, and 
— third, cooperation between competition agen-
cies in member countries should be possible 
through a multilateral instrument. 
359. The Council conclusions on October 26 
1999, regarding the ministerial conference in 
Seattle included the following passage on com-
petition: 'The WTO should begin negotiations on 
a basic framework of binding core principles and 
rules on domestic competition law and policy and 
its enforcement. The WTO principles of trans-
parency and non-discrimination would provide 
key foundations for the development of such core 
principles and rules. The WTO should also aim at 
developing common approaches on anticompeti-
tive practices with a significant impact on inter-
national trade and investment as well as on the 
promotion of international cooperation. The 
development dimension should also be at the 
centre of the considerations of such a multilateral 
framework by combining possible transitional 
periods together with technical assistance and 
flexibility in the rules.' 
360. No agreement was reached between the 
WTO members at the ministerial conference in 
Seattle regarding the launch of a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Consequently, no 
actual negotiations are taking place at this point 
in time regarding trade and competition. 
However, the WTO working group on trade and 
competition is expected to continue its meeting 
activities during the year 2000 and the Commu-
nity and its Member States will continue to fur-
ther clarify its position on the need for multilat-
eral competition rules. 
2. OECD 
567. The Commission played an active part in 
the work of the Committee on Competition Law 
and Policy of the OECD, especially in the round  97 tables and working party meetings organised in 
1999 (promoting competition in postal services, 
oligopoly, professional services, guidelines for 
multinational enterprises, enforcement priorities 
of competition authorities, airline mergers and 
alliances). The Commission took part also as 
examiner (together with Greece) in the review 
of the Hungarian regulatory reform in the area 
of competition policy which took place on Oc-
tober 21. 
3. Unctad 
362. The Commission issued on 15 September a 
working document (COM(1999) 451 final) with 
guidelines for participation in the 10th United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(Unctad X). 
363. The purpose of the working document was 
to help prepare the position of the European 
Union at the conference to be held in Bangkok, 
Thailand, from 12 to 19 February 2000. As 
regards competition, the working document 
stresses in point 23 that development requires 
above all the smooth functioning of fair and com-
petitive markets for products, services and other 
resources including credit, land and genetic 
resources. In this respect, it is essential to contain 
arbitrary action of governments against business, 
to combat corruption and to prevent the collusion 
between public authorities and rent-seeking oli-
gopolists or monopolists by rigorous competition 
policies. Further, the development dimension 
will also have to be addressed in negotiating mul-
tilateral rules on competition (point 35). Finally, 
Unctad should continue to conduct analyses and 
to provide a forum for debate at intergovernmen-
tal and at expert level on competition policies and 
rules, in order to raise developing countries' 
awareness and to allow them to share their expe-
rience. Unctad could in particular analyse the 
importance of State-owned and private monopo-
lies in emerging markets, the relations between 
investment and competition, the types of regula-
tion adapted to different levels of market devel-
opment. Unctad could also undertake analysis in 
support of the negotiations of multilateral rules 
on competition, giving particular attention to the 
specific needs and conditions of developing 
countries in this context. Unctad could carry on 
technical cooperation activities aimed at assist-
ing developing countries in the definition and 
implementation of competition rules and policies 
(point 54). 
98 OUTLOOK FOR 2000 
1. Legislative and regulatory activities 
364. The Commission will pursue the process 
ensuring that the Community's competition pol-
icy is applied taking full account of the rapidly 
evolving nature of the market place. As markets 
integrate, both in the EU and globally, it is vital 
that this evolution is reflected in the procedural 
and substantive rules of the Community. The 
Commission will therefore continue the revision 
of its procedural and substantive rules for the 
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82. 
365. In the area of procedural rules for antitrust, 
the objective of 2000 is to have the Commission 
adopt a proposal for a new draft regulation con-
taining rules on the implementation of Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC Treaty for transmission to the 
Council, which could start discussions of that 
draft regulation towards the end of 2000. 
366. In the field of vertical restraints, the objec-
tive of 2000 is to have the Commission adopt a 
set of guidelines complementing the new block 
exemption regulation adopted in 1999 and 
which enters into force on 1 June 2000. The 
guidelines will assist companies in the assess-
ment of their distribution agreements when 
these are not covered by the new block exemp-
tion regulation. 
367. Revision of policy towards horizontal 
cooperation agreements continues to be another 
priority for the Commission. Moreover, the exer-
cise is an important complement to the reform of 
vertical restraints and to the modernisation of 
antitrust procedures. 
368. In 1999, the Competition DG drafted revi-
sions of the current block exemption regulations 
on research and development and specialisation. 
In parallel, a set of draft guidelines setting out the 
principal policy lines for the application of Arti-
cle 81 to horizontal agreements has been drafted. 
In 2000, it is the Commission's objective to con-
duct extensive consultations with the experts of 
the Member States, industry, consumer organisa-
tions and other interested parties. 
369. The 1997 de minimis notice, which gives 
guidance on the concept of agreements of minor 
importance not falling under Article 81, will have 
to be revised to take account of the abovemen-
tioned changes in policy for vertical restraints 
and horizontal cooperation. Work is scheduled to 
commence on this review in 2000. 
370. In the motor vehicle sector the Commission 
has to draw up an evaluation report regarding 
block exemption Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on 
car distribution. The evaluation report will be an 
essential document for deciding on future com-
petition policy for motor vehicle distribution. 
577. As a complement to the above reform pro-
jects, impact assessment studies will be 
launched, the general aim being to improve the 
effectiveness of competition policy by measuring 
the impact of interventions by the Commission 
on markets and by identifying sectors where 
competition needs to be spurred. 
372. In the field of mergers the year 2000 will be 
a particularly active year. The merger regulation 
requires the Commission to report to the Council 
before 1 July 2000 on the operation of the thresh-
olds and criteria set out in the merger regulation, 
which determine the jurisdictional scope of Com-
munity merger control. The Commission may 
also take the opportunity to examine other 
aspects of the regulation including, in particular, 
the referral processes between Member States 
and the Commission (Articles 9 and 22). 
373. The Commission also plans to adopt three 
guidance notices which have already been the sub-
ject of widespread public consultation in 1999, 
namely a new (replacement) notice on ancillary re-
straints, a notice on the simplified treatment of rou-
tine cases under the merger regulation, and a notice 
on commitments submitted under the merger regu-
lation. The subject of remedies will also be the fo-
cus of a joint EU-US working group established 
between the Commission and US regulatory au-
thorities at the end of 1999. In addition the Com-
mission intends to develop formal guidance on oli-
gopolistic dominance, an issue of growing impor-
tance in the context of increasing European, and 
even global consolidation of certain industries. 
374. In the field of State aid policy the Commis-
sion intends to revise the guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection, the guidelines on 
aid to employment and the framework for State 
aid in the motor vehicle sector. Furthermore, it 
intends to adopt three block exemption regula-
tions concerning State aid to SMEs, for training 
and the de minimis rule. 
2. International field 
375. The ever-increasing integration of the 
world economy is creating an unprecedented  99 100 
interdependence between countries. In many 
industries, companies are competing in world-
wide markets, and are becoming larger and multi-
national as a result. The past year has seen a series 
of so-called 'mega-mergers' between companies 
based in different parts of the world, creating new 
corporations of truly global dimensions. In these 
circumstances, competition problems are also 
taking on global dimensions which necessitates 
ever-closer international cooperation between 
competition authorities in different countries. 
376. In view of the above and actuated by its 
communication to the Council of 28 June 1996 
('Vers l'établissement d'un cadre international de 
règles de concurrence'), the Commission will 
pursue a dual policy of continued bilateral coop-
eration with the Community's main partners and 
examining ways to expand multilateral coopera-
tion in the field of competition. Modalities for 
such multilateral cooperation in the area of com-
petition law could usefully be adopted within the 
framework of the WTO as part of an agreement 
which would also set out certain core principles 
to be contained in the domestic competition laws 
of the individual WTO members. 
377. In addition to these two basic objectives, it 
is clear that the preparation for enlargement will 
have a significant impact on the Commission's 
priorities for 2000 in the international field. The 
Commission will continue its technical assis-
tance to the countries of central and eastern 
Europe, Cyprus and Malta. The objective being 
to ensure, prior to enlargement, the setting-up 
and the implementation of viable competition 
law systems based on the principles and main cri-
teria of EC competition law and the establish-
ment of well-functioning and credible competi-
tion authorities. Special attention shall be paid to 
the adoption of State aid rules and effective 
enforcement of the rules by the State aid moni-
toring authorities in these countries. 
378. In respect of bilateral cooperation (other 
than in the context of enlargement) the main pri-
orities will be to ensure that the 1991 cooperation 
agreement with the US, the 1998 'positive comity 
agreement' concluded with the US and the new 
administrative arrangements on attendance are 
fully functional. 
379. The Commission will also implement the 
new cooperation agreement with Canada which 
entered into force on 17 June 1999. Concerning 
Japan, it will explore possibilities of strengthen-
ing cooperation. The Commission also intends to 
fully implement the PCA with Russia which 
entered into force in December 1997 and where, 
with regard to competition policy, it is envisaged 
to cooperate in the development and implemen-
tation of competition rules, in particular in the 
area of State aid. 
3. Supervisory activities 
380. In the context of enforcing the competition 
rules in the antitrust area, the main part of the 
Commission's work consists in dealing with con-
crete cases, be it notifications, complaints or ex 
officio investigations. The Commission will con-
tinue its efforts to focus its resources on the most 
important cases giving rise to major legal, eco-
nomic or political interest for the EU. This 
implies a sustained effort to strengthen and 
improve cooperation with national competition 
authorities and national regulatory authorities. 
557. The identification, prohibition and, where 
appropriate, fining of hard-core cartels will con-
tinue to be given the highest priority in the 
antitrust field. In a number of important cases, 
proceedings have already reached an advanced 
stage and it is therefore the objective to adopt 
several important cartel prohibition decisions 
with fines in 2000. 
382. The Commission is also determined to con-
tinue, as a top priority, with its work of eliminat-
ing abuses of dominant positions. Such abuses 
have the effect of limiting, or even destroying, 
the ability of competitors to affect the dynamics 
of the market or for potential competitors even to 
enter the market. Such practices are particularly 
damaging, since they lead to market partitioning 
and delays in market integration. It will therefore 
continue to be particularly alert to abusive behav-
iour by dominant firms and formal decisions with 
fines for infringement of Article 82 are likely to 
be adopted in 2000 in a number of cases, where 
the investigation is already quite advanced. 
383. Success in the area of liberalisation policy 
continues to depend on a strict application of 
Community competition law and monitoring of 
the liberalisation directives. With respect to lib-
eralisation in the telecommunications area, the 
main task will continue to be monitoring the 
effective implementation of Community legisla-
tion in the Member States. In the postal sector, 
efforts will be focused on the follow-up of the V — OUTLOOK FOR 2000 
implementation by Member States of the Com-
mission's liberalisation directive adopted in 
December 1997. The next step in the liberalisa-
tion process is a revision of the directive, for 
which the Commission intends to submit a pro-
posal before the end of the year. Year 2000 will 
be Year 2 for the liberalisation of the European 
electricity market, as monopoly rights were suc-
cessfully abolished in 11 Member States in Feb-
ruary 1999. The remaining four Member States 
are expected to do the same in 2000 (France, Bel-
gium and Ireland) and 2001 (Greece). The objec-
tive of the Commission is to make liberalisation 
on electricity markets a reality throughout the 
Community. The transposition of the gas direc-
tive will take place in 2000. The Commission will 
concentrate on network issues and on the con-
tractual arrangements concluded between pro-
ducers and importers, with a view to achieving 
effective liberalisation. 
384. Since many Member States intend to grant 
financial aid to electricity companies to make up 
for investments or commitments which cannot be 
honoured in a liberalised system, the Commis-
sion has decided to establish a guideline for the 
treatment of such stranded costs under the State 
aid rules. 
385. In the area of merger control, the main task 
of the Commission is to continue ensuring the 
effective regulation of mergers notified under the 
merger regulation by preventing the creation or 
reinforcement of dominant positions as a result of 
which effective competition would be signifi-
cantly impeded in the common market or a sig-
nificant part of it. Given current economic indi-
cators this casework is likely to continue to 
increase in the same proportion as in previous 
years, with even greater emphasis on the interna-
tional character of mergers. 
386. In the field of State aid, priority will be 
given to measures increasing the transparency of 
the Commission's State aid monitoring and 
Member States' State aid practice. The Commis-
sion will start to set up a State aid register. In the 
interest of increasing efficiency of State aid con-
trol, it will follow up more systematically its 
recovery orders concerning illegal aid. 
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